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

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INTERNAL DEFENSE AGAINST INSURGENCY: SIX CASES

by

Adrian H. Jones

and

Andrew R. Molnar

December 1966

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

ABSTRACT

The problem of advising developing nations regarding the maintenance of internal security in situations characterized by insurgency has confronted the United States Government in the past. It appears that this problem will continue in the foreseeable future. One method of obtaining knowledge concerning the difficulties involved in these situations is to review insurgencies that have occurred in the past or are ongoing. The activities of the internal security forces (police, paramilitary, and military) of six countries are selectively described, discussed, and compared. The countries are: Malaya (1948-1960); The Philippines (1946-1954); Cuba (1953-1959); Venezuela (1960-1965); Algeria (1954-1962); and South Vietnam (1954-1965). The following problem areas are discussed: (1) the designation of the central problem; (2) expanding the internal security forces; (3) maintaining public confidence; (4) population cleavages; (5) internal security forces recruitment; (6) collection of intelligence information; (7) insurgent terrorism; (8) guerrilla operations; (9) border and coastal access; (10) internal security forces organization; (11) internal security forces objectives and functions; (12) internal security forces methods and techniques of operation; and (13) population and resources control.

Research and writing were
completed in January 1966.

PREFACE

In the introduction to the book, The Blind Eye of History, published in 1952, Charles Reith states that "on the shelves of the world's libraries along miles of books in which the history of laws and lawmaking has been recorded, one can search in vain for a single volume which supplies even an outline of the means of securing law observance, although this is the primary essential of all communities."[1]

When the history of the world is perceived as a history of human communities it clearly reveals that man is not capable of living alone. In the resultant collective association the family becomes the basic community of man. The quest for security is a common thread running through the fabric of history. Individuals and groups unite in small communities in search of collective security and to satisfy certain basic needs, such as hunger. In the development and extension of collective association, families are organized as clans; clans then become tribes; tribes develop into races and in the process establish city-states and nations which build empires and become world powers.

Even small human groupings recognize the necessity for rules and laws in the orderly governing of the community. This recognition requires the establishment of some authority to assure that rules and laws are complied with. In communities of various complexities, there is also the recognition that some members of the community will not comply with the rules; such disregard for rules endangers the welfare of the community. Thus the community, in order to assure its survival and welfare, must find means of enforcing its rules and laws. Once these means are decided upon and established, their effectiveness is of overriding importance to collective existence.

Communities succumb to external aggression, climatic and economic catastrophe, disease, or the inability to secure and maintain observance of their laws. In reviewing history, it is revealed that more communities have succumbed because of the inability to enforce laws than have been destroyed by nature and hostile aggression. The weakness or absence of effective law enforcement machinery has been observed quite frequently to be the underlying cause of failure in battle. A community which cannot provide an effective means for securing the observance of its laws does not remain in existence for any extended period of time.[2]

Nations both past and present have used force as one of the basic ingredients for and the ultimate means of securing the effective observance of laws.[3]

During the period since World War II, individuals and organizations that indulge in the unrestrained pursuit of political power have systematized the

procedures, methods, and techniques of weakening and destroying law and order as one means of subverting political control.

This research is an attempt to provide information relative to the physical and moral forces employed by nations to secure the observance of law in situations where the environment is characterized by subversion and insurgency, and in which the weakening and destruction of internal security as it is manifested in the maintenance of public safety, law, and order is part of the strategy and tactics of subversion.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

SUMMARY

The world situation is characterized by rapid social, economic, and political changes. These conditions have created some problems in the maintenance of internal security for many of the developing nations in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. The situation is further compounded by the fact that Communist countries such as the U.S.S.R. and Communist China are attempting to promote subversion and insurgency in many of the developing nations in these areas.

The U.S. Army is involved in advising the governments of some of the developing nations on matters related to internal defense and can conceivably be called upon to assist them during any of the phases of insurgency.

Among the primary targets of subversion and insurgency are the internal security forces of a nation: that is, the civilian police forces, the paramilitary forces, and the military forces. If these instruments of governmental force are not capable of meeting the threat, then the government concerned cannot expect to be successful.

Although the civilian police forces are among the primary targets of the insurgents, the lack of police services or the existence of only inadequate police services is a significant factor in developing nations, especially in remote areas. This situation permits the insurgents to minimize their efforts against the civil police forces and to concentrate their efforts against other government agencies.

It is reasonable to assume that the best time to counter an insurgency is at the earliest possible moment and that the preventive approach to counterinsurgency may prove more beneficial and economical than remedial programs instituted after an insurgency has started.

In order to improve the quality of its advice, the U.S. Army needs more information relative to the maintenance of internal security in developing nations, especially during the periods of potential and incipient insurgency. One means by which this information can be obtained is to review recent or current insurgencies in order to determine the impact of the counterinsurgency effort upon the organization, functions, methods, and techniques of the internal security forces, and thus to discover the effectiveness of the operations of these forces.

Since World War II an unprecedented number of insurgencies have occurred throughout the world; many have been instigated or aided by other nations. The following six listed insurgencies were chosen for review: Malaya (1948-1960); the Philippines (1946-1954); Cuba (1953-1959); Venezuela (1960-1965); Algeria

(1954-1962); and South Vietnam (1954-1965). The insurgencies in Venezuela and South Vietnam were still in progress when this report was written in early 1966. The treatment of these insurgencies is intended to be selective and representative, not complete and exhaustive.

These countries are located in the three major geographical areas of interest: Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. Both colonial and noncolonial situations are represented. Two of the counterinsurgency efforts were successful, two were unsuccessful, and two were still in progress early in 1966. In four instances the insurgents received substantial outside aid and assistance. In two instances, those of Malaya and the Philippines, they did not.

The counterinsurgency efforts were similar in that all three types of internal security forces were involved. Military and paramilitary forces were always committed when the capability of the civilian police forces to maintain public safety, law, and order was exceeded.

In Malaya and the Philippines the civilian police forces were adversely affected by the roles they had played during the Japanese occupation and in the chaotic period that follows large-scale warfare. In South Vietnam the post World War II struggle between the French and the Viet Minh also had an adverse effect upon the civilian police forces.

Internal security forces in all the insurgencies encountered a multiplicity of problems. Some of the problems were similar across insurgencies and some were culturally and situationally specific. Most of the functions performed in the internal defense efforts were similar across insurgencies.

In all the counterinsurgency efforts, the internal security forces were plagued by poor coordination between forces, overlapping and divided responsibility, and rivalry between forces. In all instances changes were made in organizational structure, functions, methods, and techniques in an attempt to adjust the posture of the internal defense effort to the counterinsurgency requirements.

The similarity of internal security force functions resulted from a similarity of the problems involved. The structure of the various forces at the lower levels did not appear to be as important as the command and authority lines which, especially in the civil police and paramilitary forces, represented their involvement in the role complex of the political power structure of the country concerned.

Another important consideration was the government's concept of how the police powers of the state should be employed. In Cuba and Algeria the use of these powers was characterized by brutality and ruthlessness. In Malaya and Venezuela their use was characterized by restraint and selectivity.

CONCLUSIONS

After a review of six insurgencies and of available unclassified sources concerning internal security forces in developing nations, it is apparent that:

(1) Cultural, social, and political factors exert a substantial influence upon the organization and effectiveness of internal security forces.

(2) Many of the important factors are culturally and geographically specific.

(3) The developing nations are heterogeneous in character and should be considered individually and, in some cases, regionally.

(4) Changing conditions have made new demands upon government and have placed new obstacles in the way of the effective performance of internal defense.

(5) In many instances it is difficult to choose between recommending the continuance of indigenous institutions and ways of organization and functions and the introduction of Western ways. Many times the transition from indigenous ways to Western ways is disruptive, so that the impact of tradition cannot be ignored when recommendations are made concerning internal defense.

(6) The obstacle that most impedes assistance to developing nations is the lack of reliable information about the countries concerned.

Requirement

What is required in the counterinsurgency effort is a data bank of information which is oriented toward specific countries and specific problems.

Future Research

Future research should be directed toward establishing a classification system for the collection and analysis of information. Standardized structured interview and debriefing procedures for military and other adviser personnel should be established, and two other sources of information examined:

(1) Military police personnel who are advising internal security forces personnel of foreign nations.

(2) Personnel from the Public Safety Division, AID, who return from overseas duty.

In addition to the data collected on the basis of the information obtained, it will be possible to identify core problems and cross-cultural problems facing the internal security forces of developing nations.

CHAPTER ONE

INTERNAL SECURITY IN DEVELOPING NATIONS

Emerging and developing nations today almost always face a host of problems. In addition to internal conflict and economic and political problems, these nations are now threatened by internal subversion encouraged and assisted by outside nations. The United States has come to the aid of many developing nations by providing economic, technical, and military assistance. In some countries, notably Greece, the Philippines, and South Vietnam, there has been direct assistance to counterinsurgency programs. Assisting nations in situations which which have developed to the point where the insurgents are employing guerrilla tactics has proved to be costly to the United States. Current attention has now been directed not only toward helping to relieve the causes of insurgency through economic aid and technical assistance but also toward helping developing nations to protect themselves from internal subversion, thereby providing the stable environment necessary for orderly, nonviolent change and progress.

EXTERNAL THREAT

Within the context of the current nuclear stalemate, one threat to developing nations is Communist subversion. During the 1960 conference of Communist workers' parties in Moscow, the Communists issued a declaration which advocated a "three-continent theory" for the support of national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The basis for this declaration was the assumption that newly emerging and developing countries in these three areas of the world were most susceptible to insurrection.[4] The Communists do not claim to cause revolutions, but they do seek to exploit existing discontent and to capture indigenous movements.

In the Middle East, Egypt's Nasser assisted the insurgents in Yemen against the Royalist government. Egypt, Algeria, and Ghana provided aid and assistance to insurgents in the Congo. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) has supported insurrection in Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa. In Asia the Indonesians have indicated their opposition to Malaysia and have attempted the armed infiltration of that country. Whether by subversive decision or the process of social evolution, the developing nations are the targets of external subversion. Conditions in many of the developing nations appear to be favorable for potential incipient subversion.

PROBLEMS OF INTERNAL DEFENSE

The problems of internal defense are difficult for any nation to solve. The coastlines of some countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are extensive,

and in many instances their frontiers run through areas of rugged terrain, making them difficult, if not impossible, to patrol. The shipment of arms clandestinely from Cuba has been discovered in Venezuela; Egypt and Algeria have supplied arms to the Congolese insurgents; regular arms shipments from North Vietnam have been made to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

The significance of a safe area or sanctuary is evident from the experience in Greece. Once the Yugoslav Government withdrew from the Communist bloc and denied sanctuary and a base of supply to the Greek insurgents, the movement failed.

The Cuban schools and centers for subversion teach propaganda techniques, guerrilla warfare, and the use of arms, explosives, and sabotage. It is estimated that in 1962 alone over 1,500 non-Cuban students were graduated from these centers, from which they returned to their native countries to train others.[5] Individuals who seek to go to Cuba for this purpose generally hide behind a false passport. They travel to another country and there contact the Cuban Embassy or special agents. They are then provided with new identification and travel permits and go to Cuba to receive training or to transact business. Upon completion of their mission the students return to the second country and then reenter the country from which they came. In Southeast Asia, Laos provides sanctuary for the Viet Cong. In addition, cadres are trained in North Vietnam and are infiltrated through Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail to South Vietnam, where the cadres establish contact with the insurgents and in turn train local recruits in guerrilla warfare. Money can be routed through diplomatic channels or through normal banking facilities to real or fictitious business firms. Propaganda broadcasts beamed from outside a target country are difficult to stop.

Cuba, through Radio Free Dixie, the Friendly Voice of Cuba, and Radio Havana, beams Spanish, English, and French broadcasts to Latin America. In addition, it makes radio time available to such groups as the Dominican Liberation Movement, the Peruvian Anti-Imperialist Movement, and the Guatemalan Information Committee, which direct propaganda messages toward their countries.[6]

THE INTERNAL PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPMENT

The internal problems of developing nations are widely divergent and complex, for although the emerging nations may be new political entities, many of the problems date back for centuries. The major task of most developing nations is to provide a stable and secure political climate within which social and economic change can take place.

Populations within these countries vary widely with respect to race, language, and sectional interest. In 1965, in India, riots erupted over the adoption

of Hindi as the national language. In Southeast Asia, highland and mountain tribes distrust lowland and delta peoples. People from the urban centers such as Bangkok, Saigon, and Leopoldville are often considered outsiders in the rural areas of their country. In the Congo, the illiterate rural tribesmen look with suspicion upon the educated, European-oriented members of the Central Government.

Some of the developing nations have rich natural resources and with technical assistance can help themselves. Others are one-crop countries whose stability is greatly influenced by the fluctuations of economic markets. A very few others are truly underdeveloped, with little or no natural resources, and it is doubtful that any amount of economic aid can stimulate development.

Many of the countries have little background in administrative services, and have few literate individuals capable of carrying out such services. In some former colonies the colonizers provided the administrative bureaucracy needed to run the government. Once a country had achieved independence, however, there was no longer an effective administrative service. Similarly, in the military forces, the colonial government usually provided the members of the officer corps and recruited indigenous people as members of the armed forces. In some instances, with the departure of the colonial powers, military forces were left without an adequate officer corps and the necessary leadership. In countries which are organized socially along tribal lines, longstanding antagonisms work against effective action. In some countries, the military and police organizations are feared and disliked because of their past involvement in political matters and because of their role as instruments of force in sustaining certain powerful economic and political interests associated with the ruling elite.

To assist developing nations in internal defense matters appears to be a realistic and feasible approach to counterinsurgency, but it is difficult to generalize with regard to one uniform program for developing nations. Many of the problems involved are unique and must be evaluated within the context of the resources and development of the specific country concerned.

INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS

In some countries the Communist Party is legal and it functions as a regular political organization. In these nations, it is difficult to enforce anti-subversive laws until some overt illegal act is committed. The Communists organize labor unions, professional groups, and social and civic organizations. They form groups which ostensibly stand for humanitarian or patriotic causes and enlist the support of respected members of the community who demonstrate for these causes. In many countries they are the sole organizing force for change in the social and political life of the country. If a worker wishes to join a union he must join a Communist union. In and of themselves these acts are not

subversive or illegal. However, they do provide the political and military organization for insurgency and create social unrest. It is only in the overt period of insurgency—after an insurgency starts—that these groups are used to violate the law.

The use of subversively manipulated civil disturbances has added a new dimension to the problem of maintaining internal security. Creation of disorder will not automatically bring subversive groups to power; however, the vacuum which it creates often permits new organizations such as front groups and united fronts to seize power.

Demonstrations lead to riots and the creation of martyrs. Attacks are generally made upon the internal security forces to provoke retaliation. These issues are then used to demand the resignation of government officials and to promote armed insurrection.

In countries with representative forms of government, it is difficult to pass laws which permit search and seizure or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Many of these individual freedoms took many years to achieve and are held onto when the threat to internal security is not obvious. In the event of a conventional war most countries can automatically impose strict legal constraints upon subversive activities; however, in many countries there is no such automatic plan for combating internal subversion, and the legal tools for combating subversion come only after long parliamentary debate and often are enacted as separate acts. The formulation of a plan that is both legally and politically comprehensive presents many difficulties.

Conceivably, the U.S. Army may be called upon to assist developing nations during any phase of an insurgency. The opinion has been expressed that the counterinsurgency planner who desires to intercept an insurgency movement before it erupts into widespread violence requires, as does the commander in a purely military situation, a mechanism that will focus upon the major problem areas. He must then assess the causes, objectives, and capabilities of the subversive movement and analyze the courses of action which are available to him.[7]

The overall goal of the instigators of an insurgency is the defeat of the existing government and the seizure of political power. The internal security forces are a primary target because they bear the major responsibility for the maintenance of public safety, law, and order; without these instruments of government power, resistance to a determined and unrestrained minority is not possible. The civilian police forces or paramilitary forces usually form the first line of defense and are therefore a high priority target for subversive attack.[8] If a situation can be created wherein these internal security forces cannot cope with the insurgency threat, then military forces must be committed if the situation is not to deteriorate completely. Several advantages accrue to the insurgents. They gain in stature, and the power of the government to maintain order is seriously challenged. This indicates to the instigators that the

government may be vulnerable to increased opposition. Sabotage, terror, and the manipulation of civil violence tend to increase.

CHAPTER TWO

MALAYA, 1948-1960

SUMMARY ACCOUNT

One of the results of the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia during World War II was the complex military and political situation that it produced for the British when they returned to Malaya. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had been active in organizational work since the 1920's. Before World War II the Malayan Communist Party contained about 5,000 members and influenced some 100,000 people in front organizations.[9] The party was able to expand greatly after the beginning of World War II. The British assisted the Communist leaders in building up a guerrilla force that effectively fought the Japanese invaders. This force was called the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). There was also a civilian support element called the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Union (MPAJU). Both organizations were supplied with arms by the British and cooperated in the execution of British military operations.[10] During the time that the Malayan Communist Party was cooperating with the British, its leaders were making plans for eventually obtaining the independence of Malaya.[11]

During the late period of the war, the Malayan Communist Party engaged in planning which had the objective of developing the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army into a permanent armed force which could aid in the seizure of power after the Japanese had been defeated. The following strategy was employed: units which had cooperated with the British would remain open units; those which were unknown to the British would be designated as secret units and would remain in the jungle; large amounts of arms, ammunition, and supplies would be hidden for use when the struggle for independence developed.

Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, the MCP's demand for "self-rule" pending independence was refused. The MCP took advantage of the period between the Japanese surrender and the British return in order to establish a substantial number of administrative organs of a local character, and through these councils the MCP attempted to gain political control of many areas. During this period many individuals identified as collaborators and potential enemies were eliminated.[12]

After the cessation of hostilities, the Malayan Communist Party succeeded in dominating the trade union movement, being aided in this effort by its ability to use physical coercion, threats, and terror. Other techniques used were the creation of front organizations, such as the Democratic Youth League, and the infiltration of non-Communist organizations already in existence. One area in which the MCP failed significantly was in its attempt to increase its influence over the members of front groups.[13]

Although the Malayan Communist Party was enjoying some success it was experiencing internal conflict, and a fight for party leadership complicated the situation. In March 1947, the Secretary General of the party stole most of the funds and ran away and was never heard from again. The rapid recovery of the Malayan economy after World War II resulted in loss to the MCP of many prospective members.[14]

A plan to strengthen British central authority over the area by the creation of a Union of Malaya was not acceptable to the Malays. A federal system, excluding Singapore, was instituted instead. This system proved unacceptable to the Chinese and Indian minorities; violent riots ensued between Chinese and Malays.

In the early months of 1948, the MCP adopted a policy calling for an armed revolution against the British. In May 1948, the MCP went underground and implemented this policy of armed revolution by means of strikes, terror, and sabotage. The Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) was redesignated the Malayan People's Anti-British Army (MPABA).[15] A substantial portion of the terrorism was performed by the mobile corps, which was created from a secret section of the MPAJA.

In June 1948, the situation was so critical that the British Government felt compelled to issue drastic emergency regulations which included outlawing the MCP. This action was followed by a full-scale insurgency ordered by MCP leaders. The Malayan People's Anti-British Army was redesignated the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA). The other principal insurgent force in the struggle was the civilian support group designated the Min Yuen, meaning people's movement or mobilization of the people.

The Malayan Communist Party was originally recruited largely from among Malayans of Chinese ancestry because of their ethnic ties with the Chinese Communists of mainland China and of their resentment toward the politically dominant Malays. As a result of the deep cleavages that existed between the Chinese and Malays, the movement remained predominantly one composed of Malayan Chinese.

The overall strategy of the MCP was based upon Mao Tse-tung's concept of a drawn-out struggle consisting of three phases. It was planned that large areas of territory could be seized from the British and used as bases of operation.[16] The insurgency reached its highest point in 1951, when the MCP was able to plan and successfully to carry out the assassination of the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney.

In 1952 and 1953, the British were able to mount and sustain an intensive drive to check and eliminate the MCP insurgent forces. The British effort, which combined military, psychological, and political efforts, proved to be successful. By August 1957, the situation had been so successfully controlled that the British were able to grant the Malayans independence and admit the


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MALAYA

Federation of Malaya into the Commonwealth. The emergency ended in July 1960, with some insurgent elements still holding out in the jungle, but with the threat posed by the insurrection considered to be at an end.

HISTORICAL AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS

Apparently the activities of the Malayan Communist Party were becoming a threat to the internal security of Malaya even before World War II. For example, the party was well enough organized to promote strikes and to precipitate labor trouble by 1936. The inspector general for the Federated Malay States considered these strikes the most serious crises in the area's history up to that time.[17] Chinese rubber tappers, miners, factory workers, and canners participated in these strikes. Both civil police and members of the Malay and Punjab regiments were used to quell the disorders; the local police were hard put to cope with the violent demonstrations. The civilian police responded to the agitation of the Malayan Communist Party and its front groups by raiding headquarters of front groups and cells in an effort to break the hold of the MCP on these groups. Many of the arrested leaders were banished.[18]

Malaya is a peninsula which extends for a distance of about 400 miles from the southern border of Thailand to the Indonesian Islands; its maximum width is about 200 miles. Its total area is about 52,240 square miles,[19] making it a little larger than the State of Alabama. In surface configuration Malaya has a backbone of mountains which rise to a height of 7,000 feet. They are not particularly rugged, but are subdued to a general roundness and covered with forest.[20] About four-fifths of the country is covered with trackless evergreen forest and undergrowth. Tall trees form a solid roof which keeps out the sunlight. The rest of the country, approximately one-fifth of the total area, is composed of tin mines, ricefields, rubber plantations, towns, and native villages.[21] Malaya has a tropical climate and the weather is influenced by warm, moist air masses. Daytime temperatures in the lowlands average about 90° Fahrenheit and are slightly less in the highlands. Rainfall occurs all during the year but does have seasonal characteristics;[22] relative humidity is high.

One feature of Malaya at the time of the emergency was the lack of road communication. There were only about 6,000 miles of roads in the entire Federation of Malaya.[23] Many paths and roads were not marked on current maps, especially those in government forest reserves and rubber plantations. A rail net linked the larger cities together and also influenced the location of rubber plantations. It linked the tin mines and smelters with the port cities.[24] Numerous small craft plied the waters between the various coastal cities, towns, and villages.

In 1948 the population of Malaya was about five million. During the course of the insurgency that population increased to about six million.[25] Of the 1948

population, about 49 percent were Malays, about 39 percent were Chinese, and about 10 percent were Indians and Ceylonese. The small minorities of the population consisted of about 14,000 Europeans, 11,000 Eurasians, and some 35,000 members of indigenous tribes.[26] At the beginning of the emergency, the Crown Colony of Singapore, located on a small island at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, was a separate political element. In 1948 the population of Singapore was approximately one million people, of whom about 80 percent were of Chinese ancestry.

The population was more dense in the area of the west coast, where such urban centers as Malacca, Penang, and Kuala Lumpur were located. At the onset of the insurgency the population in Malaya was approximately 100 persons per square mile. The Chinese formed the bulk of the urban population.[27] No Malay State located on the west coast had remained predominantly Malay in population. In this area the Chinese were in the majority and controlled most of the businesses. Only two provinces located on the isolated east coast had remained predominantly Malay in population, probably due to the limitations on economic expansion.[28] The relationship between the hard-working Chinese and the more easygoing Malays was not good; the antagonism which existed between these two groups was to influence the maintenance of internal security in some interesting and complex ways. For example, the Chinese were conditioned by the recent Japanese occupation to cooperate with the insurgents through fear of reprisals.[29] This conditioned fear made it extremely difficult initially for the British to collect voluntary intelligence information from the Chinese segments of the population.

Because of its structure, the economy of Malaya was dependent upon foreign exchange. The extensive rubber plantations and tin complexes consisting of mines and smelters produced a substantial share of the world's rubber and tin. Malaya was, at the beginning of the emergency, importing about two-thirds of the food that the population consumed. The country was not developed industrially and most of the required manufactured goods were imported.[30] Prior to World War II, the standard of living of the population of Malaya was among the highest in Asia. At the cessation of hostilities of World War II, the economy after some initial difficulties recovered very rapidly. In 1948 the economy was characterized as good and improving,[31] and this continuing improvement had a favorable effect upon the maintenance of internal security. Many young Chinese who might have been tempted to join the insurgents because of dissatisfaction resulting from lack of economic opportunity did not do so.

Political control of the country was exercised by the British, who governed through local native rulers in a manner characteristic of British colonial practice. The country was divided politically into 11 separate governments. The nine Malay States were Johore, Pahang, Negri Sembilan, Selangor, Perak, Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, and Trengganu. Each of the states was headed by a ruler who

was allowed some autonomy. The rulers were aided by a Malay Prime Minister (Mentri Besar) and a Malay State Secretary. There was a majority of Malay members in each state council.

The settlement of Penang and Province Wellesley and the settlement of Malacca, the two remaining territories, were administered by British officers belonging to the Malayan civil service.

The Federation Government was the supreme authority in Malaya. A British Commissioner appointed by the reigning British monarch was the chief executive. There was an executive council which advised the chief executive. A legislative council, consisting of 74 men and women, worked to prepare the country for self-government.[32]

INTERNAL DEFENSE

Internal Security Forces Problems

The internal security forces employed in Malaya were officially designated security forces and consisted of civilian police, paramilitary, and military units. The security forces encountered and solved a series of difficult problems in Malaya. In some instances the problems were of such complexity that a favorable solution was not possible. For example, the Chinese Malayans were never successfully integrated into the Armed Forces.

One of the difficulties with which the British had to come to terms was concerned with defining the primary problem of the insurgency. Initially, the British Government had indicated that the problem in Malaya was one of seeking to maintain law and order.[33] There appear to be several reasons for this concept, among which were: (1) law and order is a traditional problem for a colonial administration, and all government agencies can be easily alerted because they know their roles; (2) the issue of law and order is easily communicated to the public without ambiguity and provides an excellent guide for individual and group behavior. These advantages were of limited duration, however, and largely disappeared as the struggle became extended.

The definition of the problem, stated as the maintenance of law and order, resulted in the Government's operating under a set of self-imposed restraints and precluded its using opportunistic measures which might have proved to be embarrassing at a later date. This legalistic approach allowed the British to demonstrate to the population that a change in conditions might be expected in areas where insurgent activity had been eliminated.

The objective of the imposition of law and order further served to define in an uncompromising way the one solution that the Government was willing to accept: the restoration of law and order and the establishment of a democratic process as a means for accomplishing political change. It also permitted the Malayan Government to maintain a high level of mobilization over a prolonged period of time.[34]

The recognition by the Government that the insurgency also had a political dimension, characterized by competition for the support of the population, resulted in a break with the narrow definition of maintaining law and order. The problem began to involve competition between the insurgents and the Government for the support of the population.[35]

Expanding the Internal Security Forces

At the outset of the emergency the insurgents were opposed by 10,223 police officers and men. The army garrison was composed of two British infantry battalions (the 1st Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry and the Seaforth Highlanders), six Gurkha rifle battalions, three battalions of the Malaya Regiment, and the 26th Field Regiment, R.A. There was also one Malaya coast artillery unit in Singapore.[36]

At the inception of the insurgency it was evident that the civilian police force was under strength and that some augmentation had to take place in order to allow the police to perform the primary function of maintaining public safety, law, and order. This augmentation presented an additional problem, as the civilian police forces were at that time just recovering from the devastating effects of Japanese occupation.

The trained personnel who augmented the regular police were largely Britishers who had served with Scotland Yard, some former members of the Palestine police who had experience with terrorists, former members of the Hong Kong police, and some former members of the prewar Shanghai International Settlement police who spoke Chinese.[37]

The total number of regular and armed auxiliary policemen reached an approximate figure of 100,000. The majority of these were Malays who were members of the special constabulary, kampong (village) guards and home guards.

It was some time before the British took action to strengthen the home and kampong guards. From the beginning of the emergency until about 1951 these units were largely ineffective because there was a deficiency in training and a lack of weapons. This shortage of weapons was due in part to the limitation of supplies and, to some extent, to the reluctance to issue weapons to home and kampong guards for fear that the weapons might fall into insurgent hands.[38]

The size of the British military commitment to Malaya was influenced by the worldwide commitments of the British military establishment. It was considered that the maximum number of troops which could be committed to the Malayan counterinsurgency operation was 40,000. Of this number 25,000 were from Britain. These contingents included royal navy and royal air force as well as royal army personnel.

MAINTAINING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

In Malaya a dilemma developed relative to increasing the strength of public morale and public confidence. The two basic objectives of the Government during the emergency were: (1) to increase the public's general sense of security; (2) to obtain a greater degree of population commitment in the conflict with the insurgents. If the public were forced to assume greater risks, this would serve to increase anxiety and thereby would increase its sense of insecurity. If the internal security forces could not guarantee security for all who were willing to stand up to the insurgents, the public could not be expected to actively support the Government against the Communists. As it turned out, only when the internal security forces were able to implement effective operations against the insurgents, thereby demonstrating that the insurgents did not have the initiative, was the Government able to ask the population to become actively involved.[39]

One of the critical problem areas involved in the maintenance of public confidence proved to be in the dissemination of information involving the activities of the internal security forces. There was some indication that the population might lose confidence in the Government if the people felt that they had more knowledge about the Communists than the Government did.

The battle for the loyalty of the Chinese and the other races of Malaya was considered so important that the Government called this parallel effort the "Second Front." Sir Henry Gurney, the British High Commissioner (1949-1951), had originated the policy of capturing "the hearts and minds of the people." Specifically, he saw a substantial portion of the program as being involved in the creation of a new loyalty among the approximately one-half million rural Chinese squatters who had to be resettled. His intention was to strengthen within this group a real allegiance to public authority and then to enlist the support of the group in the struggle against the insurgents. Sir Gerald Templer, who succeeded Sir Henry Gurney as High Commissioner, also recognized the importance of the "Second Front" and continued the efforts begun by Sir Henry.[40]

POPULATION CLEAVAGES

One of the most perplexing problems with which the British were confronted was the longstanding animosity between the Malays and the Chinese. This was one of the problems that the British were not able to solve; they did, however, use the interracial antagonism to some advantage. About 95 percent of the members of the MRLA were of Chinese ancestry, and the MRLA depended upon the Chinese segment of the population for support. Thus, operations to deny civilian support to the insurgents could be concentrated almost exclusively among the Chinese, as the longstanding hatred between the two races resulted, in most instances, in the Malays not being willing to support the Chinese-dominated MRLA.

One very interesting aspect of the influence of differences among the members of the population is concerned with the regional differences that existed among the Chinese population. The Hailams had emigrated from the southeastern Chinese island of Hainan, and the Hakkas were known as the gypsies of China. The Hailams, especially looked down upon by the more cultured Chinese, had a goodly amount of aboriginal blood in their veins. It is suspected that the resentment and hostility aroused within the Hailams and Hakkas because of their inferior status made them good targets for Communist propaganda.[41]

Recruitment

One other area that was affected by the cleavages that existed between the Chinese and the Malay population was in the field of recruitment for the internal security forces. For example, in spite of the excellent accomplishment of the Federation Government in building a closely knit and efficient police force, the attempt to make it truly national in representation failed. Members of the Chinese segment of the population were reluctant to join the ranks of the police, and appeals by the High Commissioner and leaders of the Chinese community did not change the situation. Responsible members of the Chinese community did express the opinion that the Government was right in its position that the Malayans of Chinese ancestry should form a reasonable proportion of the internal security forces, considering that they composed a substantial percentage of the total population. During the tenure of Sir Henry Gurney as High Commissioner a form of conscription was introduced. This approach failed to solve the problem, as it resulted in wholesale evasion by Malayan Chinese who apparently preferred to accept the risk of life in the jungle or in Communist China as alternatives to serving in the police force. This development led to discontinuance of the plan after a 2-year period. Chinese leadership in Malaya continued to prefer conscription to voluntary participation in the internal security forces.[42] This attitude was considered surprising; however, when examined in relation to the position of Chinese community leaders on other problems it appears somewhat more consistent. The conscription system placed the responsibility upon the Federation Government and not on the Chinese community. The Chinese leaders could more readily support conscription because it was being imposed by the legal Government.

Collection of Intelligence Information

The longstanding conflict between the Chinese and Malays also influenced the collection of intelligence information. One of the problems was that the overwhelming majority of the security forces personnel were non-Chinese; this, of course, made infiltration of insurgent organizations very difficult. This problem was modified somewhat by the use of Chinese detectives in the

Special Branch Intelligence. These detectives were all Chinese from the villages, who knew and understood their own people a. d language.

Insurgent Terrorism

The problem presented by the use of terror by the insurgents proved to be an important one in the attempts to maintain internal security. Coercion and violence were two of the principal techniques used by the insurgents in their attempts to achieve and maintain support from the population. The British recognized that to defeat the terrorists all members of the population must feel secure from terrorist attack, and that inability to protect the population resulted in individuals and groups cooperating with the insurgents in order to guarantee their own personal safety. One feature of the program for resettlement of the Chinese squatter population was that the villages to which these people were relocated served to protect them from terror, intimidation, and coercion.

Guerrilla Operations

The operation of guerrilla elements of the insurgents posed a problem which had to be worked out before the insurgency could be terminated and internal security reestablished. The tactics of the MRLA were typical of guerrilla warfare. Attacks were made upon isolated and small military and police units to obtain ammunition, weapons, and other supplies. Dependence upon civilian support units for supplies, intelligence information, and shelter also was quite typical. Several approaches to the problem were made: Attempts to obtain the defection of armed insurgents were successful; denial operations further reduced guerrilla effectiveness; hard core fighting units were pursued and the members either captured or killed.

Border and Coastal Access

The internal security forces were also confronted with a boundary problem. The border between Thailand and Malaya was patrolled by a police frontier force. The border area was characterized by deep jungles and high hills. There existed a mutual agreement between the Malayan and Thai Governments which permitted citizens of the respective countries living within 3 miles of the boundary to move across the border without the formality of possessing a passport. These citizens were permitted to purchase non-dutiable items of food in either territory. It was ascertained that insurgents were also crossing the border into Thailand for rest and relaxation. The members of the Malayan internal security forces could not follow them and the south Thailand police remained indifferent to the situation. These conditions, of course, worked to the advantage of the

insurgents. The boundary problem was modified in the latter part of 1949 when an agreement between the Malayan and Thai Governments permitted Malayan police to proceed 3 miles inside the Thailand border in pursuit of terrorists. In each instance the Malayan police had to be accompanied by a Thai police officer.

The long and irregular coastline of Malaya posed another entrance problem. Many small craft plied those coastal waters. The British Navy assumed operational control of all offshore as well as inshore patrols and was assisted by police launches. The primary objective was to intercept possible Communist reinforcements by sea and to prevent the smuggling of arms and ammunition into a country.

The British Government and the royal navy maintained that these patrols deterred the Communists from dispatching reinforcements from China by sea. Infrequently, however, small groups of Communists did land at remote coves and inlets.[43]

Internal Security Forces Organization

The Civilian Police Forces

The manual entitled The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, which was prepared under the direction of General Templer and published in 1952, indicated the organization and strength of the federal police force. It consisted of 25,000 regular police and 42,000 special constables commanded by a commissioner of police (CP). The force was divided into 10 contingents, each of which was commanded by a chief police officer (CPO) who was normally responsible for police work within one state or settlement of the Federation. Contingents were further divided into police circles which were supervised by officers supervising police circles (OSPC). These circles were themselves divided into police districts, commanded by officers in charge of police districts (OCPD). The force was divided into the uniformed branch, which included the criminal investigation department, and the special branch, which was responsible for political intelligence.[44]

The primary role of the police was seen as that of controlling the population in areas where it lived and worked. "To achieve this they must: (a) Gain the people's confidence and give them security; (b) Collect information which [would] lead to the disruption of the Min Yuen; (c) Reduce to a minimum the supply of food and other essentials to the enemy; (d) Patrol actively so as to deny to the enemy the populated areas and rubber estates."[45]

The carrying out of this role was divided between the uniformed branch and the special branch as indicated:



Legend

SAC	Senior Assistant Commissioner
A/OCPD	Asst Officer in Charge Police Dist.
DSBO	District Special Branch Officer
IO	Investigation Officer
SPO	Subordinate Police Officer
SC	Special Constable
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
SB	Special Branch
PFF	Police Field Force
PSSG	Police Special Security Group
PSS	Police Special Squad
ASG	Area Security Group
ASU	Area Security Unit
PVR	Police Volunteer Reserve
PFFTS	Police Field Force Training School
FATS	Federal Area Training School

Source:
Adapted from Adkins, E. H., Jr. The Police and Resources Control in Counter Insurgency. Saigon: Public Safety Division, United States Operations Mission to Viet Nam, 1964, p. 127.

ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE ROYAL FEDERATION OF MALAYA POLICE FORCE

(a) Uniformed Branch
   (i) To give security to the population.
   (ii) To enforce the emergency regulations which have been made.

(b) Special Branch
   (i) To establish the order of battle of the MRLA and the Min Yuen.
   (ii) To disrupt the Min Yuen.
   (iii) To obtain information which will enable the Security Forces to operate against the MRLA and armed units of the Min Yuen.[46]

By 1952 the police force had been substantially enlarged and contained about 9 times its pre-emergency strength. It was composed of regular police, special constables, and auxiliary police, the last two mentioned being used to guard estates. In addition, a number of jungle companies had been formed for offensive operations.[47]

Paramilitary Forces

The home guards and kampong guards played a very important part in the internal security effort, especially in the new villages where Chinese squatters were resettled. At first the Government paid little attention to this aspect of the struggle. However, the importance of the home guards was eventually realized, especially their importance in winning the confidence of the population. A retired British Army major general was assigned the task of reorganizing the entire system, and sufficient funds were made available for this purpose. The fact that the job consisted of building a staff and training 420,000 men gives some indication of the magnitude of the operation. Personnel with combat experience were recruited from Commonwealth countries to train the units, and they participated not only in training the home and kampong guards but also in leading them on patrols against the insurgents.

The intense effort devoted to the home guards was illustrated by the fact that in 1953 one million pounds sterling was expended in arming one out of every three home guards. They were also equipped for the first time with armored vehicles. When adequately trained, the home guards relieved hundreds of regular police from static duties[48] and played an important role in enforcing the regulations designed to deny to the insurgents the support of the civilian population.

Military Forces

At the beginning of the emergency the military forces stationed in Malaya were composed of six battalions of the Gurkha Rifles, one battalion each of the

King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, the Seaforth Highlanders, and the Devon Regiment, two battalions of the Malay Regiment and the 26th Field Regiment of Royal Artillery. In a short period of time a battalion of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers landed from Hong Kong and the 2d Guards Brigade arrived from the United Kingdom. Later elements of other British regiments as well as colonial troops in the form of contingents from the King's African Rifles and the Fijian Regiment were added to the military strength. Contingents of the royal navy and the royal air force were also utilized in Malaya.

Objectives and Functions

While it can be considered that the entire Government apparatus was engaged in the maintenance of internal security, the specific interest here is in the objectives and functions of the civilian police forces, the paramilitary forces, and the Armed Forces.

The primary objective of the civilian force was control of the civilian population. This objective was accomplished by the following functions: reassuring the population and providing for the personal safety of individuals and groups; collecting information about the civilian population; and patrolling actively to preclude the insurgents' access to villages, tin mines, and rubber estates.

The primary objective of the home guards and kampong guards was to deny to the guerrilla insurgents the support of the civilian population. In order to achieve this objective, the following functions were performed: the enforcement of emergency regulations such as those prohibiting free access to and egress from villages; and the gathering of intelligence information about those members of the villages who were cooperating with the insurgents.

The primary objective of the Armed Forces was to seek out and to capture or kill guerrilla insurgents and other armed insurgents who were aiding the guerrillas. The following functions were performed in accomplishing this objective: attacking insurgent communication lines; backing up the civilian police in villages and towns; and attacking guerrilla forces.

Methods and Techniques

Immediately following the conclusion of World War II, the Malayan Communist Party concentrated on gaining control of the Malayan labor movement and using this power as a weapon with which to overthrow the Government. By virtue of the ability to apply physical coercion, the party managed to dominate the new trade union movement. At the same time, through the infiltration of groups like the Malay National Party and the Malayan Democratic Union and through the formation of the New Democratic Youth League, the Communists attempted to create a united front against the Government.[49]

During the period 1945 to 1948, what has come to be known as the first phase of the struggle took place. The strategy of the Communists was to hinder the economic recovery of the country through a series of strikes. The success of the strategy was attested to by the 360 strikes which took place during 1947, 280 of which were on rubber estates.[50] The amount of violence and intimidation connected with the Communist effort reached dangerous proportions. For example, on September 21, 1947, the manager of a remote rubber estate near Rengam in central Johore saw torches flashing outside his bungalow. He attempted to phone the police but found the line had been cut. While the manager, unarmed and unable to intervene, observed, 10 Chinese dressed in Japanese military uniforms ransacked the homes of the plantation laborers. They succeeded in obtaining several hundred dollars. The manager of another estate was slain in ambush. Murders, ambuscades, intimidation, and robbery continued. On June 9, 1948, in Selangor, police officers started to carry arms not only on duty but off duty as well. The chief police officer started his force conducting surprise checks at roadblocks, and he further instructed the planters to purchase firearms for their own protection. The High Commissioner, Sir Edward Gent, called a special meeting of his executive council. He summoned all CPO's of the Federation to Kuala Lumpur and advised them of the proposed plan of action. The police were disappointed because the Malayan Communist Party had not been banned, but were pleased that they had been given powers to banish any individual connected in any manner with intimidation and violence committed in the course of any industrial dispute. On June 16, 1948, the insurgent terrorists murdered three Englishmen on a rubber estate and burned a rubber store. That same afternoon, the High Commissioner declared a limited state of emergency only in the Ipok and Sangei police districts of Perak and in some districts in Johore. The regulations that accompanied that limited state of emergency were relatively simple compared to the emergency regulations which followed.

"The police had special powers to arrest, detain, and exclude people from particular areas; to impose curfews; to search people and their houses; to close roads, paths and waterways; to requisition buildings, vehicles, and boats; to seize seditious documents and any article which could be used as an offensive weapon. Death was the penalty for the unauthorized possession of firearms, ammunition or explosives. Any person arrested under the Emergency Regulations could be detained for one year without a charge being brought against him, but he had every right to place his objections before a reviewing committee. No warrants were necessary for police to enter and search premises, or to stop and search vehicles or individuals. These were measures that were completely foreign to ideas of British justice, but Malaya recognized the need for them." [51]

The population demanded stronger action, such as the strengthing and re-equipping of police with modern arms. It also wanted more troops. The attitude

of the public was quite accurately reflected in an editorial that appeared in the newspaper Straits Times entitled "Govern or Get Out."

> We have no reason to believe that, whatever may have been the case last year, Sir Edward Gent has not done all in his power to act on the advice of his police and law officers in coping with the rapidly worsening situation of the last two months. Our heading today refers to the challenges that exist to the whole regime in this country—the regime which stands for peaceful industry and trade, law and order for all classes and communities and ordered political progress along democratic lines. Is it to be constitutional and civilized government? Or is it to be a government by the gun and the knife? This is the choice which faces Malaya today.[52]

The police followed up in the limited emergency by raiding two Communist controlled newspaper offices. By the time that nightfall arrived on June 16, 1948, all the rubber estates in the areas affected by the emergency had police or Gurkha escorts. The police had also been deployed to strategic points. Within 24 hours the High Commissioner was to extend the state of emergency to all the country. Police on leave both in England and in the country were recalled. The army accepted a request from the Government for assistance. The army further agreed to issue a substantial quantity of Sten guns to the police. Planters who knew how to use the weapon were also issued Sten guns.[53] A backward glance in history will give some idea of the characteristics of the police forces of Malaya immediately after World War II. During the period before the beginning of the war, the police of Malaya were largely made up of Sikhs and Malays. Most of the detectives were Chinese, supplemented with a few individuals of Indian ancestry. The force had a reputation for being well trained and efficient, with high morale. During the Japanese occupation the police were used primarily to put down resistance to Japanese rule. By 1945, when hostilities ceased, the once efficient police force had deteriorated. Crime during the same period had increased markedly. The police, after the war, were characterized as being of low caliber, without morale, poorly equipped, and poorly dressed; nor did they enjoy the confidence of the population, who tended to be hostile because of the suppressive police activities under the Japanese. The police were also practicing extortion. The force had just begun to feel the beneficial effects of the reorganization efforts in 1948 when the emergency was declared. Owing to the rapid expansion of the forces, several years were to elapse before they were properly trained. In the years immediately following the departure of the Japanese, this inadequate force had to deal not only with rising criminal activity but also with the ever-increasing violence that often accompanied strikes manipulated by the

Communists.[54] The police had been pushed to the limits of their capability by the Communist effort to subvert the Government by labor violence. Especially on the rubber estates and in the tin mines and smelters, police often arrived after the violence had been done. The Emergency Regulation of 1948 gave them the added power needed to cope with civil disturbances. Specifically, an officer in charge of police districts could, by issuing an order in writing, exclude any individual or individuals from his district or any part thereof. A meeting or assembly of five or more persons which occurred in any place whatsoever could be ordered to disperse by any police officer having the rank of sergeant or above. In this situation the police officer was authorized to use any force that was necessary to assure such dispersal.[55]

The main source of civil disturbances during the emergency resulted from the success that the Malayan Communist Party enjoyed in dominating the labor unions and in coercing and intimidating laborers into striking against the unions' wishes. That the Communist Party was forced into the use of violence in the fomenting of strikes and labor unrest was due in large measure to the fact that in 1948 many of the unions were becoming disenchanted with Communist domination. Legislation was introduced which prohibited individuals from holding offices in trade unions unless they had a minimum of 3 years of experience in the industry involved. Persons convicted of extortion, intimidation, and certain other crimes were prohibited from holding offices in unions. Only trade unions of the same industry or occupation were permitted to federate.[56]

The control of civil disturbances related to strikes resulted largely from the change in the "rules of the game," and this was accomplished by introducing laws which served to decrease and, in some instances, to eliminate the influence exercised by specific individuals and classes of individuals upon the labor movement.

The communal situation existing after the return of the British remained critical. The cultural and social differences between Chinese and Malayan had been, and continued to be, major sources of friction. The Japanese policy of favoring Malays over Chinese and Eurasians further aggravated the situation. The poorly prepared postwar police force was faced with rioting between Chinese and Malays when, on many occasions, longstanding enmity burst into overt hostility. The police were further handicapped by the force's racial composition in that the majority were Malays and Sikhs who did not speak Chinese.

The chief military officer in Malaya was designated director of operations. In 1952, when Sir Gerald Templer was appointed as director, he also assumed the post of High Commissioner, the chief government officer. This move proved to be beneficial to the maintenance of internal security, since close coordination between the civilian and military branches of the Government was made more effective when Sir Gerald Templer was wearing both hats. This close coordination was implemented down through the lower echelons of government.

The following account illustrates how a successful operation between civilian police and army units resulted from this close coordination.

The primitive aboriginal people living in the Malayan forests numbered about 35,000.[57] The insurgents made these indigenous tribesmen their unwilling allies, and this was accomplished by a combination of terror and propaganda. The knowledge of the jungle and of the methods and techniques of primitive communication possessed by the aborigines was very helpful to the insurgent intelligence network. This resulted in the internal security forces having to devise countermeasures to overcome this advantage the insurgents had obtained. The successful operation took place in 1949 and involved an area known as Tasek Bera. It was learned that the insurgents had subjugated the natives and established rest and training camps in this section, which contained a great lake and was surrounded by unexplored territory. The plan was essentially to have Tasek Bera occupied first by British troops and then by the civil police. The civilian police would have a mission involving three primary responsibilities: (1) protecting the aborigines; (2) denying food to the insurgents; and (3) disrupting Communist communications. The 1st Seaforth Highlanders were selected for the task of occupying the area while the police post was being established. An assistant superintendent of police accompanied the expedition, and this operation was successful. Contact was established with the local tribesmen and a police post and airstrip were constructed.

The collection and evaluation of intelligence information by members of the internal security forces was critical to the maintenance of law and order. The insurgents were no match for the government forces in a combat situation involving reasonably equal numbers. However, in order to protect their own existence the insurgents had developed an efficient and effective intelligence network, the information from which indicated the approach or presence of internal security forces.

In Malaya the majority of the successful actions both by the police and the army resulted from plans based on given information. In areas where the population were reasonably secure and where the methods used by police and military organizations for collecting intelligence information were efficient, the greatest amount of information was collected.[58]

Because of the fact that civilian police are familiar with the population in areas in which they operate, and because during normal operations the police utilize informants to collect intelligence information, they are capable of getting valuable information not normally available to military organizations. The British, it appears, recognized this fact in Malaya and assigned to the special branch of the civilian police the responsibility for producing intelligence information on the insurgents. Special branch staffs did not ordinarily exist at district level. Military intelligence officers did assist in the collection of intelligence information by being attached to the special branch at all police levels down to police circles.[59]

One system of collecting intelligence information, initiated by General Templer in the town of Tanjong Malim, was repeated with varying degrees of success in other areas of the country where substantial numbers of insurgents operated among the population. Soldiers and policemen stopped at each house in the district and distributed sheets of paper. The occupants were invited to write what they knew of Communist insurgents and their supporters, were assured that no one except General Templer would see their replies, and were told that they need not sign their names. After a 24-hour period had elapsed each house was again visited and each householder placed his folded sheet of paper into a sealed box. The boxes accompanied by representatives from the community were then taken to King's House in Kuala Lumpur. There, as the community representatives watched, General Templer unsealed the boxes, emptied the contents on a large table, and then inspected some of them. Although it was never made known to the public how many of the slips of paper were blank and how many contained unreliable information, the police were able, as a result of the information obtained, to arrest about 40 Chinese in Tanjong Malim who were suspected of being insurgent supporters.[60]

It appears that the success of this method of gaining intelligence information was based upon the fact that it was practically impossible for the insurgents to determine who had given information. This anonymity resulted in protection for the informers, a very important consideration for those who supply information to internal security forces.

In offering rewards for information leading to the capture or killing of insurgents, the Government followed the advice of some of the members of the Chinese community who suggested that if large sums of money were offered as rewards, informants might be induced to talk, and insurgents in subordinate positions might surrender and subsequently become informants.[61] The British did not under any circumstances prosecute a guerrilla who surrendered and was willing to help them.[62] One interesting aspect of the behavior of the guerrilla insurgent who surrendered was his willingness to lead members of the internal security forces back to his camp. He would readily give the password to an unsuspecting sentry, silently proceed to kill the sentry, and then would shoot his former leader in the head while the internal security forces captured the other insurgents present in the camp. The insurgent who surrenders and turns against his comrades is, of course, by this callous behavior protecting his own future.[63]

One of the most interesting phenomena in situations of this type is the behavior of the double agent. This type of informer is as old as the history of group conflict. In Malaya the double agent was a big source of information. He was attracted by the large rewards offered by the Government, but in order to protect his life, and in many instances literally to buy his life, he also had to collect information about the internal security forces. Then, in the event he was accused by the insurgents of talking to the police, he could always reply,

"Certainly I have, because I have been getting information about our enemies for the People's Army and here is what I have learned."[64] It is obvious that the internal security forces, in dealing with informers of this type, must realize that they are all either actual or potential double agents and that they must not be permitted to obtain critical information about the internal security forces.

Not all informants give information of their own free will, and members of internal security forces have often used various techniques to pressure individuals to furnish vital information. Because most of the insurgents were of Chinese ancestry, the police special branch of intelligence utilized Chinese detectives to good advantage. The following example is an excellent illustration of the application of some of the techniques:

> The police special branch, intelligence came into play here. They were all Chinese from the villages, Chinese detectives who knew and understood their own people and the language. They would select a man who they had determined was a supplier, but would keep from him the fact that he was suspected. Great care was taken to conceal this from him, and eventually he was turned into an agent. Now, it wasn't propaganda or any sort of social or political thing that turned these men into agents; of course these supplied the necessary background. This game of agents is the dirtiest game alive. To give you some idea of how one recruited agents, take some chap like this and build up the confidence in him. Then one dark night the police special branch man would interrogate him. It wouldn't be done in the police station; rather, the branch man would pull up his car alongside the suspect in the village—maybe between the coffee shop and his house—bundle him into the car, take him out to some quiet spot, outside under the trees in the dark, and interrogate him. Now don't for goodness sake think in terms of red hot pokers which are useless. Red hot pokers may tell you what happened yesterday but they will not make a man into a cooperating agent, which is what we are trying to do. This is possibly one of the most important lessons of all; this torture business is no good. It would be done like this: call it mental torture if you like.
>
> On the 10th of June you noticed a pound of rice, sewn into a false pocket in his trousers; on the 20th of June you took a pair of khaki trousers under his shirt, wrapped around his stomach; on the 30th of June you noticed a couple of

> flashlight batteries concealed in the frame of his bicycle. Now he, of course, denies it, says you have the wrong man, that it wasn't him, but he'd know jolly well that if the police had that much on him, they were on to him, that they would catch him if he went on and he would go to prison. So he couldn't go on. On the other hand he couldn't stop either, because, you see, if he stopped, the guerrillas would guess why. If they guessed he was suspected, the quicker they would cut his throat, and the quicker he would be silenced. And so he knew jolly well that he dare not stop. He couldn't go on; he couldn't stop! He was what you might call "on the spot." A very satisfactory situation for us. Now the one thing he could do, of course, was to scuttle away and join the guerrillas in the jungle. That, of course, is precisely what he would do if he had a brother there, or didn't trust the story of the police. But let us suppose that the police had chosen their target well, a family man, or maybe a man who wasn't fit to go into the jungle; maybe too old or sick. That man doesn't want to go to prison; he doesn't want to have his throat cut; he doesn't want to spend the rest of his life in the jungle. So he's really got one choice left, and that is to go on supplying the guerrillas so that they won't cut his throat, but tell us where he is going to meet them, so we can ambush and kill them. That, I think, in a nutshell are the basics of this sort of intelligence set up. [65]

The rewards were large because the informers had to leave the area after giving information. Chen Ping, the Secretary General of the Malayan Communist Party, headed the list of wanted men, with a reward of 250,000 Malayan dollars, or about 30,000 pounds, being offered for his capture alive. [66] The reward was related directly in proportion to the importance of the insurgent: four thousand Malayan dollars for the killing or capture of a rank and file guerrilla; 8,000 Malayan dollars for a branch chief; and 12,000 for a district chief.

The system of rewards worked for the internal security forces, because it was estimated realistically that 10 percent of the population supported the guerrillas for what may be considered good and honest reasons; not, perhaps because they were Communists themselves, but because they might have sons, husbands, or fathers fighting with the insurgents. People normally just do not give information which will lead to the ambushing of close relatives. It was also realistically estimated that about 10 percent of the people were anti-Communist. For example, the owner of a small fleet of cabs could, under normal circumstances, be expected to resist the lure of Communist doctrine. This

left 80 percent of the people not committed one way or the other and anxious only for the insurgency situation to end.[67] Actually the British were able to exploit the difference in attitudes that existed in each of the specific groups described above.

One difficulty that developed because of the fact that an overwhelming majority of the insurgents were of Chinese ancestry was that the police, the largest majority of whom were Malays, had difficulty in penetrating the Communist espionage system.[68]

It is interesting to note that intelligence information, gathered by the internal security forces and passed along to the executive branch of the Government, could not always be acted upon, because of other considerations. For example, in the spring of 1948 the Government in Malaya received reports from the police that the Communists were planning a major shift in their policy by implementing armed insurgency. Apparently the Government had good reason to believe that its anti-Communist program would prove successful, that perhaps the Communists were not capable of a serious armed insurgency, and that it would not be appropriate to overreact to the threat for fear of adversely affecting public confidence.

The following statement serves to emphasize the importance of intelligence information collection in Malaya.

> If we had had the police special branch intelligence organization at the beginning of the war that we had built up at the end of the war, then, of course, the thing would probably never have gotten underway. And, if it had gotten underway, it would have been dealt with a bit quicker...there is no better investment in a potential counterinsurgency area, there is no comparable investment, than a really good locally enlisted intelligence organization of really high class men, well paid, with good conditions to build up a really strong intelligence system.[69]

Population and Resources Control

Problems

A large Chinese squatter population existed in Malaya during the emergency. This population had increased substantially during the Japanese occupation in World War II. Fear of the Japanese, urban employment, and food shortages had caused thousands of Malayans of Chinese ancestry to flee the cities and to exist as small-plot farmers on the fringes of the jungle. It was estimated that at the close of World War II this population numbered about 400,000 people.[70] The Chinese population had been conditioned by the recent Japanese occupation to cooperate with the insurgents for fear of reprisals.[71] It became obvious that the

wide dispersion of the squatters made effective control measures by the internal security forces practically impossible. Members of the population, whose personal safety could not be guaranteed by the civil police, the home guard, or the army, could not be expected to resist coercion by armed terrorists. The squatters were so dispersed that the internal security forces were not able to ascertain just what these people were doing, nor how many were farmers or rubber tappers by day and insurgents by night.

Objectives and Functions

The primary objective of the population and resources control program in Malaya was to deny to the guerrillas their base of logistical support within the population. The overriding factor in deciding upon this objective was the desire to deny to the guerrillas access to food supplies, as food was the most difficult item for the insurgents to obtain. [72]

The new villages were located in areas where farming land was good. They were enclosed within barbed wire perimeters which were augmented by booby traps, land mines, and searchlights. The primary factor in preserving the safety of the inhabitants was the internal security forces. A police post was established in each village. The people of the village had to augment this police protection with a home guard.[73] In the event that these two components of the internal security forces were not capable of meeting the guerrilla threat to a village, units of the Armed Forces were available to back up the police.

One of the most effective techniques of population control instituted by the Government was the registration of the population. When the registration was implemented, citizens were required to report to the police station for photographs and thumbprints which were placed upon an identity card, one copy of which was carried by the individual, a duplicate copy being placed in the records of the police station. It was ascertained that the Communist insurgents had a widespread aversion to being photographed and fingerprinted, and because so many were reluctant this furnished, in many instances, the first clue the internal security forces had that this behavior probably indicated involvement in insurgent activity. After registration had been completed, if the internal security forces had reason to suspect that guerrillas were infiltrating and living in villages, it became a simple matter to check the population of the village against the existing records. [74]

The effectiveness of the population registration procedures can perhaps be more meaningfully understood if the Emergency Regulations Ordinance in which the provision is made is more closely examined. Provision was made for registration areas. The Prime Minister or the Resident Commissioner of any of the Federated Malay States was empowered to declare any area or areas within the state or settlement to be a registration area. The Prime Minister or

Resident Commissioner could then require that all persons or specific classes of persons within the area or any specified part of the area register with the police or other designated authority. The registered individual was responsible for the custody of his card and had to produce it upon a demand made by any policeman or other designated person. Failure to produce the identification card was a violation of law and subjected the individual concerned to immediate arrest without warrant. Such an arrested individual who could not prove that he had registered in compliance with the regulations was liable to deportation to the country of his birth or citizenship, or punitive sanctions were administered if the other provisions were not applicable.

Other important provisions were prohibitions against altering identification cards and against aiding and abetting individuals who violated the regulations. Police officers were empowered, with or without assistance, to search without warrant any premises, vehicle, individual, or vessel if violations of the regulations were suspected.

The proprietors of hotels, lodging houses, and other such places were required to keep a registry of guests and were precluded from registering people who did not have proper identification cards or other legally accepted identification if in transit.

The routes of entry into registration areas could be designated, thereby prohibiting the use of all undesirable routes. Vessels or vehicles suspected of use in violation of the regulations could be impounded, and, if the suspicion were justified, ordered to be forfeited with provisions that precluded legal redress. This pervasive regulation, therefore, served to control and limit illegal movement, ingress, and egress of individuals much more than was readily apparent.

The registration provisions of the Emergency Regulations Ordinance of 1948 are a good example of the comprehensiveness of the other provisions contained therein relative to the control of population and resources. No facet of the problem appears to have been overlooked. Provisions were made for the prohibition and control of the manufacture of badges, uniforms, and banners, and the control of building materials, arms, munitions, and foodstuffs. [75]

There were also provisions for collective punishment and the implementation of this portion of the regulations by General Templer became a controversial issue in Parliament. On March 25, 1952, the ambush of a party en route to repair a sabotaged waterline shocked Malaya. A police detachment which accompanied the technical repair team also suffered heavy casualties. The village of Tanjong Malim, located near the area of the ambush, now had a record of having 16 guerrilla camps in the area which were in all probability depending upon the village for supplies; 5 instances of successful ambushes; 5 instances of unsuccessful ambushes; 10 attacks on military and police patrols;

7 strikes which resulted from intimidation; some 6,000 rubber trees damaged; 8 buses and trucks burned; 2 trains derailed; 1 attack upon a Malay village; 2 incidents of damage to the village water pipeline; and 15 murders. In only three instances did anyone in the village offer any information to the police. The High Commissioner himself came to the village and requested information about insurgent activity. When none was forthcoming, the terms of the collective punishment were announced. A curfew supervised by internal security forces confined all villagers to their homes except for a period of 2 hours per day. During the 2-hour period, they were allowed to purchase food. There was a reduction in the ration of rice so that each villager would only have enough for his own needs. Questionnaires were distributed to every house, and the curfew remained in effect for a period of 13 days until the questionnaires, either blank or containing some information, had been collected in sealed boxes.[76]

If an individual or group of individuals who are exercising an unwanted influence upon the population can be removed from the population, their influence suffers a sharp decline and, in most instances, ceases completely. This is especially true of individuals who are influencing the behavior of others by means of intimidation and terror. Any police officer was authorized to arrest, without a warrant, any person suspected of committing an offense against any of the emergency regulations. The chief secretary could issue orders detaining individuals for periods not exceeding 2 years. However, an individual could be detained for an additional period of 2 years by the same procedure.

The banishment ordinance was effectively used against Communist labor organizers and later was used against alien leaders of insurgent groups. During the period prior to the declaration of the emergency in 1948, the threat of banishment was a powerful weapon, because no Communist desired to be sent in handcuffs to the Chinese Nationalist authorities who dealt rather harshly with these deportees.[77] The Government made a very concerted effort to rehabilitate insurgents who had been captured or who had surrendered. Special schools were established where persons in this category were taught to read and write if they were illiterate, or were taught trades if this was considered appropriate. Of course, these rehabilitation centers became the targets of the insurgents. The internal security guards at these installations were not so concerned with preventing the escape of the detainees as they were in protecting them against attack and intimidation Maximum efforts were concentrated upon insurgents who were not accused of crimes of violence. This group included recruiters, suppliers, and other such supporters. It is interesting to note that the Government offered to pardon individual Communist insurgents but refused to grant amnesty to the party as a whole.[78]

DISCUSSION

The account of counterinsurgency and internal security in Malaya illustrates the importance of the sensitivity of the Government to the problem and further shows the importance of recognizing when the designation of the problem should be changed to reflect the political nature of the struggle.

The Malayan emergency clearly demonstrates the limiting influence of situational factors. The rather unique geographic position of Malaya, characterized by its short border with Thailand and its distance from the mainland of China made any substantial aid to the insurgents difficult. The cleavages that existed between Malayans of Malay ancestry and those of Chinese ancestry influenced the course of events in favor of the Government. The hostility that existed between the two groups served to motivate and mobilize the Malays against the insurgents, the majority of whom were Chinese. This intergroup animosity limited the recruitment of Malays into the insurgent movement and the recruitment of Chinese into the internal security forces, thereby further polarizing the positions of the two ethnic groups.

The influencing effect of the cleavages between Malay and Chinese was also evident in the resettlement of the Chinese squatters. These people provided a substantial amount of the logistical support for the insurgents, and the denial of this support adversely affected the mobility of guerrilla units. This factor, and the inability of the insurgents to grow food in the jungle without making a clearing which could be spotted from Government aircraft, fixed the rebels in areas where they could be located and captured or killed by government forces.

The successful exploitation of group and individual differences by the British in their intelligence, persuasion, and reward efforts serves to demonstrate the universal similarity of the behavior of human beings. The situation which was employed by Chinese detectives to entrap the insurgent supplier is an excellent example of the exploitation of predictable human behavior.

Further illustrated is the favorable impact that the introduction of outside resources in terms of money, manpower, equipment, and supplies, can have. The British introduced experienced leadership, trained internal security force personnel both as individuals and units, and provided necessary equipment and supplies. The emergency regulations employed had evolved from British experience in such countries as Palestine and Cyprus.

According to one British officer who had served in Malaya during the emergency, effective intelligence units and well-trained internal security forces are important to assure that insurgency situations do not develop to the point of guerrilla warfare.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PHILIPPINES, 1946-1954

SUMMARY ACCOUNT

The events which led to the Hukbalahap insurgency in the Philippines can be traced back to the activity of Communist organizers in the 1920's. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was founded by a Moscow-trained Filipino Communist, Cristiano Evangelista, in 1930.[79]

Until the beginning of World War II, membership in the party was confined to small groups of individuals, a substantial number of whom had been trained in Moscow. The party had a considerable following among peasants and workers and also had the support of a few intellectuals. The CPP was outlawed in 1932, but continued its activities underground and through various legal peasant and labor organizations.[80]

During the year 1938 the party leaders who had been imprisoned were released and immediately started to infiltrate the legal Socialist Party which had been steadily increasing in size. By 1939 the party was operating openly, and by 1941 had succeeded in achieving legal status and was enjoying the rights of a minority party under the law.[81]

Immediately following the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the CPP pledged its loyalty to the Philippines and to the United States. The tendered cooperation as a unit was refused. When the Japanese invaded the Philippines the CPP would not assist the joint Filipino-American Guerrilla Command under General MacArthur but formed its own resistance group, the Hukbong Bayan Laban Sa Hapon (Hukbalahap) or People's Anti-Japanese Resistance Army. The Huks numbered about 5,000 full-time officers and men at the peak of their World War II activities in 1943.[82]

Following the cessation of hostilities the Communists were refused seats in the newly formed parliament to which they had been elected. After this rebuff, the Huks resorted to insurgency.

At the start of the insurgency the government forces were too poorly equipped to oppose successfully the well organized insurgents. At the height of the insurgency the Huks controlled about 12,000 armed guerrillas and 100,000 active members.[83] The Philippine constabulary, a poorly equipped paramilitary police force controlled by the Department of the Interior, bore the brunt of the campaign against the Huks during the years 1946-1950. The ill equipped Philippine Army, led by an officer corps which was handicapped by an inefficient promotional system, unorganized for sustained combat, was able to play only a minor role until 1950.

The Hukbalahap was redesignated the People's Liberation Army (HMB) in 1950 and consisted of the following three types of forces: (1) mobile striking units operating as a regular military force; (2) seven regional commands; (3) local self-defense corps.[84]

The Huks controlled an area in central Luzon as a "Liberated Area." It was not uncommon in Huk controlled barrios (villages) for the municipal administrators and sometimes for members of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) to be in the service of the insurgents. Other standard insurgent activity included appointing civil officials and establishing schools, courts, and tax collection procedures. In areas where the Huks were in complete control, the local population supplied food. In areas where the Huks were not in complete control, the barrio units defense corps (BUDC) had the responsibility for supplying the guerrilla units.

The majority of the weapons used by the insurgents were obtained during World War II. Supplemental arms and ammunition were captured from or supplied by the municipal security forces. There is some indication that some of the members of this force were apathetic toward the Central Government and that some were susceptible to bribery.

The insurgents maintained a special "terror force" within each guerrilla band. Some of the members of the terror force formed "enforcing squadrons" and took violent security measures against the local population by punishing offenders.

The name most closely linked with the successful suppression of the Huk insurgency is that of Ramón Magsaysay. Many of the countermeasures which he originated in 1950 as Defense Minister he completed after becoming President in 1953. The measures included the major civic effort known as the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), whose mission it was to rehabilitate and resettle Huk prisoners and their families. This objective was designed to get other guerrillas to defect. The program established in 1950 was, by 1954, highly successful.

The combination of military and civilian programs directed by Ramón Magsaysay became so successful that during the year 1954 Luis Taruc, the commander of the Huk forces, surrendered, and by 1955 the rebellion was no longer a threat to the constitutional Government of the Republic of the Philippines.

HISTORICAL AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS

The Philippine Islands are an archipelago which was named for King Philip II of Spain. There are some 7,100 islands located 500 miles off Asia's southeast coast. They are bounded on the north by the China Sea, on the south by the Sea of Celebes and the coastal waters of Borneo, and on the east by the Pacific


THE PHILIPPINES
Luzon Strait
0 50 100 200
MILES
North
Cordillera Central
Sierra Madre
Lingayen Gulf
Baguio
LUZON
South China Sea
Philippine Sea
San Jose
Subic
Manila
Pasay
MINDORO
Sibuyan Sea
CALAMIAN GROUP
SAMAR
Visayan Sea
PANAY
CUYO ISLANDS
PALAWAN
Bacolod
CEBU
LEYTE
Cebu
NEGROS
Mindanao Sea
MINDANAO
Sulu Sea
Balabac Strait
Davao
Moro Gulf
Davao Gulf
NORTH BORNEO
SULU ARCHIPELAGO
Celebes Sea
HPO, Jr

Ocean. The length of the island chain is 1,152 miles and its width is 688 miles.

The total coastline is in excess of 14,000 miles. Mountain ranges are located in close proximity to the sea in many places. The coastal plain is narrow and interrupted. The central plain located on northern Luzon is approximately 150 miles long and 50 miles wide and except near its center is only 100 feet above sea level. The greater part of southern Luzon consists of irregular masses of hills, mountains, and isolated volcanoes. The most densely populated areas are the plains located amid the mountains. These are the central plain of Luzon, the Bikol plain of southeastern Luzon, the Agusan and Cotabato Valleys in Mindanao. The exception is Cebu, where the coastal plain is densely populated.

There is a variety of climate with little variation in the lowlands but with marked altitudinal variations. Many rainfall patterns exist; however, the most common is that pattern having two pronounced seasons—rainy in summer and autumn and dry in winter and spring.

Substantially more than one-half of the total land area of the islands is forested. In these forests are found Philippine mahogany and other hardwood and softwood trees.

A number of cultural and linguistic groups compose the population. They are the result of the varied historical relationships that the islands have undergone, with local conditions also making a contribution.

The ancestors of the Philippine population came from Southeast Asia. From south China came traders, some of whom remained. Some Indian and Arab traders remained in the southern islands and intermarried with the Moslem population. Later came Western domination, first by Spain and then by the United States. When Magellan visited the Philippines in 1521 it was estimated that the population was about one-half million. It inecreased to about 18.5 million by the beginning of the insurgency in 1946. Over a long period of time there has been a blending of the various racial strains. The language of the islands is quite diverse; large numbers of dialects of a common Austronesian-type language are spoken.

The bulk of the population of the Philippines belongs to the Malay race, a subdivision of the great Mongoloid stock found throughout the eastern portion of Asia. Small Negroes, called Negritos and related to those of the Andaman Islands, came to the archipelago before the Malayans. In 1946 they were located in the Bataan Peninsula and in some other marginal areas.

There are about 75 linguistic groupings in the islands, and language forms the outstanding feature of various Filipino ethnic groups. Spanish was not extensively spoken and the decline in its use was noticeable after World War II. It was estimated that during the period of the insurgency about 45 percent of the population could speak English. Tagalog is the language taught in the schools.

The majority of the inhabitants of the islands belong to the Roman Catholic faith. The Moslem religion was introduced before Christianity by Arab traders. However, until the 20th century, the Spaniards successfully prevented the spread of the creed of Mohammed. Protestantism was introduced when the islands came under the domination of the United States; only 2 or 3 percent of the people, however, adhere to this religion.

The roots of Filipino culture extend far back into the past of the Malayan civilization with substantial influence by Spain and the United States. The family and kinship circle form the center of social life. There is an annual cycle of fiestas and ceremonies which lend color and meaning to daily existence. Corn, rice, and fish supply the basic items of subsistence.

In the southern areas, which are predominatly Moslem, the culture is characterized by strong political authority and follows the Islamic pattern; however, the bases of life in Christian and Moslem areas are similar. The cultural patterns of the aborigines have been little influenced by outside events.

The economy of the Philippines underwent some difficulty after World War II. The huge financial costs of rebuilding after the destruction of World War II were only partially aided by financial assistance from the United States. During this period large-scale development programs resulted in government and trade deficits.

During the period of United States domination the industrial development was devoted primarily to the manufacturing and processing of agricultural products. Thus the country remained primarily agricultural.

The heavy fighting which occurred during World War II heavily damaged communications and transportation facilities. In the postwar period, however, these facilities were largely rehabilitated. There were about 20,000 miles of roads in the Philippines in 1949. The Manila Railroad is owned by the Philippine Government and most of the system's 400 miles of track are on the island of Luzon.

Interisland shipping between the numerous ports of the islands plays an important role in communications and domestic trade. Some 3,000 small vessels are engaged in this local trading.

The Philippine Islands were a colony of Spain from the 16th century until they were ceded to the United States as a result of the Spanish American War. Under the United States the islands had Commonwealth status. During World War II the Philippines were occupied and ruled by the Japanese military. After cessation of the hostilities of World War II the United States granted the islands independence, and a republic patterned after that of the United States was formed in 1946.

INTERNAL DEFENSE

Internal Security Forces Problems

Philippine internal security forces at the beginning of the insurgency consisted of the Philippine Army (PA), the Philippine Constabulary (PC), and the civilian police forces. The Philippine Constabulary had the responsibility for action against the insurgent Huks. However, all three of the internal security forces were involved in the counterinsurgency effort.

The perception of the Huk insurgency by Filipino political leaders and the apparent initial failure to realize the magnitude of the problem were reflected in the actions of the President. The Huks were treated as a group of unruly dissidents and the initial campaigns against them were characterized by the use of terror by the internal security forces. There was an absence of any long-range and comprehensive planning and no unified program existed. This situation resulted in the introduction of inconsistent and ineffective stop-gap programs. Ramón Magsaysay, first as Secretary of Defense and later as President, recognized the problem as being influenced by the widespread dissatisfaction that existed in certain segments of the population. His comprehensive program was geared to the betterment of these conditions.

Maintaining Public Confidence

The confidence of the dissident elements of the population was a critical factor in the insurgency. There was a strong nationalistic feeling, but the oppressive occupation by the Japanese, plus other factors, had created a situation in which confidence in the Government was difficult to inspire. Some of the ill feeling resulted from hasty administrative action following World War II. There was corruption and graft connected with the payment of guerrillas who had fought the Japanese. Some loyal guerrillas failed to receive recognition of their services while others of questionable participation resorted to bribery and political maneuvering to obtain some of the generous supply of American dollars.[85]

The issue of collaboration with the Japanese further served to undermine public confidence. The question of what constituted collaboration was never resolved and eventually nearly all individuals were cleared regardless of the degree of their involvement with the enemy. However, among the population, resentment against collaboration was still strong. Because the first President of the Republic of the Philippines, Manuel Roxas, and many others who held government office had also been officeholders in the Japanese puppet government, the resentment was reinforced.[86]

Large numbers of the soldiers and officers in the Military Police Command, which was activated after the United States reentered the islands, had been

members of the Bureau of the Constabulary under the Japanese occupation. Still others had been long identified as opponents to peasant movements in central Luzon. As an example, the Chief of Staff of the new Armed Forces, Gen. Rafael Jalandoni had, in 1931, as a major in the Constabulary, arrested two famous peasant leaders on charges of treason. Thus many old antagonisms, complicated and given added meaning by the Japanese occupation, served to alienate certain segments of the population from the Government.

Population Cleavages

Although religious, linguistic, and cultural differences existed in the population, the cleavage that contributed most to the insurgency was based on economic class and had existed in the Philippines even prior to the arrival of the Spaniards. They found in existence on the inland of Luzon a native, agrarian-based slave-serf-tenant system, upon which they superimposed the encomienda system which was in use in Central and South America. The basic characteristic of the encomienda system was that the peasants did not own the land but occupied it as tenants and received a share of the crops they raised. This system continued, with the control eventually passing into Filipino hands.[87]

The social system of the rural Philippines, comprising over three-fourths of the population, included two main classes, the landlords and the tenants. The overseers and moneylenders were included in the landlord class. The Philippine Army and Constabulary formed a third group, which was conceived of as a neutral force to protect the rights of all citizens. However, because the political power was in the hands of the landlords, the police powers of the state were frequently used to maintain the supremacy of this class.

The struggle between the two classes took on a new character because of Communist and Socialist activity during the 1930's, with the Government and old political leadership being opposed by the organized peasants and workers. The same issues and the same leaders of this prewar period organized and manned the Huk resistance to the Japanese and directed the insurgency against the Philippine Government in 1946.[88]

Recruitment

Because the civilian police forces and the Bureau of the Constabulary had been used to maintain the Japanese in power during World War II, both had deteriorated in quality. The issue of collaboration made it difficult to find officers for the constabulary and the Armed Forces. This officer problem influenced the quality of the forces involved because the constabulary and the Armed Forces were plagued with organizational problems which could not be solved without efficient officer leadership. This problem was not effectively dealt with until

Ramón Magsaysay became Secretary of Defense in 1950. He reorganized the Armed Forces and the constabulary and purged them of inefficient and corrupt officers.

Collection of Intelligence Information

The peasants' sympathy for the Huk movement made the collection of intelligence information a problem of great magnitude. One of the valuable contributions of the counterinsurgency effort was the development of intelligence collection methods and techniques. Intelligence collection evaluation and dissemination came to be recognized as the keystone to the success or failure of military operations.[89]

The Military Police Command under the U.S. Army after the cessation of hostilities in World War II did not engage in any substantial amount of intelligence collection. The effort was further hampered by the lack of funds for intelligence work. Because there was no money to pay agents and informers, an effective intelligence network could not be established. The problem was further aggravated by the shortage of trained personnel. The lack of confidence of the peasants, who were adversely influenced by abusive methods of interrogation, resulted in difficulty in obtaining intelligence information and in erroneous information.[90]

The Huks, besides having the sympathy of many of the peasants, took punitive sanctions against informers. Therefore, peasants who had to remain in the Huk controlled and dominated areas had another good reason for not giving information to the internal security forces.

Coastal Access

Although there are 14,000 miles of coastline in the Philippines, supplying the Communists with arms and equipment from outside the country never became a problem for the internal security forces to combat. This fact worked to the advantage of the Government, since the Huks had only a limited number of small arms.

Insurgent Terrorism

The use of terror, coercion, and intimidation proved to be a difficult problem for the Government to solve. In the areas they controlled, the insurgents established an apparatus for controlling the villages and surrounding territory. The situation of having their loyalty demanded by two governments confused the peasants. One government was legal, but in these areas had little or no physical control. The insurgent government was illegal, but had partial or complete physical control and an enforcement capability. Those peasants who failed to

cooperate with the insurgents were often tried by citizens' courts. This amounted to the quasi-legal applications of coercion and intimidation.

At the high point of their power the Huks organized assaults upon villages to elimirate mayors and other noncooperating government officials. Many raids of this kind were initiated in the period 1949-1951. The insurgents at this time extended their terroristic activities to the city of Manila. Because they did not desire to alienate the public, the insurgents did not extensively employ sabotage as a technique. It was felt that the destruction of public facilities would adversely influence public opinion.[91]

Guerrilla Operations

The counterinsurgency effort had as one of its principal problems the elimination of insurgent guerrilla activity. The Huks had gained valuable experience in operating against the Japanese and maintained an intelligence network of their own to inform them of government activity. One of the factors which contributed to the success of the guerrilla operations was that the government forces initially involved in the counterinsurgency effort were not properly organized, trained, equipped, or led. As a result they did not make a favorable showing against the Huks, who were properly organized, equipped, trained, and led for the kind of hit-and-run tactics which they employed.

Civil Disturbances

Civil disturbances did not become a problem in the insurgency. The unrest was centered in rural areas characterized by farms and small villages. In Huk-controlled areas they were the recognized authority, and demonstrations would have been of no advantage. In the larger cities the movement did not have enough influence to promote demonstrations and strikes which would lead to riots.

Internal Security Forces Organization

Civilian Police Forces

There were several police systems in the Philippines. At the national level were found the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine Constabulary, while at the local level each political entity had its own police force.

The National Bureau of Investigation was under the control of the Department of Justice and was modeled upon the FBI of the United States. It operated primarily in the Manila metropolitan area; investigations in the provinces were limited by transportation facilities and funds. There was cooperation between the National Bureau of Investigation and the other police forces.

The Philippine Constabulary (PC), previously discussed, functioned as the national police force. It was primarily equipped and trained to handle large-scale banditry, insurrections, and mass civil disturbances. The PC was not trained in the detection of crime and police work. PC units were stationed throughout the island and charged with the maintenance of law and order. This mission was accomplished primarily by the indirect supervision of local police forces. When the local forces were incapable of handling a situation the constabulary could move in at the direction of the President, the head of the constabulary, or at the request of the local police official. There have been some indications that this power was not always wisely used. During the insurgency there was some friction between the constabulary and the local police forces. One of the causes of contention was that the PC was able to enter civil police jurisdiction in the pursuit of its duties without the knowledge or consent of the local authorities, since it had police jurisdiction in all the Philippines.

There were 27 chartered cities in the Philippines, and each had its own city police force. These forces, especially in the smaller cities, suffered from lack of proper organization, inadequate equipment, and insufficient training. The administrative control of the chartered police was shared by the President of the Philippines and the local mayor. The President exercised his control through the constabulary. The municipal police forces were composed of political appointees. They were organized along lines established by the American military government which followed the Spanish American War, and consisted of two line divisions, the uniformed service, and the secret service. The police force of Manila followed the organization, control, and other practices of the other chartered municipal police forces, but was better equipped and trained.

Provinces of the Republic of the Philippines were administrative subdivisions of the Government. Police responsibility of the provincial governor was carried out by two quasi-police forces which were the special agents of the governor and the provincial guard. The special agents of the governor were political appointees, and as such helped the municipal police to maintain order. The provincial guards were used primarily to guard the local jail.

The municipality, which was an administrative subdivision of a province, was composed of several villages and was the seat of the municipal government. The mayor of a municipality was responsible for the maintenance of law and order. He was accountable to the municipal governor and to the PC. The constabulary exercised considerable jurisdiction, making inspections and supervising the correction of deficiencies. Because the municipal police forces could not always afford firearms, these were sometimes lent them by the PC.

The barrio was the main administrative and political entity in rural areas. It was a subdivision of the municipality and the chartered city. A municipal or city councilor was in charge of a barrio or several barrios which composed a district. The councilor was charged with the maintenance of law and order.

Each municipal barrio and some of the city barrios were entitled to a barrio lieutenant. As the representative of the councilor, the barrio lieutenant maintained law and order through the supervision of the rural policemen who were untrained and unpaid deputized barrio residents. When the barrio police could not handle a situation the Philippine Constabulary moved in.[92]

The organizational structure of the Philippine police systems gave the primary position of power to the PC by providing for joint responsibility with all the other systems and placing the PC in a position to supervise the other forces. One of the most important attributes of the PC was that political influence was so minimal that it was not an operationally disrupting factor.

Paramilitary Forces

The Philippine Constabulary, which had the initial major responsibility for action against the dissident Huks, was formally organized in August 1901, to enforce and maintain peace and order. The primary mission was to rid the provinces of insurrectos (insurrectionaries) who were still at large after civil government had been established. In addition to its primary mission the constabulary participated in the suppression of murder, slavery, kidnaping, and cattle rustling among the Moros in Sulu and Mindanao. Headquarters were established in the remote mountains of northern Luzon to control tribal wars among non-Christian tribes.[93] After some organizational changes, which shall be discussed in connection with the Philippine Army, the constabulary had established a reputation as an efficient force on the eve of World War II. A few months prior to the beginning of this great conflict the PC was inducted into the United States Army Forces Far East (USAFFE). Two combat PC regiments were formed which took responsibility for security missions in Manila and in neighboring provinces. At the outset of the war, PC units fought on Bataan and were engaged in many encounters. During the Japanese occupation most of the members of the constabulary went into the underground. They fought the Bureau of the constabulary formed by the Japanese. After the defeat of the Japanese forces in the Philippines, the PC returned to active service with the PA. In connection with the reorganization of the army, the PC was designated a Military Police Command (MPC) under the operational control of the U.S. Army Forces Western Pacific (AFWESPAC). This reorganization was begun in March 1945. The primary mission of the MPC was the maintenance of law and order and the enforcement of the orders of the United States and Philippine Armies. Also involved was assistance to the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines in enforcing civil laws, though not in active combat areas or on exempted reservations. The MPC, pending the assumption of the function by the Government, took responsibility for controlling the entrance and egress of all persons, forms of transportation, imports, and exports, except those belonging

to the military and naval forces. Further responsibilities were to supervise local police activity and assist in the reorganization of the local civil police. The MPC was also responsible for guarding installations, prisoners of war, military prisoners, and collaborators.[94]

The MPC consisted at this time of 112 military police companies, which were activated by the Philippine Army and then assigned to the MPC for administration, supply, operations, and training. The companies were deployed as follows: Luzon Zone, 50 companies; Visayan Zone, 19; Mindanao, 43. Additional PA service troops, such as medical and signal units, were attached to the MPC. The U.S. Army was responsible for training the MPC. On December 16, 1945, the transfer of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order to the civilian government started. It was completed on about July 1, 1946.[95] The MPC was transferred to the Philippine Army when the islands received their independence on July 4, 1946. It was again reorganized as the Philippine Constabulary on January 1, 1948. The strength of the PC at this time was about 12,000 officers and men, which increased to 30,000 by the time of the presidential elections of 1951. The PC was then merged with the Armed Forces of the Philippines.[96] The responsibility for law and order was again transferred to the PC in August 1955.[97]

From its inception, the organization, discipline, and training were those of any military body. The military instruction conformed originally to the regulations of the U.S. Army, later to the Philippine Army, which was in turn patterned after the U.S. Army. [98]

Military Forces

The other force which engaged the insurgents was the Philippine Army. The PA had its beginnings in 1935 when the Commonwealth of the Philippines made the provisions for establishment in Commonwealth Act No. 1. The cadres for the newly organized PA were furnished by the constabulary. The total strength of the army was about 10,000, with the PC being reduced to a division of the PA under a provost marshal general. The constabulary, though now a part of the army, continued to discharge its regular police duties. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory, since the PC could not perform army missions and maintain civil law missions without both being adversely affected. In an attempt to correct this situation the PC was relieved of its police powers, but remained as an integral part of the army. The "State Police Force" was organized and assumed the police functions of the PC. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory and after the period of 1 year the "State Police Force" was abolished by the National Assembly and the PC was reconstituted as an organization separate and distinct from the Philippine Army.[99] On July 26, 1941, the President of the United States called into the service of the United States all the organized military forces of the Philippines and directed

that they be inducted into the United States Army Forces Far East (USAFFE). About 5 years after its activation, the Philippine Army was in combat against the Japanese and served with distinction. During the occupation by the enemy many members of the Philippine Army fought in the underground. As soon as the U.S. Army landed on the beaches of Leyte, Headquarters Philippine Army was again reconstituted and designated as the Philippine Army Section of USAFFE Headquarters. After the reconquest of the islands the PA was reduced from a strength of 250,000 officers and men to 37,000 by June of 1946.

Upon the granting of independence by the United States on July 4, 1946, the army was drastically revamped. The designation Army of the Philippines was changed to Armed Forces of the Philippines. Major commands were formed as integral parts of the army. Headquarters Army of the Philippines became Headquarters National Defense Forces. The Military Training Command became the Philippine Ground Forces. The Off Shore Patrol was redesignated the Philippines Naval Patrol, and the Air Force, the Philippine Air Force.

The Philippine Armed Forces were again reorganized in December 1950. The major commands previously established were abolished and major services were activated. They were the Philippine Constabulary, the Philippine Army, the Philippine Air Force, and the Philippine Navy. The Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines became General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines. General Headquarters Philippine Constabulary became Headquarters Philippine Constabulary. The Philippine Army Training Command took over from the Philippine Ground Forces the functions of supervision of trainee instruction, the Reserve Officers Training Corps, and the Service Schools. The battalion combat teams which had previously been under the control of the Philippine Ground Forces were placed under the Chief of Staff, AFP, who exercised command through area commanders.

The transfer of officers and men between the constabulary and the army has taken place on numerous occasions, with the PC sometimes being an independent entity under the control of the Interior Department and sometimes being an integral part of the Philippine Army. Even when the primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order was given to the army in 1950, many of the PC officers and men were transferred to the army. Those who remained in the constabulary still performed duties of law enforcement.[100]

Objectives and Functions

The primary objectives of the counterinsurgency campaign were cogently expressed by Ramón Magsaysay during the time he was Secretary of Defense in 1951. Interestingly, he placed the objective of restoring the confidence of the people in the Armed Forces ahead of the objective of restoring peace and order. His justification was that the Armed Forces, regardless of how efficient in

combat, would not be effective if they were estranged from the population and did not have the confidence and cooperation of the very people they were supposed to protect.[101]

The objective of defeating the guerrilla insurgents was very important to the overall counterinsurgency plan, but it was closely tied to winning over the guerrillas to the Government. Magsaysay did not forget that they were first of all Filipinos—misled and dangerous, but still his people.[102]

The functions of the constabulary and the army changed several times during the insurgency. The mission of combating the insurgents was originally given to the constabulary. When, on April 1, 1950, the Philippine Constabulary was merged with the Philippine Armed Forces as a major command, the primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order was transferred to the Philippine Armed Forces. The responsibility for pursuing the anti-dissident campaign was returned to the constabulary from the Armed Forces on January 16, 1956.

Methods and Techniques

The involvement of the internal security forces followed a familiar pattern, as has been indicated, with the civilian police forces early in the struggle proving to be ineffective. The role of the constabulary was initially influenced by its position as a national police force. When, because of organization and personal problems, this organization proved inadequate, the army entered the situation.

The Huks seized an initial advantage over the government forces, and in 1949 were able to attack almost unmolested. They dominated the countryside. Like well trained guerrillas they chose the place of battle always to their own advantage. The peasants paid taxes and provided shelter and intelligence information.[103]

For 2 years following the independence of the Philippines the constabulary, in spite of superiority in arms and equipment, could not successfully devise methods and techniques to control and eliminate the insurgents. President Roxas died in April 1948, and Elpidio Quirino succeeded him in office. Quirino decided upon a shift in operational policy and offered amnesty to all dissidents who were willing to surrender and give up their arms. An extension of the original amnesty failed to yield satisfactory results and the fighting started again.

On September 1, 1950, President Quirino appointed Ramón Magsaysay Secretary of Defense. The methods and techniques of operation were strongly influenced from this time to the end of the insurgency by Magsaysay, who was a former guerrilla leader against the Japanese. He immediately went into the field on inspection tours and promoted deserving officers and men on the spot. He also dealt firmly with the inefficient and corrupt, removing them from office.

During October 1950 Armed Forces operatives, acting upon intelligence information, were able to capture in Manila a number of members of the Secretariat of Politburo of the Philippine Communist Party. This fortunate event is considered to have been the turning point of the counterinsurgency effort. To give meaning to his belief that the population must be won over, Magsaysay organized the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) which provided for the resettlement of repentant members of the Huks.[104]

The program of the Armed Forces was called the Right Hand Effort and was envisioned as not limited to dissident campaigns. This effort also included campaigns against outlawry, piracy, smuggling, and other forms of criminality. The Left Hand Effort included peaceful means of ending the insurgency, such as EDCOR. The basic principle behind the campaign was "All-out Friendship."[105]

In 1952 and 1953 the methods and techniques utilized against the guerrillas were to make contact with these insurgent groups and to keep the pressure on them. These tactics proved successful. As the military pressure was increased, the surrender and rehabilitation program also became more effective. As the power of the Huks decreased, intelligence information from individuals in the population increased.

In 1953 Magsaysay was elected President and in this capacity continued to implement his all-out friendship campaign. The Armed Forces were so successful in maintaining pressure on the guerrillas that Luis Taruc, the insurgent leader, chose to surrender when his capture seemed imminent in May 1954. The insurgency was considered ended. Although sporadic fighting continued, it was not considered to be a threat to the internal security of the Republic of the Philippines.

Population and Resources Control

Problems

The problems involved in population and resources control had their roots deep in the history of the Philippines. Uprisings against the agrarian system had been recorded as early as 1662. These, and other sporadic outbursts, indicated widespread unrest, but they were poorly organized. The Huk insurgency also had its beginning in resentment over agrarian conditions. The problem then became one of removing the cause of the dissatisfaction by providing land and economic and social guidance for the unfortunate landless peasants.

Objectives and Functions

The objective of EDCOR was to resettle as many dissident members of the population as possible. One of the functions of the administration was to locate

desirable and unclaimed land, but this proved to be difficult. As soon as EDCOR surveying and construction teams started work, they were confronted with the claims of squatters and the ancestral claims of the Moros. Such claims were allowed, even though they reduced the amount of land available for resettlement. This proved to be of some value as it created good will for EDCOR.

In developing the community there were many obstacles to overcome. The administrators had to perform many functions, one of the most important of these being that of peacemaker. The main difficulty occurred among the various dialect groups within the new settlements.

The old class differences among the Filipinos continued to cause difficulty and the social makeup of the community reflected this old problem. At Buldon on Mindanao, where EDCOR 4th Project was located, the army enlisted men occupied houses at the entrance to the townsite. They acted as a buffer between the Moros of the adjacent village and the Christian settlement. The officers' homes were located on the main street facing the administrative buildings. Behind the officers' homes were the dwellings of the settlers. Recreation tended to follow class lines except during fiestas, founding day, and religious holidays.

EDCOR administrators often found themselves fulfilling the function that had been reserved for the landlord back at the barrio. Many of the settlers, because they were used to the role of inferiority, came to the administrators with personal problems. Considerable confusion resulted when the administrators refused to react like benevolent representatives of the landed aristocracy but insisted on a policy of self-help.[106]

Methods and Techniques

Many of the settlers came from the flatlands of central Luzon and the coastal plains of Panay. To these farmers, clearing land was a new and disappointing task. Special allowances were given for the clearing of the land. The settlers were mixed from different areas for the obvious reason that former Huks from the same area might be inclined to resume their activity. Military units were assigned to the settlements and served in a dual capacity of aiding in the administration of the camp and in furnishing protection. The background of the bulk of the settlers precluded the Government from organizing them into self-defense units. This decision not to allow the settlers to have firearms proved to be a point of contention, since some of the settlers felt that they needed at least shotguns to protect their crops from wild pigs and monkeys. Nevertheless, the number of successes at EDCOR resettlement areas was remarkable.

From the initial experience EDCOR evolved the following principles:[107]

(1) The land should be thoroughly inspected and all squatters removed, or their claims should be adjusted before the settlement begins.

(2) The townsite should cover about 80 hectares (about 200 acres) and be located centrally where all farm roads converge.

(3) There should be a landing strip for L-5 aircraft within the project in order to provide contact with the nearest military establishment.

(4) The survey of the farm lots into 6-hectare (about 14 acres) plots should be completed before the settlers arrive.

(5) Settlers should be carefully screened to find those suited for farm life. They should be told that they will have to clear land covered by forests. All arrangements should be understood correctly from the beginning.

(6) The engineers should first ensure a safe water supply and construct a power plant for electric lights.

(7) A dispensary and medical service should be established immediately.

(8) Settlers should be granted a ration but with the clear understanding that it must be paid back.

(9) Money crops such as abaca and coffee should be planted in addition to rice and corn.

(10) When all settlers have acquired land titles, any indebtedness should be turned over to the Philippine National Bank for collection.

(11) Army personnel should be used in opening settlements for several reasons: (a) the problem of security on the frontier is a military policing job; (b) a working army is less expensive in the long run than a "standing" army; and (c) the army's system of accounting and discipline leads to rapid and efficient progress.

(12) Personnel assigned to EDCOR should be officers and men who have volunteered and who are inspired by missionary zeal for the job.

One of the essentials of successful resettlement under pioneering conditions was the security of life through adequate police protection.

The main effort in resources control was in the control of firearms. As far back as 1949, regulations were in effect which governed the carrying of firearms. Unless special permission was indicated, the firearms were not to be carried outside the house. Special provisions were made for the surrender of firearms upon termination of license, revocation of license, or the death or disability of the licensee. There was also a provision for a yearly inspection of firearms.

There were stiff penalties ranging from 1 to 5 years in prison for illegal possession of pistols, and from 5 to 10 years' imprisonment for the illegal possession of a rifle. [108]

Another technique employed by the Government was to offer rewards to individuals turning in weapons. Because of the reward feature and freedom from prosecution, this proved to be an effective measure.

One of the techniques employed in the control of the population was to take group photographs of the inhabitants of a village; then, when suspected insurgents were thought to be in the area, everyone in the village was rounded up and checked against the group photo.

DISCUSSION

The Huk rebellion in the Philippines illustrates the devastating influence that the chaotic conditions of a postwar situation can have upon internal security. The issue of collaboration with the Japanese during their wartime occupation extended to almost every facet of life. This issue was particularly salient in the internal security forces, where accusations of collaboration limited the effectiveness of members of the civilian police forces, the constabulary, and the Armed Forces.

This account also demonstrates the importance of tradition and organization in the effectiveness of internal security forces. The organization of the Philippine police systems reflects the power structure of the country. The dominant role accorded the constabulary permitted the development of an elite force characterized by efficiency and the lack of susceptibility to political influence. The civilian police forces, especially of the smaller municipalities, were traditionally composed of political appointees, were vulnerable to political pressure, and were characterized by inadequate training and equipment.

The Philippine experience is excellent as an example of the influence of one individual upon the public confidence of the population. Ramón Magsaysay's favorable impact upon the dissident segments of the population was a critical factor in the favorable resolution of the insurgency.

Also impressive is the persistence of one of the underlying causes of the conflict. The land distribution problem, it has been pointed out, predated Spanish rule and persisted through U.S. control. The durability of this problem is deeply rooted in the cultural, social, economic, and political structure of the country.

The efforts of the Government to adjust the internal defense posture to the situation is evident in the reorganizations and changes in responsibility which took place in the constabulary and military forces, with the primary responsibility for combating the insurgents being held sometimes by the constabulary and sometimes by the army.

In a situation where the supply of weapons available to the insurgents was restricted, the regulations for the sale and possession of firearms were particularly effective in controlling and limiting the population's access to weapons. These regulations were complemented by a system of rewards for weapons turned in to the Government.

CHAPTER FOUR

CUBA, 1953-1959

SUMMARY ACCOUNT

The revolution which has been termed the Castro revolution (1953-59) perhaps had its real beginning with the overthrow of the regime of President Gerardo Machado in 1933. The start of the new era also marked the rise of a former army sergeant, Fulgencio Batista, to power. From 1933 until 1940 Batista controlled Cuba through his handpicked presidents. He assumed the presidency himself during the World War II years of 1940-1944. After the completion of his term, Batista retired to Florida. In March 1952, he decided to return to Cuba and to campaign for the office of president.[109] The preelection polls indicated that he had little chance of winning the election. By accusing the opposition of planning a coup and conspiring with army officers, Batista staged his own bloodless coup and returned to power on March 10, 1953.[110]

Conditions appeared to have become stabilized. However, the opposition to Batista's seizure of power grew. The opposition was centered among the students and intellectuals.[111] The initial revolt against Batista was on July 26, 1953, when, with about 165 supporters, Fidel Castro, a young lawyer, mounted a suicidal attack upon the Moncada army post located in Santiago, Cuba. Fidel Castro and his few surviving followers were sentenced to prison.

In 1954, in an attempt to legitimatize his position, Batista permitted elections to be held and was elected president. Opposition to the regime continued to grow. Castro was released from prison as a result of a general amnesty, with the qualification that he go into voluntary exile. Castro complied with the provisions of his release. His exile in the United States and Mexico was characterized by continued plotting to overthrow the Batista regime. His time was consumed in a continuous search for recruits and for financial and political support. Castro's new revolutionary movement took its designation from the date of the ill-fated attack upon the Moncada army post. It became the 26th of July Movement, often called simply M-26.

Much of the credit for the later success of the insurgent effort is often attributed to the secret training given to a volunteer invasion force—composed of Castro and some of his adherents—by Gen. Alberto Bayo, a Spanish Civil War veteran who fought in the Republican Armed Forces in the late thirties. Instruction in the use of modern weapons, physical conditioning, guerrilla tactics, and sabotage was augmented by nationalist indoctrination and psychological motivation.[112] Raúl Castro, Fidel's brother, and an Argentinian revolutionary, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, participated in Bayo's training program.

After some delays at sea, the insurgents led by Castro landed in Cuba on December 2, 1956. They missed their designated landing beach and were soon discovered by the Cuban Army. The 82 members of the invasion force were reduced to 12. Castro, his brother Raúl, and "Che" Guevara were among the survivors. They escaped into the Sierra Maestra.[113]

The Batista regime continued to become more repressive, and opposition among the population increased. In July 1958, an agreement was concluded between Fidel Castro, representing the 26th of July Movement, and various other organizations representing the opposition.[114]

Castro, aided by the support of the peasants in the Sierra Maestra area who were loyal to the insurgents, was able to establish a secure base of guerrilla operations. The peasants supplied food, intelligence, and new recruits.[115] Guerrilla tactics consisted of such standard insurgent activities as attacking small government patrols, assaulting small garrisons, ambushing relief columns, sabotage, and other calculated acts of violence. The objective of these tactics was to weaken and destroy the internal security of the country.

The insurgents suffered some setbacks both in their guerrilla operations and in some related operations such as the general strike of April 1958. In order to offset these reverses, Castro ordered increased activity in such areas as terrorism, assassination, and sabotage.

During the middle and later months of 1958 the insurgents continued to gain popular support. Batista responded with more brutal retaliatory measures in his effort to retain his control of the government apparatus. Batista's downfall occurred in much the same manner as President Gerardo Machado's had some 25 years earlier. The final influencing factor was the withdrawal of support by the three strong pillars upon which the Batista government rested. They were the army, organized labor, and the conservative elements.[116]

In November 1958 the situation was chaotic. The guerrillas threatened the countryside and the terrorists in the cities pinned down great numbers of internal security forces. High-ranking army officials indicated a willingness to talk, and some of the regular army commanders went over to the insurgents.[117] Batista and his cabinet fled the country and the insurgent underground took over Havana on January 1, 1959. Castro captivated the Cuban people and rapidly consolidated his hold upon the Government.

HISTORICAL AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS

Cuba is the largest and most westerly of the Caribbean Islands. It is about the size of the State of Pennsylvania, with a land area of about 45,000 square miles. The population at the end of the insurgency was 6,744,000. Cuba is located only 98 miles from the Florida Keys and occupies a strategic position, as it commands the sea approaches to western Florida, the Mississippi Valley, and Mexico.


Gulf of Mexico
LA HAVANA
MATANZAS
Havana
Matanzas
Sierra del Rosario
Sierra de los Organos
Cardenas
LAS VI
Pinar del Rio
San Diego
Ensenada de la Broa
Cienaga de Zapata
Golfo de Guanahacabibes
Golfo de Batabano
Zapata Peninsula
Hanabana
Santa Clara
Cienfuegos
Peninsula de Guanahacabibes
PINAR DEL RIO
Bahia de Cochinos
Banco de los Jardines
ISLE OF PINES
(LA HABANA)
JARDINES DE LA
Caribbean Sea
North
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National capital
Camaguey Province capital
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
FLORIDA
Gulf of Mexico
BAHAMA ISLANDS
Atlantic Ocean
CUBA
Caribbean Sea
Windward Passage
HAITI
HISPANIOLA
JAMAICA
VILLAS
CAYO COCO
CAYO ROMANO
CAMAGUEY
Camaguey
Sierra de Nipe
ORIENTE
Bahia de Nipe
Sierra del Cristal
Cuchillas de Toar
Manzanillo
Guantanamo
Sierra Maestra
Santiago de Cuba
U.S. NAVAL BASE
Windward Passage
E LA REINA
North
60 80 100
MILES
CUBA
HPO, Jr

Cuba is bounded on the northwest by the Gulf of Mexico, on the north by the Straits of Florida, and on the northeast by the old Bahama Channel which separates it from the Bahama Islands. Haiti is 48 miles away across the Windward Passage. Eighty-seven miles to the south lies Jamaica. One hundred and thirty miles to the west lies Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula.

Cuba, one of the most densely populated countries in Latin America, is fertile and endowed with many natural resources. It has produced some of the highest per acre sugar yields in the world. The mountains contain rich deposits of iron, nickel, copper, chrome, and manganese. The economic development, however, has not kept pace with the demands of the growing population.

The economy has an agricultural base, yet is highly urbanized. In 1953, about 57 percent of the population lived in urban areas. Twenty percent of the population was located in Havana. Most of the settlements were located around the sugar mills which form the center of the rural economy.

The surface of Cuba is about 60 percent flat or undulating and about 40 percent mountainous. Large areas of the country consist of valleys and rolling plains which were previously covered with heavy timber but are now primarily devoted to growing sugarcane. The most important mountain ranges are the Sierra Maestra in the east, the Sierra de Trinidad in the center, and the Sierra de los Organos and Sierra del Rosario in the west. With the exceptions of the higher mountainous areas the climate is essentially uniform, with a mean winter temperature of 77° F. and a mean summer temperature of 80° F. The existing patterns of settlement are characterized by the growing of sugarcane; to a smaller extent, coffee growing and livestock raising are possible in most parts of the country.

The population is composed of peoples of varied ethnic origins, most of whom came to Cuba as immigrants. The 1953 census reported a total population of 5,829,029. Of this number, 72.8 percent were classified as white, 12.4 percent as black, and 14.5 percent as mestizo or mixed, and 0.3 percent as yellow. Intermarriage among the various groups has been common. The racial classification based upon the subjective impression of census takers differs to some extent from other estimates. One estimate indicates 20 percent mestizo, 49 percent Negroid and 1 percent oriental. Most of the white population is of Spanish extraction. Those who are of recent Spanish extraction continue to think of themselves as Spaniards and are not called criollo, a term used to describe someone of native origin, usually of mixed blood.

The traditional social order prior to the insurgent victory was based upon the division of the society into upper and lower classes characterized by access of the upper classes to political authority and capital resources. A middle class existed, although it was neither large nor influential.

About 85 percent of the people of Cuba are nominally members of the Roman Catholic Church. However, only about 10 percent are active; and in practice

perhaps 25 percent are agnostics. The church and state have been separated only during the 20th century; however, the church never had the influence in Cuba that it had attained in other Latin American countries.

The church has acquired a poor reputation traceable to the corruption and antipopular policies of the 19th century. The general popular attitude toward the church ranges from indifference to active hostility. The leaders of revolutionary movements have traditionally made the church a major target.

The Cuban economy between 1925 and 1958 showed very little growth and was tied to the fluctuating demands of the sugar industry. In 1953, more than 2 million persons comprised the labor force. Of this number, about 800,000 were engaged in agricultural occupations, with 500,000 of these individuals being employed in the sugar industry. Because all but a small number of the agricultural workers were accustomed either to working for wages or producing for the market, the large agricultural labor force did not represent a sizable peasant or farming group. Employment throughout the economy reached its height during the short cane-cutting and milling season which usually extended from January until June. For the rest of the year, most of this labor force was unemployed and this 7-month period was characterized by serious poverty and social unrest.

Although unemployment was primarily among sugar industry workers, influence was also felt in the cities.

The history of Cuba is characterized by the domination by, or dependency upon, outside powers. Spain governed Cuba from 1511 to 1898. It was among the first colonized and organized by Spain and was the last colony in the New World to be relinquished by the Spaniards. The Cubans unsuccessfully revolted against Spain in 1868, 1878, and 1895. In 1898, with help from the United States, freedom from Spanish domination became a reality. Cuba remained under U.S. military government occupation until 1902. However, the United States retained the right to intervene in Cuba to preserve public order and to protect the island's sovereignty.

During the long period of domination by Spain, Spanish political and social institutions were transferred to Cuba. Colonial government and the Spanish legal system, in which inequalities before the law were recognized well into the 19th century, intensified the stratification of a society that was already sharply divided into social classes by a plantation economy based upon the importation of cheap Negro slave labor.

Upon the conclusion of the U.S. occupation in 1902, the Cubans instituted a republican form of government patterned after that of the United States. However, the supporting institutions necessary for the protection of the promised individual rights, administrative honesty, or governmental responsibility did not develop. The new leaders were still influenced by the prolonged period of Spanish rule and they frequently used their positions of power for their own

economic and social advancement. The political history of Cuba in the 20th century was characterized by recurrent rebellion arising from political rivalries and having only slight relationship to economic or social questions.[118]

INTERNAL DEFENSE

Internal Security Forces Problems

There is evidence to support the contention that Fulgencio Batista, who was President of Cuba during the insurgency period, never realized the magnitude of the problem of the insurgency.[119] It appears that Batista originally conceived of Castro as a rival for political power in Cuba and as a popular man who was without any widespread base of support among the Cuban population. Many of the decisions of Batista during the insurgency appear to have been influenced by the fact that he had himself been elected President under very questionable circumstances and that he really did not have complete control of the country. Perhaps the disastrous defeat of the Castro guerrillas when they invaded Cuba might have given Batista the idea that he was confronted with only a minor problem in dealing with the insurgency. Some idea of the problem as it was perceived by the Government might be obtained by analyzing the strategy and tactics against the insurgents. The moves were all primarily military in nature, the objective being either to kill or to capture the guerrillas. The main tactics utilized against supporters of the insurgency were repression and terror.

Expanding the Internal Security Forces

There is no evidence that the expansion of the internal security forces ever posed a problem for the Government. The Armed Forces of Cuba and the police possessed sufficient manpower to effectively combat the guerrillas and to maintain law and order in the urban areas. The lack of effectiveness of the internal security forces was not related to their size but to the manner in which they were employed.

Maintaining Public Confidence

The maintenance of public confidence was one of the most important problems faced by the Government. This factor was very influential in the outcome of the insurgency as the government forces were never completely defeated in combat. Several factors influenced public confidence. One was the contrast between the images projected by Castro and by Batista. Castro, tall, striking in appearance, and eloquent, looked the part of the dynamic leader. Batista was short and squat and apparently did not like the public spotlight. Another

factor was that the Batista regime had acquired a reputation as being corrupt, and this reputation continued to increase throughout the insurgency. The United States also exerted some influence on the confidence that the public had in the Government of Cuba. The embargo on arms shipments to Cuba during the same time that Castro was receiving aid clandestinely sent from the United States and the attacks upon the Batista regime by the press and officials of the U.S. Government certainly had some influence upon public opinion.

Population Cleavages

Despite the fact that there were ethnic differences in the population, the most important cleavage turned out to be that of social class. Cuban society had, over the years, generated some degree of dissatisfaction among members of the urban middle and rural lower classes. The aspirations of the members of the middle class for a standard of living and social class commensurate with their education and their own estimate of their capabilities were continually frustrated by two obstacles: the success of the upper class in maintaining its wealth and political power, and the inability of the Cuban economy to provide adequate employment and other opportunities—especially for the professional middle class. Many highly educated professionals were unemployed and many were forced to take jobs outside their professions to maintain what they considered a standard of living that was commensurate with their social status. Although the middle class professionals formed the nucleus of the revolutionary movement against the Batista Government, the majority of them did not benefit from the success of the revolution. The other neglected class was the rural lower class. This was the group that had been the most neglected prior to the revolution. It lacked medical facilities, educational opportunities, and adequate housing. This group was illiterate and plagued with nutritional deficiences and parasitical diseases. Many of the members of this group refused to migrate to the cities or to the sugar mills and remained isolated in out-of-the-way places. The members of this group were eventually won over by the guerrillas.[120]

Recruitment

Recruitment for the internal security forces was not a problem. The power and graft that were a part of the job of being a policeman made this a job to be sought. The pay in the Armed Forces was good and the life offered advantages to the poor and underprivileged.

Collection of Intelligence Information

The ability of the Government to obtain effective intelligence information was a problem. As the population lost confidence in the Government, the problem of

gaining reliable intelligence information increased. The police force and the rural guard responded to the terrorism of the rebels with their own terrorism. Individuals were indiscriminately arrested, tortured, and murdered. This created a wave or revulsion throughout the Cuban population, including the army.[121]

Insurgent Terrorism

The terroristic methods of the insurgents presented the Government with one of its most serious problems. Although the underground arms of the insurgent organization operating in the urban areas was not successful in initiating a national strike, it was able through assassinations, bombings, and acts of sabotage to effectively keep more than half the security forces occupied in the cities. The guerrilla portion of the civil war also was characterized by the use of terror when it served the purpose. At least one opinion has been expressed, that the war in the Sierra Maestra was a sordid struggle conducted by means of bribery, betrayal, and lies by two protagonists, neither of whom was fit to govern any people or any nation.[122]

Both selective and indiscriminate terror were used by the insurgents. Theaters, cafes, and marketplaces were bombed. Because these acts often killed or injured innocent members of the population who happened to be at the place of attack by chance, anxiety among members of the population was maintained at a high level.

Guerrilla Operations

The guerrilla activities of the insurgents posed a problem to the internal security forces which was not successfully dealt with. The ability to conduct guerrilla operations against the Government supplied the insurgents with propaganda material. On one occasion the Government announced that Castro had been killed by government forces, only to have this statement refuted when an interview with Castro after the date of his reported death was published in a U.S. newspaper.

Coastal Access

One of the most difficult problems faced by the government internal security forces was that of the interception of shipments of arms, munitions, equipment, and other supplies destined for the insurgents. Supplies received from outside the area were purchased with funds collected by the underground organizations working in the various cities of Cuba and in foreign countries. Wealthy benefactors and sympathizers contributed heavily to all the revolutionary organizations,

regardless of their political affiliations. Prio Socarras, a Cuban, bought arms for various revolutionary groups from 1952 to 1959. It has been reported that he spent 5 million dollars in the attempt to oust the Batista government. Much of the materiel intended for the guerrillas was intercepted by the Government. In addition to receiving supplies by boat, the insurgents also cleared landing strips to receive supplies shipped by air from foreign countries.[123]

Civil Disturbances

The popular opposition to the Batista government resulted in numerous demonstrations, primarily by students and women. The demonstrations were mostly peaceful in character, but large numbers of internal security forces were required to disperse the crowds. Student demonstrations at the University of Havana reached such proportions that the Government closed it for the remainder of the insurgency, beginning in 1956.

Several protest demonstrations took place in the city of Santiago de Cuba in 1957. Women in black mourning clothing started the demonstrations. They were subsequently joined by other women who shouted slogans, blocked traffic, and carried banners.

Internal Security Forces Organization

Civilian Police and Paramilitary Forces

A number of police and paramilitary organizations were available in the government counterinsurgency effort. The National Cuban Police Force was composed of 7 militarized divisions. One was assigned to each province and a central division was assigned to the city of Havana. This force was under the command of the Minister of Defense and often cooperated very closely with the regular army.

The rural guard was a separate branch of the police stationed in rural areas. This force was under the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Cuban Army. The Department of the Interior and Department of Justice each maintained substantial investigatory police forces. The Department of the Interior's investigative force was called the National Secret Police. The Justice Department's force was the Judicial Police. Senator Rolando Masferrer of Oriente Province maintained a private paramilitary force of some 2,000 men. This force was uniformed and motorized and was at the service of the Government.[124] Masferrer was a former Communist who had fought in Spain with the Spanish loyalists. Although he now served the Government, his methods were those he had learned as a Communist.

Military Forces

It has been estimated that the strength of the Cuban Army in the late 1950's was between 20,000 and 30,000 men.[125] An officer in the Cuban Army has indicated that the strength was in excess of 40,000 men at the time that Batista departed the country.[126] The equipment of the army is considered to have been satisfactory. This equipment consisted of tanks and other mechanized vehicles, including halftracks which were used against the insurgents.[127] The Cuban Air Force had about 65 combat aircraft, including both fighters and bombers.[128]

Objectives and Functions

The internal security forces of Cuba had two objectives: the first was to contain and eventually defeat the insurgent guerrillas in the mountains, and the second was to maintain law and order in the urban areas.

The army and the rural guard, assisted by the national police, performed the function of combating the insurgent guerrillas in the rural areas. The national police, assisted by the army, performed the function of maintaining law and order in the urban areas. Each of the various internal security forces contributed to the collection of intelligence information. The Military Intelligence Service (Servicio Inteligencia Militar, SIM) performed the function of collecting military intelligence information. This service had a wide latitude of operation, since any type of intelligence information might have military application during the insurgency.

Methods and Techniques

The methods of operation of the government internal security forces from the beginning of the counterinsurgency effort were characterized by oppression and terror. A large part of the insurgent activity took place in urban areas. The government countermeasures were so effective in the cities that the urban based insurgents suffered 20 times as many casualties as did the guerrilla forces operating in the countryside.

During the fighting phase of the insurgency, two general strikes were planned. In April 1958, the Castro forces planned a general strike. Propaganda efforts in connection with this tactic started on March 12, 1958. Instructions, in the form of bulletins, were delivered to workers in the cities. The strike started in Santiago on the night of April 8, 1958. It spread to other areas by April 9. However, the Batista government capitalized upon the warning it had received in the form of propaganda by the insurgents. Special powers were granted to the President by Congress and the strike was suppressed through the use of severe measures by the internal security forces. Some of the

reasons for the failure of the strike must, however, be accorded to urban labor which, almost until the end of the insurgency, remained loyal to the Government.

The final strike was called for on January 1, 1959, following the resignation and departure of Batista. Castro, through his followers, instructed the entire Cuban population to go on strike. The underground civil resistance movement came out in the open to organize and direct the strike. Part of the success of the strike has been attributed to the desire of the population to celebrate both New Year's Day and Batista's departure. The internal security forces, because of lack of leadership, took no action against the strikers, and the insurgents replaced the internal security forces with their own secretly organized and armed militia.

In suppressing demonstrations the internal security forces, consisting of army and police, on several occasions used rather stern measures against women in Santiago de Cuba in 1957. Adverse criticism of these actions received wide publicity.

In attempting to control sabotage, army and police units patrolled the streets and in many instances were successful in preventing the saboteurs from accomplishing their mission. The internal security forces conducted raids of homes which they suspected were being used for illegal sabotage activities. The killing and wounding of suspects during these raids were not infrequent. In some instances prominent citizens and students were the victims.

The assassination efforts of the insurgents included an attempt to kill Batista himself in March 1957. The plot failed and the reaction was to increase the use of terror against the insurgents and the population.

After the survivors of Castro's ill-fated invasion reached the Sierra Maestra by January 1957, they concentrated on preserving and expanding their forces. The Government countered this activity with air raids upon the insurgents. The guerrillas then resorted to small, hit-and-run raids against the government outposts. These raids were embarrassing to the Government. Until the successful attack by the guerrillas upon the military garrison in Ulbero in May 1957, the Government attempted to create the illusion that no rebel forces existed in the mountains. The armed forces in Oriente Province far outnumbered the rebels but were unable to cope with the military situation. The campaigns against the guerrillas in the mountains were fruitless and the army fell back on the strategy of containment. Since the rebels seldom defended the terrain over which they fought, the use of armor and aircraft against them was only of limited value. Hand grenades and machineguns proved to be the most useful weapons.[129]

In response to increased insurgent activity in the spring of 1958, the Government started a new offensive against the guerrillas. Fortified posts were prepared; artillery was moved up; and armored units and armed helicopters were employed. The regular warfare methods employed by the Government

succeeded in containing the rebels in the Sierra Maestra; however, they were less successful in the Sierra del Cristal against a guerrilla force commanded by Raúl Castro. Intermittent fighting between government units and rebels in Oriente and Las Villas continued throughout the summer without significant victories being scored by either side. The situation became static and remained so until the last few weeks of the insurgency.

During this period, government-military affairs worsened. Some officers were involved in conspiracies, some others were inefficient and conducted their operations badly, some others defected to the rebel army. Rivalry between high-ranking army officers further hindered effective military operations against the guerrillas.

DISCUSSION

The counterinsurgency and internal security situation in Cuba illustrates quite vividly the adverse effect of the use of terror by the internal security forces. By countering terror with terror, the Government lost support in many segments of the population.

The inability of the Government to control the introduction of resources on the side of the insurgents contributed to the rebel victory. The attack that signaled the beginning of the revolt was launched from outside the country by insurgents trained in Mexico. The support the rebels received consisted of manpower, money, arms, ammunition, and supplies. The popular support that the insurgents enjoyed outside of Cuba weakened the position of the Government.

In this instance the group that furnished much of the revolutionary strength was the disenchanted middle class and not the laborers or farmers which is often the case. Other groups were involved, but the driving force of the revolution was the middle class, whose expectations the Government could not meet.

The history of the internal security forces had been one of supporting the ruling class at the expense of other groups. This fact served to undermine public confidence in the internal security forces. Civilian police were involved in gambling and prostitution, which further tarnished their image.

The ability of Fidel Castro to conceal his actual convictions, intentions, and objectives might have been prevented had this information been better known and documented. This conflict was characterized by duplicity and deceit which extended from the leadership downward on both sides.

The Cuban experience is illustrative of an insurgency where the action was centered largely in urban areas and the greatest casualties occurred among urban insurgents. Here it is possible to observe the large number of internal security forces which can be tied down by strikes, demonstrations, terror, and coercion in cities.

CHAPTER FIVE

VENEZUELA, 1960-1965

SUMMARY ACCOUNT

Venezuela has a long history of political unrest. During the 20th century, until 1945, Venezuela was ruled by army generals. The military-civilian plot which occurred in October 1945 brought the Acción Democrática party (AD), led by Rómulo Betancourt, to power.[130] A conservative military dictatorship was reestablished in November 1948. Rómulo Betancourt was sent into exile.

Because of general dissatisfaction with the Government's corrupt internal politics and ruthless suppression of all open civilian opposition, many people embraced clandestine political action. The situation became critical about mid-year of 1957. Some of the members of the Armed Forces started plotting about that same time. Following a period of several weeks of political and military involvement, characterized by demonstrations and riots in Caracas, the Government fell and was replaced in January 1958 by a junta composed of civilian and military members.

This change in government made possible a period of constitutionally elected government led by civilians.[131] Betancourt was inaugurated on February 13, 1959.

During the Cuban insurgency of Castro and his followers (1953-1959), Betancourt had been sympathetic toward the revolutionaries, speaking out in favor of the Cuban revolution and promising to allow his country to be used as headquarters for a Cuban government in exile. However, by the time that Betancourt was inaugurated in 1959, Castro had already succeeded in wresting power from the Batista government.[132]

Not too long after his successful assumption of leadership, Castro started to interfere in the internal affairs of other Latin American countries. Among these countries was Venezuela.

Prior to this time Venezuela had experienced many insurgencies, but they had been of the traditional type characterized by seizure of power by coups d'etat. The country was now faced with the attempt of the insurgents to seize power from below in an effort characterized by terror, civil disturbances, and guerrilla activity. The first effort of this kind is traceable to protests against the "make work" policy of the Government which started in 1958.

Political unrest, punctuated by civil disturbances, attacks on foreign business properties, and minor military revolts, was underlined by the constant attempts of the insurgents to seize control of critical civilian organizations such as the Confederation of Venezuelan Workers (CTV).

By early 1962 the Venezuelan insurgency had become characterized by a terror that was of military significance. The military concern resulted from such incidents as three attacks on military installations committed in January 1962 and bombings of police stations in Caracas.[133]

After January 1962 there were at least three identifiable groups of insurgents operating in Venezuela. There were rural guerrillas, whose bases of operations were located in remote, heavily forested, or mountainous areas. There were suburban and small-town terrorists whose operations were sometimes similar to those of guerrillas. There were also urban insurgents in Caracas and other large cities. Their activities were characterized by terrorism.[134]

In the period from January to April 1962, an inept attempt was made to start a widespread revolution. The strategy was for the insurgents to operate from a number of widely dispersed guerrilla bases. During the second period, which was from about May 1963 forward, the insurgent activity was characterized by guerrilla operations in western Venezuela. The insurgent terrorists were extremely active during 1962 and 1963.

The National Liberation Front (Frente de Liberación Nacional—FLN) is a typical Communist-inspired popular front organization which attempts to unite the leftwing opponents of the Government. Its military counterpart is called the Armed Forces of National Liberation (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional—FALN).[135]

In countering the insurgency, the Government found that the use of political and psychological techniques was as important as military operations. Although the terrorists and guerrillas were able to cause the Government some embarrassment, the insurgents were never able to mount the full-scale insurgency which they desired. The people apparently never envisioned them as legitimate protestors against a corrupt and abusive government. This public disaffection with the insurgency was an influential factor in the failure of the insurgents to obtain their goals.

The civilian police were given the primary responsibility for the maintenance of public safety, law, and order.

Aided by good intelligence information and cooperation from peasants living in the area of guerrilla camps, the Armed Forces of Venezuela were able to conduct successful operations against the guerrillas. Although the Government succeeded in decreasing guerrilla activity, it is not known how many guerrillas are still in the remote areas in the early months of 1966.

HISTORICAL AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS

Venezuela, the sixth largest country in South America, has an area of 352,000 square miles and a coastline of 1,759 miles on the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. The country lies entirely within the tropics and possesses a great variety of vegetation. It is one of the world's leading petroleum producers


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Puerto Ordaz
San Cristobal
Ciudad Bolivar
Cerro Bolivar
COLOMBIA
BRITISH GUIANA
LA GRAN SABANA
SA MAIGUALIDA
SIERRA PACARAIMA
SERRA PARIMA
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International boundary
Road
Capital

and is also rich in mineral resources. Most of the country is drained by the Orinoco River, which is second in length only to the Amazon. The Orinoco is navigable for 1,300 miles, and navigation by light draft vessels greatly improves internal transportation. There is within the country great geographical diversity. The Andes Mountains extend well into the country. Venezuela is divided into four major geographic regions: the mountains, the Maracaibo Lowlands, the llanos (which constitute the flat basin of the Orinoco), and the Guiana Highlands.

The country has a variety of climates. The coastal regions are extremely hot, while several of the peaks of the Andes Mountains are continually covered with snow. The llanos of the Orinoco are continually hot and alternately excessively dry or excessively wet. The climate in the mountain regions is pleasant. There are no true desert areas in the country, and there is generous rainfall in most areas.

With the exception of the boundary of British Guiana, the borders generally follow physical features. The border with Brazil generally follows the line which divides the Orinoco and Amazon basins. With Colombia the border generally follows the course of the Apure, Meta, and Orinoco Rivers, except in the north where it follows the crest and the western spur of the eastern Cordillera of the Andes. The border between Colombia and Venezuela is easily crossed at almost any point, a situation that serves to encourage both legal and illegal local trade.

A census conducted in 1961 indicated that the population was 7,523,999, which was an increase of 2,489,161, or 49.44 percent over the figure of the 1950 census. During this period about 500,000 immigrants arrived from Europe. Discounting the new arrivals, the population increased at an annual rate of 3.99 percent, making Venezuela one of the fastest growing countries in the entire world.

The distribution of the population was initially influenced by climate and geography, with a majority of the people living in the more temperate region of the Andes Mountains. The greatest concentration of the population is around Caracas in the coastal range, where approximately 2.5 million people or one-third of the total number live in the 8,330-square-mile area which constitutes the Federal District and in several small states which border it. Other areas with high population density are located in the high Andes, in the states of Nueva Esparta and Sucre, and in the oil-rich Lake Maracaibo basin.

The total labor force comprises about 33.5 percent of the total population. In 1959 the labor force was employed as follows: 34 percent in agriculture, 2.2 in mining and petroleum, 7.6 percent in construction, 10.7 percent in manufacturing, 21.3 percent in services, 10 percent in commerce, 3.5 percent in transportation and communications, 0.5 percent in power, with the remaining portion in other unspecified sections, including unemployment. A serious decrease in construction activities and employment in the important mining and petroleum

industries had decreased to 1.7 percent and in construction to 4.9 percent of the total labor force by 1961. The problem of keeping the rapidly increasing population employed is a serious one.

Venezuela is a predominantly racially mixed (mestizo) country, in contrast to other Latin American countries which have a majority of either white or Indian people. Spanish, Negro, and Indian ancestry in varying proportions is visible in about two-thirds of the population. No Venezuelan census since 1926 has included the enumeration of racial or ethnic groups, with the only consideration for various groups being a separate category for tribal Indians.

It was estimated in 1940 that 20 percent of the population was more or less unmixed white, primarily of Spanish descent, about 2 percent pureblooded Indian, and about 9 percent pureblooded African.

The process of racial amalgamation has been consistently associated with linguistic, social, and cultural integration. This development has resulted in Venezuela's having only one national culture which is basically hispanic with considerable Indian and African influence. It appears that mestizaje, the process of racial mixing, will continue, and that the venezolanos will become an increasingly distinctive mestizo people.

There have been social changes during the past 3 decades. In the 1920's Venezuela was divided primarily into two classes, the upper and lower. The situation was influenced by the petroleum boom and subsequent economic expansion and has been more rapid and dramatic in urban areas. An industrial proletariat has developed, who are wholly dependent upon cash wages, and who, through their exposure to urban life, are experiencing rising economic expectations. With this development has come political awareness. Because of the growth of labor unions, the industrial working class has become a powerful force in national life.

Because of the cultural and political influence exerted by Spain for a period of 300 years, Venezuela has become overwhelmingly Roman Catholic; about 92 percent of the population in 1962 was of that faith.

Transportation in Venezuela is undergoing development. The railroads are far less extensive and less important than the highways. There is no rail network. The railroads were originally constructed to expedite the export of coffee; however, the advent of modern roads and more economical modes of transportation has made the railroads virtually obsolete. In 1962 there was a total of only 286 miles. At this time the highway system consisted of 17,486 miles of roadway. In addition there were 4,630 miles of cart and pack trails.

Venezuela, after a long period of domination by Spain, won its independence in 1821, and was after that time subjected to a long period of rule by local leaders, known as caudillos, and to the personal political rule of dictators. During this time little social or economic development occurred. During the rule of dictator Gen. Juan Vicente Gomez (1908-1935), the bases of progress and

national prosperity were formed by means of the exploitation of the country's large reserves of petroleum. This development started in 1913-14 and accelerated in the 1920's. Although the ruling politicians enriched themselves, the tremendous amount of oil money benefited the entire economy and Venezuela became a solvent nation. Although military dictatorship continued, a government under liberal leaders did emerge briefly in 1945. Sweeping social and economic changes were proposed to benefit the rural and urban workers, redistribute land, combat disease, and eliminate illiteracy. In addition, political reforms such as universal suffrage and direct election of the president and congress were proposed. These proposed changes resulted in increasing opposition in the civilian and military ruling classes. The liberal government was overthrown in November 1948 and a military dictatorship ruled for the next 10 years. Popular government returned once more when the dictatorship was toppled by a combination of military dissidents and an effort by all the elements of the civilian political opposition. Reforms were once again undertaken.[136]

INTERNAL DEFENSE

Internal Security Forces Problems

The counterinsurgency doctrine of Venezuela indicates very clearly that the central problem has been designated as the maintenance of law and order. The Government has been insistent in maintaining throughout the insurgency that a democracy cannot afford to defend itself by other than the means authorized by the written law of the land.[137]

Expanding the Internal Security Forces

The primary problem in Venezuela is not so much one of expansion of the internal security forces as it is one of training, organization, and equipment. This problem has been acted upon, and reorganization, the introduction of foreign advisors, and new equipment have improved the situation.[138]

Maintaining Public Confidence

The maintenance of public confidence has been a problem area in the Venezuelan insurgency. The difficulty stems from several sources. The poor caliber of personnel in many of the Venezuelan police forces has resulted in cases of brutality in dealing with captured insurgents.[139] In some instances citizens have reacted emotionally to internal security force failures to prevent urban-rural terrorism. There has been a history of poor and sometimes antagonistic relationships between the civilian police forces and the population. As agents of

dictatorial regimes, the Venezuelan police have acquired a poor image which still adversely influences their relations with the public.[140]

Population Cleavages

Despite the ethnic mixture of the population of Venezuela, the primary cause of social discontent is not racial, but results from differences in economic classes. Several class conflicts appear to be in progress simultaneously. The rising middle class is asserting itself in the political and economic spheres of the country. The skilled technicians in the growing industries are organizing and gaining political power. The unskilled workers are also organizing and demanding a greater voice in political, economic, and social changes. The lower, depressed economic classes and the unemployed clamor for a better life. The farmers, whose income is far below that of other workers, are also seeking to improve their position in society.

Recruitment

Recruitment in the national guard poses no problem. This is an elite unit, and the prestige it enjoys makes personnel acquisition no problem. The army also experiences no difficulty in filling its personnel needs. Recruiting in the police forces does present some problems. One is concerned with the caliber of personnel in some of the forces where the pay is low. A second problem in recruitment is a result of a campaign of terror waged against the police by the insurgents. One of the primary methods used in this campaign is the random assassination of policemen. During the year 1962 in Caracas alone 26 policemen were killed and 55 wounded. Many were shot in the back without provocation.[141]

Collection of Intelligence Information

The problems encountered in this area are involved with overcoming the resistance that people with antipolice attitudes have toward giving information. The ability of the insurgents to take punitive sanctions against individuals who give information is another factor. In the rural areas the close ties between family and kinship groups make the collection of intelligence information difficult. The Government has insisted that torture as a means of obtaining information from captured insurgents will not be condoned.

Insurgent Terrorism

One of the primary weapons of the Venezuelan insurgents has been terror. Besides the special campaign against the police, both small unit and mass

terror have been employed. Urban tactical units (UTC's) operate in the cities. These units specialize in collecting funds and supplies and also in bolder actions like robbery, sabotage, arson, and murder.[142] The insurgents had hoped by the use of small unit terror to produce mass terror in the population by increasing the level of restlessness and anxiety.

Guerrilla Operations

Because of terrain favorable for guerrilla operations the insurgents have established rural guerrilla units. Successful operations were established in Falcon State and El Charal, two western mountain regions. Two of the guerrilla leaders in the Falcon Mountains had extensive local family connections which aided them in recruiting local people in the movement. Army and police units have taken counterinsurgency action against the guerrillas.[143]

Border and Coastal Access

One of the difficult problems confronting the Government has been preventing the infiltration of men, arms, and munitions into the country. Cuba is being used as a sanctuary where insurgents are trained and where shipments of supplies and arms originate. The ease with which the border with Colombia can be crossed increases the possibility of infiltration of insurgents by land. There is always the danger that the guerrillas operating in Colombia and Venezuela may coordinate their activities.

Civil Disturbances

One of the primary means of weakening internal security has been through civil disturbances. In 1960 the Government took an anti-Castro stand. The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) published an article in its newspaper Izquierda advocating the overthrow of the Government by violent means. When this article resulted in the arrest of three MIR leaders, 2,000 students of the Central University rioted. These riots spread throughout the country.

Again, in January 1962, Communist-inspired civil violence erupted throughout the country in a protest against the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este, Uruguay. Thirty-nine persons were killed in these riots.[144]

Internal Security Forces Organization

Civilian Police Forces

The long history of the use of the police as agents of various dictators resulted in the creation of an unfavorable police image among the population. The

hostile feeling toward the police reached such an intensity that in 1958, the national police force was inactivated. This left the country dependent upon the state and Federal District police, the national guard, and civilian vigilantes for the maintenance of law and order.[145] Three new police organizations were created in 1958. They were the General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL), the Criminal Investigative Police (PTJ), and the Traffic Police. The responsibility for the maintenance of public safety, law, and order was dispersed among a number of different agencies of the Government. Four ministries shared the responsibility at the national level. The General Directorate of Police was under the supervision of the Minister of the Interior; the Technical and Judicial Police were under the supervision of the Minister of Justice; the Traffic Police were under the supervision of the Minister of Communications; and the national guard was under the supervision of the Minister of Defense. The separate states maintained their own urban and rural police forces.[146]

Coordination among these various forces proved to be a substantial problem. This was especially so in the area of Caracas. An attempt was made to solve this problem in July 1963 when representatives of the various agencies charged with the maintenance of law and order met with the police of Caracas for the purpose of establishing a unified command for directing the countermeasures against terrorists in the area.

The coordination problem is further complicated by the fact that each individual state and the Federal District is responsible for the maintenance of law and order within its own boundaries. Each of these political subdivisions has its own urban and rural police and has the responsibility for determining what portion of these forces is maintained under the jurisdiction of its administrative subdivisions. The municipal and state police usually work with national police. The national guard functions in those areas not served by the municipal or state police, and also moves into areas where these two operate to help them if requested to do so.

In Caracas, in 1960, leftist-inspired civil disturbances occurred. The municipal and national police were usually able to control these disturbances until the national guard could arrive. A substantial number of the police owe their appointments to the Betancourt government and have made sincere efforts to counter the insurgents. Among the factors which have worked against them is the fact that the police lack experience and the fact that the insurgents have directed their campaign of terror at the police.

The General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL). This force is commonly referred to as the political police. Its primary responsibilities are crime prevention, preservation of law and order, narcotics control, and the supervision of foreigners within the country. Because of its fairly recent organization, it is considered to be lacking in training, poorly paid, and with low morale.

PROPOSED PLAN OF ORGANIZATION FOR UNIFIED POLICE COMMAND

VENEZUELA, 1963



The Technical and Judicial Police. The organization has the primary mission of protecting the rights and liberties of the citizens of Venezuela. It has the primary responsibility of making criminal investigations and arresting suspects. Because of its recent founding, this force is still inexperienced and in the process of being trained. The pay is considered to be inadequate, although higher than the DIGEPOL. The morale is characterized as not high.

The Traffic Police. The traffic police confine themselves to the enforcement of traffic regulations. This force very carefully avoids being involved in the enforcement of non-traffic laws.

The State and Municipal Police. The state police have in some instances been given the police responsibility in large urban centers of Venezuela. Caracas is an example of where this delegation of responsibility has taken place. The municipal police force of Caracas, since its reconstitution in 1958, has been expanded from about 1,500 to 6,200 men. A substantial amount of this manpower is utilized to permanently guard government buildings. Also, many are engaged in guarding industrial concerns where they receive additional pay. Because of the 24-hour nature of police operations, only about 500 men are available for duty at any given time.

Since 1958, the standards for admission to the municipal police force of Caracas have been raised, and a school for trainees has been made available to the police trainees from all the states. Salaries are still low and the increased standards for qualification have rendered recruitment difficult. The recruiting appears also to have been adversely affected by the terror campaign. The problem of counterinsurgency, expecially in Caracas, is compounded by a substantial increase in ordinary types of crime. In 1953, an attempt was made to alleviate this problem by dividing the city into zones for the purpose of patrolling.

Paramilitary Forces

The national guard is one of the four coequal services under the supervision of the Minister of Defense and is at all times under the control of the Central Government. The missions undertaken cover separate and dissimilar areas. Some of these responsibilities are preventing smuggling, enforcing liquor tax laws, enforcing laws not connected with traffic on the highways, operating the coast guard, teaching illiterate children and adults to read, farm extension work, and supervising resources including mines, forests, and national parks.

The strength of the national guard is about 9,000 men. It is a professional force that is well paid and enjoys a good reputation with the public. All of the men belonging to this organization are volunteers and many have been in other branches of the Armed Forces. Venezuela is divided into regional national

guard commands with one also being assigned to Caracas. The national guard has its own school system which specializes in military type training.

The national guard is playing a significant role in the counterinsurgency effort. It has also been used in conjunction with other services to put down revolts staged by members of the military. The guard has remained, as a whole, loyal to the Government. In 1960, the president called upon the national guard to assist in quelling leftist riots, and they did an effective job without bloodshed. Again, in connection with the presidential election of 1963, the national guard performed counter-terrorist duties.[147]

Military Forces

The Armed Forces of Venezuela consist of four coequal services with an estimated strength, in 1962, of 33,000 men, divided as follows: army, 16,000; navy, 5,000; air force, 3,000; and national guard, 9,000. There are no formally organized reserves; however, since conscription is used to raise enlisted manpower, there are always trained individuals available in Venezuela. For example, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, 5,000 reservists were called to duty.

The President is Commander-in-Chief of the National Armed Forces and is advised at the highest level by the Supreme Council of National Defense. The council consists of the Council of Ministers, the Chief of the Joint Staff, and the commanders of the four military services. This body may also include the President of the Congress, the President of the Supreme Court and any experts which the President may desire. The command authority of the President is exercised through the Minister of Defense, who in turn normally acts through the Chief of the Joint Staff. The Minister of Defense has his own advisory staff and receives reports directly from the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces.

The organization of the Armed Forces is very similar to that of the United States because of the influence of U.S. military advisers. The training system is also modeled on that of the United States. Much of the instructional material used in training has been translated directly from U.S. Army Field Manuals. Because many of the officers of the army are from middle class, and some are from lower class families, and training in vocations is given to enlisted personnel, the army has maintained a sense of identity with the people.

The primary mission of the Armed Forces is to defend the national territory from external attack and to help preserve internal security. To perform this mission, the Armed Forces has available the four coequal services. The army is composed of battalion-sized units which are equipped with standard U.S. Army-type infantry weapons. It has very few heavy weapons. The national guard is more lightly armed and is deployed into widely separated detachments. The navy controls a destroyer force. The air force is equipped with modern

jet fighters and bombers and also has transport planes and helicopters. This force can be used in support of the army and the navy.[148]

Objectives and Functions

The objectives of the Government are to maintain public safety, law, and order while at the same time imposing as few restrictions as possible upon the basic civil liberties of the population. The functions of the government internal security forces are influenced by the plan for revolutionary war drawn up by the FALN and seized by the army intelligence service in 1962. The plan consisted of five steps which were to culminate in the violent take-over of military power. The steps were: (1) agitation against the government; (2) demonstrations, disturbances, and strikes; (3) terrorism and sabotage; (4) guerrilla activities throughout the country; and (5) insurrection. The Government has concentrated on using every legal means available. The police, at times aided by the national guard and other services of the Armed Forces, have performed the function of controlling demonstrations and civil disturbances. On several occasions the President has used his power as granted by the Constitution to suspend certain civil liberties. The courts have continued to perform their functions as delineated by the Constitution, using the changes in the laws provided for when the President has invoked emergency powers.[149]

Methods and Techniques

By making the objective one of maintaining law and order, using legal means normally employed, the Government has in effect made the rules of the game known to the population and to the insurgency as well. The Government has refrained from such activities as taking hostages or executing captured insurgents. Internal security forces have been instructed not to torture or mistreat prisoners. Police have been instructed against the unwarranted use of firearms against citizens. The constitutional right to travel freely about the country has not been curtailed.

It is felt that the legal restrictions imposed by the Government on the activities of the internal security forces have made it very difficult for these forces to mount an effective counterinsurgency effort. This difficulty illustrates one of the principal problems encountered by the counterinsurgency planner. that is, just when should the laws (the rules of the game) be changed to give the internal security forces a better operating posture? Perhaps the advantage to the Government over the insurgents is in the form of the strong moral position it has gained.[150]

DISCUSSION

Action taken by the Venezuelan Government to improve the image of the internal security forces indicates one possible course of action to accomplish this objective. This specific action was the deactivation of the unpopular National Police Force in 1958. Some of the difficulties involved in creating and training new police forces are also involved. One of these difficulties is the recruitment of high caliber personnel into police organizations which have poor public images and low pay scales.

Further illustrated in the Venezuelan account is the influence of a second country upon the insurgency situation—in this instance Cuba, which trains insurgents for antigovernment activity in Venezuela and supplies arms and munitions to the rebels. Here again the limiting geographic factors appear to structure the situation in favor of the dissidents. The long coastline, ease of access from Colombia, and proximity to Cuba combine to increase the problem of outside access to one of formidable proportions.

The National Guard of Venezuela is an example of a paramilitary unit with a primary responsibility for maintaining law and order. The selectivity exercised in recruiting, adequate training, and equipment and the low vulnerability to political influence combine to give this force a good public image. One result is that the national guard is often capable of utilizing the psychological aspects of force to accomplish what a less respected internal security force might have to use physical force to accomplish.

One of the features of the Venezuelan experience is the concentrated campaign of terror used by the insurgents against the civilian police. Assassination is a favorite technique. The random terror attacks against the police are designed to demoralize the force and to limit its recruiting effort.

Another characteristic of the insurgency has been the designation of the problem as one of combating the dissidents within the existing democratic framework of the country. The Government has limited its ability to react with maximum effectiveness against the rebels but has also demonstrated to the population its intention of not placing any unnecessary limits upon personal freedoms.

The effectiveness of security forces recruited, trained, and maintained by the oil companies has been influential in limiting the amount and seriousness of the damage that the insurgents have been able to inflict upon this vital industry.

CHAPTER SIX

ALGERIA, 1954-1962

SUMMARY ACCOUNT

The defeat of France by Germany in World War II and the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities served to increase the desire of the Moslem Algerian population for independence from France. The wartime promises of the French concerning reform did not satisfy most of the Moslem political leaders. As a result a revolution started in May 1945 in the town of Setif. The revolt was crushed by the French and punitive sanctions were applied. During 1946, Ferhat Abbas founded the Union Democratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA). The goal of this organization was internal autonomy. The popularity of this party, however, decreased. In 1947 a group whose goal was full independence, the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Democratiques (MTLD) was formed by Messali Hadj. The Front de Libéracion Nationale (FLN) developed from the MTLD. The FLN planned and activated the insurgency against the French which started on November 1, 1954. The FLN started with bombings and attacks upon French military and gendarmerie installations throughout Algeria. The insurgents at the outset numbered 2,000 or 3,000 militant nationalists. [151] At the start of the insurgency the FLN was composed of a few hundred guerrillas and a few thousand underground members; however, by 1956 the strength had increased to about 8,050 armed guerrillas and 21,000 members of the supporting underground. The military organization of the insurgents was the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN). [152]

As the struggle developed the insurgent strategy and tactics attempted to achieve its goals by means of a protracted military, political, and diplomatic campaign. The insurgents utilized a decentralized command structure with the major authority exercised by wilaya (province) commanders. In the self-contained wilaya each commander directed recruitment, supply, training, and operations. Individuals and groups in uniform and in the conventional dress of the area concerned took direct military action to hinder French control by means of terror, assassination, and acts of sabotage. Attempts were made to bring punitive sanctions to bear upon the opposition in both French and Moslem communities by means of coercion and intimidation. [153]

The insurgency was further complicated by the French political situation. The European sector of the Algerian population had, for a considerable period of time, been a political force which opposed concessions for the Algerian Moslem population. [154]

The insurgent forces were organized into regular units called the Moudjahiddine (freedom fighters) with an estimated strength of 40,000 men, with some

25,000 being based outside Algeria. This force consisted of 350-man battalions organized into 3 companies of 3 platoons having 3 groups. In 1957, the regular force battalions were augmented to 600 men to allow them to cope more realistically with the tactical situation. There was also an irregular force called the Mousabiline (auxiliaries) with an estimated strength of from 55,000 to 100,000. These auxiliaries were primarily concerned with supporting the regular ALN forces in military operations. [155]

The insurgents' military capability increased from the inception of the rebellion and in 1956 the ALN was a well-developed tactical force capable of combat characterized by hit-and-run tactics against the larger and more powerful French Army, especially in northern Algeria. The insurgent terrorists were able to step up their activity, too, and near the end of 1956 were able to commit about 700 individual acts of terror in the city of Algiers. [156]

The French military adopted a pacification tactic known as the quadrillage in 1956. This was a grid operation which provided for the garrisoning in strength of all major cities and, in relatively lesser force, all towns, villages, and farms in Algeria. [157] The quadrillage reached its full effectiveness in 1957. By 1958 a military stalemate had been reached. [158]

FLN influence in Algiers was effectively curtailed in 1957 by giving blanket police authority to paratroop units under the command of Gen. Jacques Massu. [159]

Counterinsurgency activity was pursued by the French throughout Algeria. The military also established control over administrative functions such as the registration of vital statistics and the supervision of elections. [160]

In an attempt to control the interior, the French established Special Administrative Sections (SAS) to perform administrative functions in the Moslem communes. Members of the SAS performed such duties as supervising the reconstruction of sabotaged buildings and teaching school. [161]

The Algerian revolution caught the French by surprise. Apparently the relatively tranquil period following the May 1945 revolt had served to allay French suspicion. The French authorities were evidently under the impression that this revolt could also be easily crushed, because they were not expecting a revolt in this area. Large units of the French Army were in Vietnam. The French Army on the continent was organized and deployed for a European war as a part of NATO. The equipment of these army divisions was not suitable for use in combating the flexible tactics of the insurgents. [162]

The French Army, with a strength in Algeria of 55,000 at the inception of the insurgency, was able to increase the size of the Algerian Army commitment to 200,000 at the beginning of the year 1956 and to double the strength to 400,000 by mid-summer of the same year. It has been estimated by the insurgents that by the termination of the insurgency in 1962, French military strength consisted of 500,000 with an additional 150,000 Algerian Moslem auxiliaries.



ALGERIA

International boundary

Internal boundary

Capital



HPO, Jr

As early as 1956 the French Government was favorably considering a negotiated settlement with the insurgents. The principal forces opposing a settlement were the Algerians of European lineage and a powerful clique of army officers. On January 2, 1956, a French Government was elected on a platform of democratic reforms and peace by negotiations in Algeria which would eventually lead to Mohammedan self-determination. However, the Government could not carry out these reforms and many moderate Algerians joined the FLN as a result. In 1956 a group of negotiators, including Ben Bella, were kidnaped by the employment of a ruse. In 1958 the situation became so critical that the Fourth Republic fell and Charles de Gaulle was brought to power. He continued the efforts for a political settlement, encountering stiff opposition from the Algerians of European extraction, their political allies, and elements of the French officer corps.

Members of the French officer corps translated the opposition into dramatic action by organizing the Secret Army Organization (OAS). They temporarily seized the city of Algiers in a coup on April 22, 1962. They committed brutal acts of terrorism and violence in an attempt to provoke the Moslem population to respond in kind, thereby causing the French Army to intervene.

General de Gaulle defeated the OAS by political and military maneuvering and succeeded in ending the insurgency against the French by negotiation; Algeria became an independent nation on July 1, 1962.

HISTORICAL AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS

Algeria has a land area of about 919,450 square miles and is located in the northern portion of the continent of Africa. The coast of Algeria extends along the coast of North Africa for 600 miles and forms the southern seaboard of the western Mediterranean. The western boundary is formed by Morocco and by the Spanish Sahara; the eastern border is formed by Tunisia to the north and Libya to the south. The southern border extends through the Sahara desert. Only about 12 or 15 percent of the land area is considered arable and climatic conditions may reduce the total of productive land during any given year. More than 90 percent of the 1958 population of over 10 million was concentrated in the northern part of the country in an area of approximately 81,000 square miles. The southern part of Algeria is mostly desert and is sparsely inhabited by nomadic peoples and oasis dwellers. The surface area of Algeria is divided into three major east-west bands by two chains of the Atlas Mountains—the Sahara Atlas and the Maritime Atlas.

The coastline of the country is rough and mountainous. The major ports of Arzew, Bone, Bougie, Mers El Kebir, and Philippeville are all man-made. Infrequent low, marshy plains are to be found in close proximity to the coast. Farther inland are the fertile plains of Oran, Algiers, and Bone, and the valleys of Cheliff.

From October through May there are 8 months of rainy winter weather. During the rainless, hot summers the east and northeast winds bring relief from the high humidity. Winds blow from the desert during this period, often carrying sand. The coastal region has a temperature that ranges from a winter average of 53 degrees Fahrenheit to a summer average of 79 degrees Fahrenheit. Freezing temperatures are unusual. Annual average rainfall in the coastal plain area varies from 24 to 41.4 inches.

In 1954 the population of Algeria was 1 million Europeans and 8.5 million Moslems. Most of the European population was concentrated along the Mediterranean coast and about 200 miles inland. About 78 percent of the 1954 European population lived in cities with populations over 20,000. The city of Algiers and its suburbs had a European population of about 300,000. This constituted almost one-third of the total European population. The city of Oran and its suburbs contained 200,000 and Constantine and Bone each contained about 50,000.

The Moslem population of Algeria in 1954 was predominately rural, with only some 20 percent or 1.5 million living in cities of 20,000 or more. The bulk of the Moslem population was located in the valleys of the coastal area and in the foothills of the Tellian Atlas. About 70 percent of the Moslem population lived in the northern rim or Tell area which contained only 5 percent of the total land area of the country.

Of the European population of 1 million who arrived mainly after the French conquest, less than half were of French origin. A sizeable number were of Spanish and Italian descent, with a smaller number being of Maltese, Alsatian, or German origin. Most of the Europeans were Catholic and spoke French. These people, despite the existence of small distinctive ethnic groups, tended to become a single group separate from the Moslem population, with their own common political and social interests.

The largest segment of the population, consisting of about 9 million (1958) were Arabic- or Berber-speaking Moslems. About 75 percent of the Berber population spoke Arabic. The non-European population was divided between Berbers and Arabs with the Berber speakers comprising about 25 percent of the Moslems.

Since the dawn of recorded history, Algeria and the rest of northern Africa has attracted invaders and colonizers. During a period of 3,000 years, the native Berbers have been subjugated by the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, Romans, Vandals, Arabs, Ottoman Turks, and French.

Resentment of French administration and the European population's sense of superiority date back to the arrival of the French in Algeria. In the earlier periods, the Moslem resentment was manifested only by the attempts of local groups to achieve popular reforms. As time passed, the Moslem Algerian unity transcended the narrow local and family concerns of the past. More and

more the Moslems began to see themselves as a single group aligned against the Europeans.[163]

From the early days of the French colonization, the economic and political power was concentrated in the hands of a few wealthy landowners, merchants, and land speculators, all of whom had benefited from the liberal homestead policy of the French. When some representation in the Government was allowed, the Europeans were again given the political advantage over the Moslem population.

INTERNAL DEFENSE

Internal Security Forces Problems

There is some indication that the tranquil period which followed the abortive revolt of May 1945 might have had some influence upon the designation of the problem. The French thought the situations were similar to each other and did not expect a full-scale insurgency. Therefore, the problem was originally defined as the putting down of a minor revolt by a group of political dissidents. Thus, the problem became one of maintaining state power. In order to solve the problem, the French Government granted authority to its Resident Minister substantially to increase the police forces and the police powers of the military forces. By the end of 1957, the French Government recognized the magnitude of the problem and started to develop the counterinsurgency tactics which stemmed the growth of the revolution.

Expanding the Internal Security Forces

In expanding the internal security forces, the French were faced with several problems. In any plan to use Moslems in the security force expansion, some consideration had to be given to the loyalty of the individuals and groups involved. The employment of French policemen from metropolitan France required a period of indoctrination and further training. In increasing the number of army units in Algeria, some consideration had to be given to the fact that these forces were not equipped, organized, or trained for the mission they had to accomplish.

Maintaining Public Confidence

This problem was complicated by the fact that there were longstanding animosities between the Europeans and the Moslems. The internal security forces suffered from a long history of having operated to sustain the European population in political and economic power and having disregarded the welfare of the

Moslem population. The Europeans, by insisting that no concessions be granted the Moslem population, ' locked any effort of the Government to win the confidence of the Moslem population by political, economic, or social reform. Some segments of the Moslem population did have confidence in the French. However, they were soon subjected to punitive sanctions by the insurgents. It was difficult, if not impossible, to retain the loyalty of these individuals and groups when the internal security forces could not guarantee their personal security.

Population Cleavages

There were several cleavages among the European and Moslem populations that contributed to the failure of counterinsurgency measures. There were political, ethnic, social, economic, and religious differences, making this situation one of the most complex in terms of cleavages in the post-World War II history of insurgency.

Recruitment

Besides the recruitment problem previously mentioned relative to the loyalty of Moslem recruits, the French faced two other recruitment problems. If Europeans were recruited into the police and paramilitary units, there was no assurance that they would not use their issued weapons as members of clandestine groups operating against the Moslems. The French Armed Forces were forced at this time to use a considerable number of draftees in the Algerian counterinsurgency effort. There was constant political pressure from metropolitan France either not to use draftees in Algeria or to reach a political solution with the rebels.

Collection of Intelligence Information

The collection of intelligence information was an important consideration. The French Army became preoccupied with this facet of operation. This interest stemmed from the knowledge that both the planning and implementation of insurgent activities, especially those in the cities, involved the knowledge of a considerable number of members of the Moslem population. In an attempt to gain this information, French troops resorted to the use of widespread brutality, reprisals against hostages, and torture. Brutal beatings, electric shock to sensitive areas of the body, the internal administration of pressurized gases and liquids, and the mutilation of bodily orifices by the forced insertion of wine bottles, all became standard interrogatory tactics.[161] French intelligence efforts were not confined to Algeria. They exploited the French prominence in Interpol, the International Police Organization, denouncing suspected FLN

sympathizers as common criminals. French military intelligence also conducted intelligence activity through such civilian groups as the terrorist "Red Hand." This organization operated against FLN logistics efforts in Italy, West Germany, and Switzerland.

Insurgent Terrorism

One of the primary techniques used by the insurgents was terror, especially against the members of the Moslem population, in order to assure their loyalty. The French Army, police, and administration were harassed by means of sabotage, assassination, and terror to make it impossible for the French to win a military victory over the insurgents. A bomb network was created to conduct terror in the cities. In many instances this network employed the services of unemployed workers or known gangsters. Another unit known as the "shock group" was charged with the responsibility of enforcing all FLN directives and were permitted to use any means available, ranging from intimidation and coercion to murder. [165]

Guerrilla Operations

Although the revolution was hurriedly organized, the leadership was composed of men who had gained experience in conventional and unconventional warfare. Their actions indicated that they were aware from the very first what the requirements were. The two-pronged assault which they launched against the French included guerrilla warfare in the rural areas and a campaign of terror in the urban areas. At the beginning, with almost no modern weapons and not much support, the guerrilla units withdrew to the mountain ranges of Algeria. There they recruited personnel to build a fighting organization. They attacked French patrols in order to capture weapons and started to organize their supply lines.

Border and Coastal Access

The lengthy coastline and common borders with Tunisia and Morocco posed a problem for the French. One of the first acts of the guerrillas was to organize supply lines and to set up bases in Tunisia and Morocco after these two countries had achieved their independence. Numerous small craft engaged in supplying arms, munitions, and supplies to the insurgents. The effective propaganda machine of the insurgents was responsible for soliciting quite a large amount of logistic support for the rebels. Yugoslavia and Egypt supplied a substantial amount of arms and ammunition. Extensive military support and assistance came from Tunisia and Morocco. On October 16, 1956, French naval

units stopped and boarded the ship Atos off the Cap de Trois-Fourches, a point near the Moroccan-Algerian border. The cargo, a consignment of 70 tons of arms, was confiscated. The French alleged that the ship had sailed from Alexandria, Egypt, and that the ship was piloted by an officer of the Egyptian Navy.

In order to seal off the Algerian-Tunisian border, the "Maurice line" was constructed. This was an electrified fence running about 400 kilometers along the border on either side of the Bone-Tebessa railway line. An electrified fence was also constructed along portions of the Moroccan-Algerian border. [166]

Civil Disturbances

The FLN used strikes and demonstrations to draw outside attention to the cause and to aggravate cleavages between the European and Moslem communities. Strikes in Algeria on August 20, 1955, were scheduled to coincide with demonstrations in Morocco which marked the anniversary of Moroccan independence from the French and were intended to give evidence of the solidarity of the North African people. The demonstrations and violence which occurred in September 1955 were timed to take place when the Algerian question was to be debated in the United Nations. In December 1960, demonstrations were launched by the FLN to show that the Algerian Moslems were unified against De Gaulle's offer of an Algerian Algeria.

The insurgents also organized demonstrations in order to provoke severe repressive measures by the French. The technique was for members of the FLN to organize a small demonstration. When the police or the army arrived on the scene, the members of the FLN would fire and then hastily leave the scene. The full force of the internal security force retaliation would be directed against the demonstrators and their families. This, of course, alienated them from support of the French.

Internal Security Forces

Organization, Functions, and Operations

The initial Algerian police services were established in 1844 in Algiers, Constantine, and Oran, and used the police system of metropolitan France as a model. The strength of these forces did not give them the capability of maintaining law and order outside the cities. The Algerian police forces after that time were continually strengthened; however, the division between civil and military activities had always been unclear. Various paramilitary police bodies, which have operated in the countryside, have been alternately under civilian and military control, depending upon the seriousness of the situation. The seriousness of the insurgency, after 1954, resulted in the formation of

police and army units, acting under joint command, to combat the insurgents.

The Algerian police were autonomous until January 1955. They were under the control of the Governor General, and personnel were not interchangeable with police personnel of metropolitan France. However, in 1955, the Algerian police were integrated into the French police system and placed under the General Directorate of National Security of the Ministry of the Interior. The police in Algeria were placed at the disposal of the Governor General of Algeria by the French Minister of the Interior, who retained ultimate control and could effect transfers of personnel between metropolitan France and Algeria. This arrangement was made to aid the French Government in its effort to control the actions of the police, especially the brutal measures which were sometimes employed against the Algerian Moslems. However, the Minister of the Interior seldom interfered with the Algerian Governor General's supervision of the police, although he had the authority to do so.

The Algerian Governor's responsibility for the maintenance of public order and the guarantee of respect for the law was exercised through the General Directorate of General Security. It directly operated administrative services, such as secretariats for regulations (dealing with the carrying of arms, public meetings, etc.), personnel, and materiel and the active (plainclothes) police services. The General Directorate also controlled the "external services," that is, the uniformed police attached to the departments and communes. The external services in Algeria were more decentralized than those in France. A substantial amount of police authority was delegated to one of the two Secretaries General of the Prefect administering each department. Under his guidance the subprefects, who supervised the arrondissements (the largest administrative subdivisions of French departments), were authorized to utilize the police personnel and material placed at their disposal by the Governor General to maintain public safety and law and order.

The criminal police were responsible for the detection and suppression of crime and had a broader responsibility for the internal security of the state. They were organized into mobile brigades, each of which was commanded by a police commissioner and included from 8 to 21 police officers, inspectors, and agents. In 1955, there were 7 of these brigades in the Algiers Department, 7 in the Oran Department, 11 in the Constantine Department and 2 in the Southern Territories, which were attached to those of the departments of Algiers and Oran. The criminal police functioned under the supervision of the judiciary and not under the supervision of administrative authorities. They also maintained, for the General Directorate of General Security in Algiers, the central documentary files on all known offenders.

The general information service had direct responsibility for keeping the Governor General informed of political, social, and economic developments

within the country. This organization had a central office in each department, under the supervision of a police commissioner, with posts in each major city. It had sections concerned with the surveillance of political activities. The general information service had sections concerned with the surveillance of political activities, social developments, financial matters, press, radio, films, associations of foreigners, and movement of persons in and out of the country. It also operated frontier posts.

The Territorial Surveillance Directorate (DST) was responsible for counterespionage operations. When this function was broadly interpreted it included meeting all possible threats to the internal and external security of the state. DST personnel, all of which held officer rank, were chosen from among the uniformed services and then especially trained in counterespionage techniques. Organized into territorial brigades, the DST was theoretically answerable to the Governor General. However, it depended almost entirely on orders from the commander of the DST or the Director General of National Security in Paris.

After the start of the insurgency, the DST played an important role in the functioning of the civil police, the gendarmerie, and the army, by exposing and rounding up members of insurgent terrorist organizations, especially in the urban areas.

The External Services consisted primarily of the uniformed state police, who had the responsibility for maintaining public safety, law, and order in the population centers and along public roads. This organization cooperated closely with the criminal police and general information services.

There were, in addition to the state police, large numbers of uniformed municipal police, who were not under the control of the Governor General but who were recruited, trained, and paid by municipal governments. At the outset of the insurgency, the mayors of small communes and the administrators of mixed communes exercised police powers under the general authorization of the prefects. They could use the municipal police force to enforce the law, investigate crimes, and arrest violators. After the insurgency had been in progress, these municipal forces were gradually amalgamated into the state police.

The Algerian police were a part of the civil service. Both Europeans and Moslems were eligible to take the competitive examinations for appointment and legally there was no discrimination. The Algerian police, the same as the police of metropolitan France, were forbidden to go on strike. After the integration of the French and Algerian police systems in 1955, there were numerous transfers in personnel between departments. One reason for this procedure was to made the two forces more homogeneous.

The gendarmerie, a paramilitary organization, was subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense. In normal times its main function was to assist the municipal police in maintaining law and order in areas where local police did not have the capability.

Expansion of the Police System

The rapid increase in terrorist acts following the outbreak of the insurgency and the decline in the level of public safety, law, and order, led to increases in personnel manning levels and the addition of equipment in the Algerian police forces. This strengthening was achieved by the creation of new types of police organizations or by the transfer of French police personnel to Algeria on special mission.

In December 1954, the French Minister of the Interior transferred to Algeria 20 Republican Security Companies (CRS) on temporary assignment to aid the police and gendarmerie in maintaining public safety, law, and order and to strengthen police units containing large numbers of Moslems considered politically unreliable. The CRS uniform police units were created in France immediately after World War II. They reinforced the local police, trained police units, and worked closely with the gendarmerie and the army. They became an elite corps of tough men used efficiently and often brutally to break up demonstrations and political opposition. Upon their arrival in Algeria, the CRS units were placed under the control of the Governor General and extensively used in conjunction with the gendarmerie, the DST, and army units, to round up insurgent terrorists in the cities and to patrol highways.

The Governor General established new police units in the rural areas in January 1955. Increases were made in 1957. The personnel of these forces were mainly Moslems who had formerly been members of the French Army. They were uniformed, trained, and paid by the Algerian Administration. Units were made available to the subprefects and communal administrators throughout northern Algeria and participated in operations with the army and police.

The French Parliament declared a state of emergency to exist in the Aures area of Algeria in April 1955. This emergency was extended to most of Algeria. It resulted in increases in the number of police and gendarmerie and in improvement of their motorized equipment and weapons, but it failed to halt the insurgents.

In mid-1956 the French Government authorized the Governor General of Algeria to use extraordinary powers for the purpose of reestablishing law and order. Included in the powers were placing individuals under house arrest, prohibiting meetings, and dissolving associations. In June 1956, the 3 departments of Algeria were divided into 12 new departments. Three subprefects known as Inspectors General of Administration on Extraordinary Mission (IGAME) were named to coordinate the public security activities of the police and military authorities. Military authorities throughout Algeria were empowered to arrest without warrant and to bring before a permanent court of the Armed Forces all persons caught, armed or uniformed, in acts against persons and property.

In an attempt to reestablish order in the Moslem villages and to reestablish contact between French and Moslems, the Governor General established the Specialized Administrative Sections (SAS) composed of French army volunteers trained to handle Moslem affairs. In August 1957 there were over 600 SAS units, about 3,700 officers and men, operating in rural areas.

The concept of civilian self-defense was established in 1956 primarily to permit the arming of Europeans living on isolated farms and to facilitate the formation of "home guards" to protect Moslem villages from nationalist terrorism. The French also established fortified farms with small groups of men connected by some form of communication with army units. The number of the home guard units or harkas rose rapidly in mid-1957 with 240 villages reported to be protected.

The French then decided to depend primarily on units composed of European Algerians for the protection of areas where the Europeans were represented in sufficient numbers. Some of the members of the harkas deserted to the insurgents and some of the Europeans supported the extreme groups organized by Europeans. This posed a dilemma for the Government.

The police increased their terrorist activity against the Moslem population as the insurgency increased. Many suspects were tortured and some disappeared, never to be heard from again. Defense lawyers who handled cases for Moslems were arrested and some were assassinated. Some Moslem police deserted to the insurgents.

A review of the internal security forces of Algeria during the early part of the insurgency indicates that they were faced with numerous problems that were complicated and some were of long standing. The efficiency of the forces involved appears in general to have been good. Perhaps the single most important factor influencing their operation was the longstanding animosity between the European and Moslem communities and the breakdown of communications between the two. The distrust that existed between the communities manifested itself in the internal security forces. Army units composed of French officers and Moslem enlisted personnel encountered difficulty when the murder of French officers and defection of their troops to the insurgents caused other French officers serving in similar capacities to be suspicious. The open sympathy of European members of the police for the European community influenced their treatment of the groups involved. The allegiances of the home guard type or self-defense groups to their own ethnic groups caused some difficulty for the administrators.[167]

Population and Resources Control

Problems

The primary reason for imposing population control measures in Algeria was to deny the insurgents control over the population, thereby cutting off the support that the insurgents were able to receive. The problem then was composed of two distinct parts, one being the problem of population control in the urban areas and the other population control in rural areas.

Objectives and Functions

The objective was maximum control over those segments of the population which were most likely to offer aid and assistance to the rebels through their own free will or who were most likely to be coerced and intimidated into offering aid and assistance. The internal security forces were given authority to perform the function of administration as well as the police function. The Specialized Administration Sections (SAS) were activated and assigned the function of reestablishing contact between European and Moslem populations and to weaken FLN influence over the population, particularly in rural areas, by means of asserting the "French presence." These units usually consisted of volunteers from the officer corps of the army who were especially trained. They were assisted by volunteer noncommissioned officers and from one to three civilians under special contract.[168]

Methods and Techniques

After government forces had won the battle of Algiers against the insurgents in September 1957, the paratroopers established the ilot (small island) system. In this system, one individual in each family group was made responsible for the location of all the other members of his family. The arrangement was pyramidal in character with the responsible family man on each floor of every building being responsible to a floor chief. The chain of responsibility extended upward from every family in the casbah to the French headquarters. Seventy-five thousand Moslems were included in the system. The arrangement permitted the military to contact or apprehend any Moslem in the casbah within minutes. The French stooges were called bleus after the blue jeans worn by Moslems working at odd jobs in French Army camps. During this period, the population of the casbah could not make a move without the approval of the bleus. The French Army penetration of the casbah was thorough and complete.[169]

Tactics similar to the ilot were put in effect throughout Algeria. Outside of the urban areas, the army used its administration of basic services as a means

of controlling villages. In the interior, population control was exercised through the control of education, medical attention, employment, transportation, and food. Administrative services such as the publishing of newspapers and registration of births and marriages were conducted by military officers.[170]

SAS units accompanied by a detachment of armed Moslem volunteers handled all strictly local problems in areas to which they were assigned. Such activities consisted of rebuilding sabotaged schools and teaching Moslem children.

Thousands of Moslems were forcibly relocated from critical areas termed security zones. Their dwellings were burned and government planes, tanks, and armored cars patrolled these areas, shooting at anything that moved. Many of the specially built camps and villages to which the uprooted Moslems were moved were near army camps. The French reported that more than 1 million persons were moved in these operations. The International Red Cross placed the figure at closer to 2 million.[171]

The techniques of population census and the issuance of identification cards were widely used. One technique used by the paratroopers was to cordon off an area, make a census, and issue new identification cards on the spot. Checkpoints were randomly established at which identification cards had to be shown.[172]

DISCUSSION

One of the characteristic features of the Algerian insurgency was the number of areas in which the groups composing the population had significant differences. The cultural, religious, social, economic, political, and status differences between the European and Moslem segments of the population structured the insurgency situation in such a manner that a reconciliation between the two groups was all but impossible. The animosity that existed adversely influenced the maintenance of internal security and the counterinsurgency effort.

Here again the ability to introduce resources from outside the country permitted the internal security forces to bring some stability to the situation. These outside resources enabled the French to limit substantially the aid that the insurgents were receiving from outside the country. The large number of internal security forces that were introduced precluded the insurgents from mounting an offensive of their own.

The caution that had to be exercised by the French in recruiting both Moslem and French Algerians into the internal security forces was a unique feature of the conflict. This caution resulted from the struggle that was taking place between the two groups. Secret terrorist organizations on both sides took sanctions and sought reprisals against members of the opposing group.

The organization of the population and the forceful control by the French illustrate that hostile populations can be organized and controlled, notwithstanding their lack of public confidence in the internal security forces. It also reveals what extreme measures may be necessary to accomplish this objective.

The army in this instance had always exercised police powers since the conquest of Algeria by the French. Here is an illustration of the delegation on a permanent basis of a function normally exercised, except in cases of emergency, by civil police or paramilitary forces. However, the civil police and paramilitary forces continued also to exercise these police functions. This situation produced some jurisdictional and coordinating problems.

One important feature of the Algerian experience is that the decision to end the conflict was political one, made when the internal security forces had not been defeated by the insurgents, and exceptional in the fact that the decision was apparently made to sacrifice the interests of the European Algerians in favor of the national interests of France.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SOUTH VIETNAM, 1954-1965

SUMMARY ACCOUNT

Following their defeat at Dien Bien Phu the French found themselves in an untenable position and they were obliged to enter negotiations at an international conference convened in Geneva, Switzerland. This conference succeeded in settling the status of the three former French possessions in Indochina. In this settlement the independence of Vietnam from the French Union was agreed to and the country was divided into a "people's democracy" in the north allied with the Communist bloc and an autocratic republic which was pro-Western. The Geneva Agreement provided for the eventual reunification of the country through popular elections.

After the ceasefire and division of the country at the 17th parallel, there was some exchange of population between the north and the south, with supporters of the Viet Minh being permitted to move north and those people in the north who supported the south being permitted to move south. Many in the latter category were Catholics. There is some evidence that the Viet Minh took advantage of this population exchange in order to leave behind some 6,000 elite troops who hid large quantities of weapons and supplies and kept their hideouts intact.

Evidence that the North Vietnamese Communists never intended to abandon the struggle for unification was manifested by the creation of the Vietnamese Fatherland Front (To-Quoc). In 1960 the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam (NLF/SVN) was formed. Both of the above organizations were under the control of the North Vietnamese Communist Party.

The military arm of the insurgent organization, the Viet Cong, was composed of three different organizations. The Chu Luc was the regular guerrilla force and functioned as a mobile regular army. It moved from area to area and fought when it had the advantage. The regional troops, the Dia Phuong Quon, usually lived in their own villages and operated within a specific geographic region. The members of the local militia, the Du Kich, remained in their villages and farmed their land. They provided supplies and aid to both regular and regional troops when needed.

During the initial period of the insurgency, that is, from about August 1956 to about January 1960, the insurgent operations were characterized by stepped-up underground resistance. The apparatus that had existed in the days of the struggle against the French was reactivated. Organization of underground cells was undertaken and the collection of intelligence information was increased. Logistical bases containing arms, ammunition, and other supplies were established in strategic locations.

Other activities were characteristic of an insurgent movement prior to the introduction of armed guerrillas, such as terror, coercion, kidnaping, and assassination. The insurgents did stage a few commando-type raids. The pattern of the assassination of such village leaders as mayors, police officials, policemen, and leaders of civilian organizations became clear in 1957 and continued to be a problem in ensuing years.

Perhaps the most significant activity of the Viet Cong during this period was the gaining of administrative control over a substantial number of villages. At the end of 1962, the Communists had extended their control to 80 percent of the countryside. By April 1964, about 42 percent of the villages were under Viet Cong control, only 24 percent were under control of the South Vietnamese Government, while the remainder existed partially under the control of both the Government and the Viet Cong.

With the beginning of 1960, the Viet Cong stepped up the pace to guerrilla warfare with an attack on a South Vietnamese arms and ammunition storage area. Using standard guerrilla tactics, the Viet Cong continued ambushes, and surprise assaults, and made use of captured arms and equipment. Foreign arms of heavier caliber such as anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns were introduced.

Conventional tactics were introduced in early 1963, and, after several months of the continuing struggle, in 1964 the insurgents were making some attacks with regiment-sized units. The situation had become so critical that increased aerial bombardment of Viet Cong troop concentrations and supply dumps was undertaken early in 1965. Other stepped-up actions included the aerial bombing of targets in Laos and North Vietnam by South Vietnamese and United States planes. The United States Navy during this period started to assist the South Vietnamese Navy in patrolling the coastal areas to prevent the introduction of arms, supplies, and manpower. Substantial U.S. ground combat units were committed to the conflict.

HISTORICAL AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS

The Republic of Vietnam, which is more commonly referred to as South Vietnam, is approximately as large as the State of Washington, and has a total population of about 14 million people. The majority of the people live in the fertile delta of the Mekong River which is located at the southern end of the country, or in other small deltas along the narrow coastal plain which lies between the Chaîne Annamitique and the South China Sea. Some 85 percent of the population are engaged in agriculture with rice being the principal crop. With the exception of some 1 million Chinese and 350,000 Cambodians, most of whom live in the Mekong Delta area the inhabitants of these lowland areas are all ethnic Vietnamese


NORTH VIETNAM
DEMARCATION LINE
Gulf of Tonkin
International boundary
Canal
Capital
0 10 20 30 40 50 100
MILES
LAOS
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
Annam
Cordillera
Hue
Tourane
Faifo
Quang Ngai
Bong Son
Nha Trang
Dalat
Saigon
My Tho
Cu Lao Hon
Duong Dong
Con Son
North
Mekong
South China Sea
Gulf of Siam
SOUTH VIETNAM
HPO, Jr

To the north of Saigon the Central Highlands area forms a fertile plateau. This plateau is sparsely populated by various indigenous tribal groups, all of whom have come to be known as "montagnards." It has been estimated that from 500,000 to 700,000 montagnards occupy an area that is twice the size of the Mekong Delta and the Central Lowlands combined. These people have not been integrated into the mainstream of national life in South Vietnam, and generally live the life of primitive agriculturists out of touch with the bulk of the people of the lowlands.[173]

The climate of the country is tropical and there is a range of temperatures from 90 degrees in the delta to 60 degrees in the highlands. The humidity of the lowlands, except for the winter months, is high. South Vietnam is located in the monsoon belt and has a rainy summer season which is characterized by typhoon-like storms.[174]

In terms of religion, the population of South Vietnam can be generally classified as Buddhists, Catholics, and members of various sects such as the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao. Catholicism is the religion of the overwhelming majority of the 1.5 million Christians in the country.[175] In considering Buddhism, perhaps the critical criterion is whether or not an individual would rally to Buddhism if he felt that it were threatened. It has been estimated that under these conditions approximately seven and one-half million people could be expected to react as Buddhists, two and one-half million as Cao Dai, and two million as Hoa Hao.[176]

Vietnamese is one of the many languages, dialects, and subdialects spoken on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. The relationship among these languages has never been clearly established. Linguists do agree that Vietnamese is one of a large group of tonal languages which includes Chinese. In its spoken form Vietnamese has three major dialects which are northern, central, and southern. They differ from each other in tonal pattern, pronunciation, and vocabulary. The dialects are mutually intelligible only within limits, with great differences being found among the various villages.

The social structure of the Vietnamese has been strongly influenced by the Chinese family tradition. In the villages the social structure is based upon the extended family group. The external appearance of the Vietnamese village has changed very little with time. It continues as the focal point of social, moral, and religious life and remains isolated from many of the changes which were more strongly felt in the cities and towns. However, upon closer scrutiny, it is evident that the foundations of the traditional village order have been undermined. The Vietnamese villager found himself at the bottom of a pyramid of higher levels, some of which were slowly crumbling under the weight of an alien authority. As the villager began to perceive that the traditional values were losing force with his superiors, he also started to question them. The French, by intervention in local affairs and the curtailment of the power of independent

decision of the village elders, weakened their authority. Colonial economic demands resulted in new burdens being placed upon the peasants without the provision of corresponding rewards or incentives. The situation tended to arouse the traditional resentments with which the Vietnamese has reacted to foreign domination. It also served to alter the character of the aspiration for independence. The way to modern nationalism was cleared by the weakening of the institutional supports of the society.

Most of the people of South Vietnam are farmers who live in scattered villages and hamlets; they have 7 million acres under cultivation, with 5.7 million acres in irrigated rice. Plots are usually from 5 to 12 acres. The farmer is able to supplement his diet with vegetables from the family garden, some livestock and poultry, and fish from the canals.

Tea and rubber plantations located on the slopes of the Central Highlands cover about 300,000 acres and employ some 50,000 persons. The French still own most of these plantations. In the Central Highlands there are an estimated 5 million acres of fertile uncultivated land. About 190,000 fishermen ply their trade along the coast.[177]

Internal Security Forces Problems

The philosophical beliefs and character of President Diem made it difficult for him and, therefore, for the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to recognize that the insurgency was a revolutionary conflict. Because of his background and political ideology, Diem tended to see his Government as the one true expression of Vietnamese revolution and nationalism. He was very reluctant to admit that the insurgency of the Viet Cong bore any relationship to the insurgency of the Viet Minh against the French. He apparently confused the beginnings of the Viet Cong insurgency with the dying embers of the French Indochina conflict. Some indication that the major problem facing the Republic of Vietnam was not correctly perceived by the Government is that the Armed Forces were organized and equipped to defend against a conventional armed attack from North Vietnam.[178]

Expanding the Internal Security Forces

The problem of expanding the internal security forces has been a constant one throughout the counterinsurgency effort. This expansion problem has been associated with all three types of internal security forces: the army, the

paramilitary forces, and the civilian police forces. Other problems associated with expansion are organization, equipment, recruitment, and training.

Maintaining Public Confidence

The maintenance of public confidence in the Government has been one of the major problems of the insurgency. This problem has several facets. The success of the Viet Cong, and the fact that they have almost complete control over some areas of the country and partial control over other areas, has tended to weaken public confidence in the Government. The lack of government stability, especially in leadership at the national level, has also adversely influenced public confidence.

The traditional peasant's distrust of the police power of the state, which has been reinforced by inconsiderate acts on the part of military and civilian police personnel, has tended to alienate certain segments of the population.

Population Cleavages

At least four different cleavages in the population appear to have had an influence upon counterinsurgency efforts. The longstanding animosity between Vietnamese and montagnard has made the necessary cooperation between the two groups difficult. During the month of October 1965, the Vietnamese Marines disarmed a montagnard unit which had been equipped and trained to operate against the Viet Cong. There is always a possibility that the distrust between the two ethnic groups may affect the relationship between United States advisors and Vietnamese Armed Forces personnel. U.S. advisors have enjoyed a good working relationship with the montagnards.

The cleavage which exists between Buddhists and Catholics has plagued every government since the Republic of Vietnam was founded. During the Diem regime, Buddhists claimed that Catholics were getting preference in political appointments and in other areas. Since that time, conflict between Buddhists and Catholics has been responsible for explosive civil disturbances which have tied down a number of internal security forces that could otherwise have been employed against the Viet Cong.

The cleavage between urban and rural inhabitants has made the insurgency, in some instances, appear as a conflict between villager and city dweller. Part of this impression is perhaps created by the fact that the capital and symbol of government authority is a large city.

Recruitment

Recruitment for the internal security forces has become a problem. One of the underlying reasons is that both sides in the struggle are securing their

recruits from the same population base. As the Viet Cong effectively control large areas of the country, recruiting by the Government in these areas is precluded. There is also competition for recruits by the government administrative structure and the labor market. It also seems reasonable to assume that some young men in the population might be reluctant to enter the internal security forces if a political settlement or an insurgent victory appeared imminent.

Collection of Intelligence Information

The collection of intelligence information in South Vietnam has been of vital importance to the counterinsurgency effort. The need for good intelligence information is caused by the excellent intelligence network that the insurgents have established.

In order to carry out effective countermeasures, some indication of the location of guerrilla elements must be ascertained. Various sources, such as aerial reconnaissance and radio reports from outposts, have been utilized. In some instances the field interrogation of captured guerrillas or insurgent supporters, by members of the South Vietnamese internal security forces, has been characterized by harsh methods.

Efforts have been made to secure the defection of guerrillas and other insurgents from whom some intelligence information might be obtained. The ability of the Viet Cong to impose punitive sanctions upon individuals and groups who supply intelligence information to government forces has been a factor in the conflict. For example, when the Viet Cong are forced to evacuate a village, they leave behind one person who will report to them, should they return, on villagers who have cooperated with the government forces.

The civilian police in the urban areas have networks of informers, some of whom are paid for their services. Paid informers in many instances work for both sides, selling information to the highest bidder.

Insurgent Terrorism

The terror effort of the Viet Cong has reached a high level of effectiveness. Terror is utilized in both urban and rural operations.

Special enforcement squads operate in the villages. Government administrators and non-cooperating village chiefs have been the victims of assassination. As early as 1957, it became obvious that the assassination of youth leaders, teachers, policemen, police commissioners, village leaders, and mayors had reached such a proportion that the fabric of the local administration of South Vietnam was threatened. In 1957, it was reported that 472 village chiefs had been killed.[179] In 1960 and 1961, it was reported that almost 3,000 Vietnamese civilians—some in the service of the Government—were assassinated, and 2,500 were kidnaped.[180]

Guerrilla Operations

The insurgency in South Vietnam has been characterized by guerrilla operations since its inception. Viet Cong guerrilla commands comprise both mobile and territorial units. The difference between the two units became more important when the insurgency moved from underground resistance to open combat. The mobile units are made up of hard-core regulars recruited in the south or from among those who have infiltrated from the north. The territorial units, made up of regional battalions and local militia operate with some exceptions within their own home areas.[181]

The insurgents initially equipped themselves with the weapons of such foreign countries as France, Japan, Russia, Germany, and the United States. The Viet Cong strategy was to use the same type of armament as that used by the South Vietnamese Government in order to facilitate the utilization of captured ammunition and spare parts.[182]

It is obvious that the Viet Cong started receiving external aid at an early date. The amount that was received from specific countries is, of course, not verifiable. Some of the external support came from China with North Vietnam being the chief source.[183]

The success of insurgent guerrilla operations is indicated by the fact that the United States committed ground combat troops to aid the South Vietnamese Government in containing the Viet Cong guerrillas in 1965.

Border and Coastal Access

One of the difficult problems in the counterinsurgency effort has been the control of the entry of personnel and supplies into South Vietnam both by land and by water. Vital supplies reaching the Viet Cong have included medicines, maps, and propaganda equipment in addition to arms and ammunition.[184] Through 1963, it was estimated that 7 percent of the material requirements of the Viet Cong came from outside Vietnam.[185] Weapons deliveries apparently have been stepped up since that time.[186]

North Vietnam serves as a sanctuary where Viet Cong reinforcements are trained and oriented. Some 90,000 South Vietnamese went north at the time of the partitioning of Vietnam in 1954. Before 1964, it is estimated that approximately 34,000 infiltrators, originally from South Vietnam, returned to the South. Most infiltrators since 1964 have apparently been native North Vietnamese.[187]

Countermeasures have included aerial reconnaissance to guard borders, where feasible, and the increased patrol of coastal waters.

Civil Disturbances

Civil disturbances in the form of demonstrations and riots have been a problem for the internal security forces. The most serious of these have involved Buddhists and Catholics and date back to the Diem regime. There have been accusations in many instances that Viet Cong agents have been responsible for fomenting the demonstrations and riots.

In May 1963, President Diem's difficulties with the Buddhists became critical. Local authorities at Hue, the traditional capital and center of Buddhist influence, would not allow the Buddhist flag to show in parades in honor of Buddha's anniversary. The Buddhists retaliated with the fact that the Catholics had been allowed to fly their church banners. The Buddhists chose May 8, 1963, as a day to demonstrate against the ban. Nine demonstrators were killed when the Hue police fired into the crowd. This incident served to increase the smoldering resentment felt by the Buddhists against what they considered to be the preferential treatment of the Catholic minority of South Vietnam.[188]

Internal Security Forces Organization

Background

At the start of the World War II, large cities such as Saigon had their own police departments which were administered by the mayor and the local council. The responsibility for maintaining law and order in the outlying areas belonged to the security police which had Vietnamese officers but were under the close supervision of the French colonial administration. It was difficult for these police units to develop uniform police procedures because French supervisors served such short tours of duty.

In 1941 the Japanese occupied Cochinchina and permitted the police organizations then in existence to continue to perform their functions under the Vichy administration. Vichy France fell in 1945, and a nationalist regime of short duration was formed under the former Emperor Bao Dai. The Japanese allowed this regime to exist, but the Japanese position deteriorated near the end of the war, and Communist Viet Minh forces increased their control. The Viet Minh pressure upon the government of Bao Dai had become so intense that in August 1949 he abdicated in favor of the Viet Minh government. The British were designated by the Potsdam Conference, held in July 1945, to accept the surrender of Japanese forces in Cochinchina. British military units landed in the area and exercised police control until the French expeditionary force arrived a short time later. The chaotic and turbulent period which followed the end of World War II was characterized by successive changes in police authority. Many police records, including criminal records, were lost or destroyed. The

Communists took advantage of the disorder to infiltrate into many key positions in the security police.

After the French had reinstalled themselves in Vietnam they were faced with a widespread and increasing sentiment for independence. The well-organized Communist movement exploited this sentiment. When the French attempted to impose strict police controls, they were met with increasing public antagonism, especially in the urban centers. In a move designed to gain control of the country the Communists organized a national assembly in 1946 in Hanoi. The French reacted to the mounting pressure for independence by granting Vietnam independence within the French Union. The former Emperor Bao Dai returned from France, where he had been in voluntary exile, to become the chief of state.

Although the new government acquired some police powers, the French continued to exert considerable influence. For example, they maintained a police apparatus of their own. One factor which limited the Bao Dai government in the functions of police power was the lack of experience of the Vietnamese police officials in responsible positions. Both the criminal and subversive elements of the population took advantage of this situation.

When the Indochina War ended in June 1954 and the country became divided at the 17th parallel, the police were no longer effective in the cities, and in the villages they were largely under the control of Viet Minh forces. In the Saigon area the control of the municipal and security police had been turned over by Bao Dai to the Binh Xuyen. This political and racketeering organization had agreed to perform the function of maintaining public safety, law, and order in exchange for the control of gambling, prostitution, and the traffic in narcotics. This organization further profited from its control of imports and the sale of commodities such as rice and fish in the Saigon area. In addition, two religious sects, the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, were in control of large areas of the country and maintained their own police and security forces. The area of operation for the Cao Dai was Tay Ninh and neighboring provinces north of Saigon. The Hoa Hao operated in provinces southwest of Saigon.

By the summer of 1954 the Binh Xuyen had become so powerful that it was threatening to take over all government functions. The state of public safety, law, and order continued to deteriorate. Saigon was characterized by conflicts among the groups which were contending for power, with the presence of French expeditionary forces adding to the tensions which existed.

In an effort to bring the situation under control Ngo Dinh Diem was appointed Prime Minister of the Bao Dai government with full military and police powers. The strategy of Diem was first to win the confidence and loyalty of certain army battalions and then to win over the Cao Dai leaders and their forces. In this endeavor Diem achieved some success. On October 23, 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem became President, replacing Bao Dai as the chief of state.

The move to eliminate the Binh Xuyen as a power in Saigon had begun in April 1955. The Binh Xuyen attempted to retain their power, and street fighting erupted in Saigon. However, their forces proved to be no match for those of the army, and their defeat and the subsequent arrest and execution of Hoa Hao leader Ba Cut resulted in the restoration of some of the confidence and effectiveness that the forces of law and order had lost.

National Police Organization

The most recent reorganization of the National Police of Vietnam was, as were those which preceded it, an attempt to give the police a better posture and to permit them to cope more realistically and efficiently with the problems of counterinsurgency and the maintenance of law and order. The executive order directing this reorganization was signed on June 27, 1962. At that time, the National Police and Sûreté services, the municipal police of the city of Saigon, the municipal police of the provincial chief town, and the rural police of South Vietnam were integrated into a single organization called the National Police. This organization has jurisdiction over all the territory of the Republic of Vietnam. The reorganization provided for the standardization of police wages, allowances, uniforms, and badges. The National Police includes Special Police, Judicial Police, Uniform and Traffic Police, Administrative Police, Combat Police, Scientific Police, Immigration Control, and In-Service and Technical Training, operating under the Directorate General of Police.

The Directorate General of Police. The Directorate General of Police, headed by a director general assisted by a deputy director general, is composed of many services and bureaus, grouped according to their operational natures into three blocs: (1) the police operations bloc; (2) the administrative bloc; and (3) the special police bloc. Each bloc is supervised by an assistant director who is directly responsible to the director general and the deputy director general.

The police operations bloc includes the following services and bureaus of purely operational nature: (1) judicial police service; (2) immigration service; (3) administrative police service; (4) combat police service; and (5) uniform and traffic police service.

The administration bloc is supervised by an assistant director responsible for the following services and bureaus of managerial and support nature: (1) personnel service; (2) budget and accounting service; (3) supply and logistic service; (4) laboratory service; (5) records and identification service; (6) legal bureau; and (7) training bureau.

The special police bloc is supervised by an assistant director responsible for the following services and bureaus whose operations are of a pacification

nature: (1) operation service; (2) plan service; (3) administrative bureau; and (4) operations coordinating bureau. The operations service is responsible for gathering information on political activities and carrying out investigations and undercover activities against subversive elements.

Six elements are directly responsible to the director general and the deputy director general: (1) the private office; (2) the secretariat; (3) the special bureau; (4) the telecommunications bureau; (5) the central technical bureau; and (6) the inspection team.

The Judicial Police Service. The judicial police service is headed by a chief of service and is responsible for:

(1) Supervising and controlling judicial operations of regional directorates and provincial police for the purpose of standardizing judicial regulations and procedures.

(2) Developing statistics and charts of crimes and studying prevention and repression measures.

(3) Acting in the capacity of judicial police officers representing the public prosecutor regarding crimes which concern several regions, provinces, or areas at one time, or which are of an international nature. This service acts also on specific judicial missions assigned by superiors.

(4) Assigning investigators to support local units in the completion of important judicial investigations.

The judicial police service has two bureaus: (1) the criminal bureau: and (2) the control-research bureau. The chief of the criminal bureau is a sworn-in officer who is qualified as a judicial officer. He is assisted by a number of sworn-in officers.

The Administrative Police Service. The administrative police service is headed by a chief of service and is responsible for:

(1) Supervising and controlling the operations at regional directorates and provincial police regarding the control of weapons, associations, unions, released or confined prisoners, motorized vehicles, radio receivers and transmitters, hotels, and rented apartments. It also issues passports and exit visas to South Vietnamese citizens.

(2) Making studies and suggestions for changes of administrative regulations in view of a more appropriate application of these regulations. The administrative police service has three bureaus: (1) the administrative investigation bureau: (2) the passport bureau; and (3) the control and research bureau.

The Immigration Service. The immigration service is headed by a chief of service and is responsible for:

(1) Controlling and maintaining a census of foreigners applying for residence in Vietnam and making official reports for prosecution of illegal residents.

(2) Receiving applications for entry of foreigners, submitting the applications and files to the ministry, and issuing visas after approval is given by the minister.

(3) Investigating foreigners who apply for South Vietnamese citizenship.

(4) Conducting administrative investigations of foreign residents.

(5) Controlling passengers at Saigon Airport and Harbor.

The immigration service has three bureaus: (a) the entry and exit bureau; (b) the immigration control bureau; and (c) the files bureau. The chief of the immigration control bureau is a sworn-in officer, qualified as a judicial police officer.

The Combat Police Service. The combat police service is commanded by a chief of service and is responsible for:

(1) Support of intelligence activities.

(2) Conducting police operations to destroy the enemy's armed elements who operate on highways and commit individual acts of terrorism.

(3) Specific security duties for the protection of VIP's when they are on movement.

(4) Reinforcement and support of local police units.

(5) Military training for personnel of the combat police service.

The combat police service has three bureaus: (a) the reconnaissance bureau; (b) the operations bureau; and (c) the administrative bureau.

The Uniform and Traffic Police Service. The uniform and traffic police service is commanded by a chief of service and is responsible for:

(1) Making studies and distribution of uniform and traffic police regulations.

(2) Making statistics and charts of traffic accidents, and recommendations for preventive measures or for appropriate improvements.

(3) The service has two bureaus: (a) the research bureau; and (b) the control bureau.

The Headquarters Security Bureau. The headquarters security bureau is headed by a chief of bureau and is responsible for maintaining security at the headquarters of the directorate general of police. Personnel of this bureau are grouped in two categories:

(1) Personnel in uniform who are in charge of guard duties at vulnerable points at the headquarters.

(2) Personnel in plainclothes, doing undercover work, observing men and things and taking preventive action against any sabotage or infiltration of the enemy in the compound.

Regional, Provincial, and Municipal Organization

There is a police directorate in each region, supervised by a director assisted by a deputy director. This official is responsible for supervising, controlling, and coordinating the provincial police agencies in the region. The Saigon municipal police also has a director and a deputy directory. This force is responsible for maintaining public order in the municipality. The police precincts within the Saigon area on land as well as on rivers, the harbor police, and the Tan San Nhut Airport police are all directly attached to the municipal police.

Each province has a police force which has jurisdiction over the province and has the responsibility for maintaining security and order in the province. The police force in each province is designated by the name of the province.

In major cities such as Hue, Da Nang, and Dalat there are city police who are independent of the provincial police in the province where the city is located. The city police force has a more restricted organization than the provincial police and is headed by a sworn-in police chief having judicial powers.

There is a police precinct in each municipal administrative district which is supervised by a chief of precinct. The functions of the precinct are exercised by: (1) a judicial police bureau; (2) an administrative police bureau; and (3) an operational bureau.

Each administrative district has a police sector supervised by a sworn-in chief of sector who has judicial powers. Each sector includes three sections: (1) a police section which maintains, orders, directs traffic, and assures guard duties; (2) a studies section which acts in secrecy and is responsible for pursuing, investigating, and interrogating on judicial as well as police matters; and (3) a secretarial section that is responsible for records, personnel, materials, equipment, correspondence, and typing.

In densely populated villages a police sub-sector may be created and supervised by a chief of sub-sector.[189]

Objectives and Functions

The objectives and functions of the internal security forces, especially those of the civilian police forces, are identifiable from the foregoing description of the National Police. This reorganization has produced a force in which the problems encountered by the police are reflected in the functions and structure of the organization.[190]

ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE NATIONAL POLICE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM



Source: Adapted from Adkins, F. B., Jr. The Police and Resources Control in Counter Insurgency. Saigon: Public

A COMMAND ORGANIZATION FOR THE FUNCTION OF CONTROL
OF POPULATION AND MATERIAL MOVEMENT:
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM



Source: Adapted from Adkins, E. M., Jr. The Police and Resources Control in Counter Insurgency. Saigon: Public Safety Division, United States Operations Mission to Viet Nam, 1964, p. 29.

Methods and Techniques of Operation

Most of the provincial governors and many of the district chiefs are officers of the army. In some areas it has been necessary for the military to assume police responsibilities in order to meet the threat of the Viet Cong or to relieve local tension created by fear of the Viet Cong. Sometimes the army participates with the police in patrol, surveillance, and guard duties. The army has also been active in assisting the police in training matters. Paramilitary organizations of various types have been created to assist the army in maintaining internal security and to ease the heavy pressures imposed upon the civilian police officers by Communist terrorism.

Population and Resources Control Problems

The insurgents in South Vietnam have been very active in the rural areas and have not only sought aid and assistance from the peasants but have also established administrative control of many villages and areas. In some villages where the Viet Cong have not been able to establish effective administrative control they have established partial control in that the peasants of the villages must comply with their demands when government forces are not present to guarantee the personal safety of the inhabitants. Implicit in the problem of denying population support and resources to the insurgents is the protection of the personal safety of the individual peasant.

Objectives and Functions. The objectives of population and resources control in South Vietnam have been to formulate workable plans for accomplishing the goal of denying the support of the population and resources to the Viet Cong and for translating these plans into workable programs and regulations. As in many other complex objectives of this type, this is the point at which difficulty has been encountered.

The population and resources control programs and regulations in South Vietnam have had to make special considerations in the assigning of functions, with the military being assigned many of the administrative as well as the operational functions. The internal security forces, especially at the field implementation level, have performed a substantial portion of the critical functions that are concerned with the maintenance of public safety, and law and order.

Methods and Techniques of Operation. The strategic hamlet program instituted in South Vietnam was an attempt to deny the Viet Cong access to population and resources and to protect the peasants. The new strategic hamlet scheme was started in March 1963. The Government envisioned that the needs of the villagers would be met through direct contact between them and the

authorities. All means were to be used to give the hamlet direct assistance and to bring it into the orbit of the nation. Another aim of the scheme was to make the hamlet residents realize their rights and responsibilities and to provide them the means for active participation in the reconstruction and defense of the country, to give them equal opportunities of fulfillment of their rights, and of enjoying the benefits that the nation can afford them.

The translation of these aims into programs and regulations has presented some difficulties. The Viet Cong appeared to recognize immediately the threat that the strategic hamlet program posed to its own objectives and it initiated measures to limit and destroy the effectiveness of specific hamlets.

Some difficulty was situational in character. Peasants in some instances were reluctant to being relocated and even if forcibly relocated left the strategic hamlets and returned to their homes. In some instances the location of the strategic hamlet was neither tactically nor militarily tenable. This situation was largely influenced by the aggressive counteraction of the Viet Cong.

The administrative and coercive control established by the Viet Cong in some areas resulted in no loss of their control of the peasants concerned, regardless of the bamboo spikes, barbed wire, and self-defense forces. Even if control was not partial or absolute, several Viet Cong agents or sympathizers could compromise the defenses of a strategic hamlet.

Some of the lack of effectiveness of the program resulted from the very human failing of subordinates trying to please superiors. One of the primary criteria by which the effectiveness of the program was judged was the total number of strategic hamlets completed. The desire of officials at national government level to keep this figure continually and rapidly increasing led subordinates at the field operational level to hastily complete strategic hamlets in disregard of the prevailing circumstances. One such technique was to surround a village which was militarily not tenable with barbed wire rather than to take the time required to relocate it in a tactically defensible area.

The concept of collective control of the strategic hamlets was also used to organize urban communities into strategic subquarters or streets and to sectionalize the cities and towns in an effort to apply some of the control methods utilized in the strategic hamlet. This method of control has been used in Dalat, Can Tho, and other large towns.

The national identity card program was established in South Vietnam in April 1959 with a pilot program in two southern provinces. This program was accompanied by a public relations effort designed to condition the public for its implementation. Identity cards were not a new technique as they had been utilized by the French since 1938. This program, despite operational problems, has been considered successful in the areas in which it has been implemented.

Regulations have been passed governing the manufacture, production, transportation, and use of critical items such as arms, ammunition, medicines, etc.

These regulations provide for documentation of individuals, manifests for goods, check points, and searches. The enforcement of these regulations has been only partially successful.

DISCUSSION

Perhaps the most salient feature of the South Vietnamese insurgency is the devastating effect that a well organized and determined contiguous country can have on an insurgency situation. The ability of the North Vietnamese Government to organize and effectively control the Viet Cong political apparatus and to infiltrate resources into the country in 1965 exceeded the capability of the South Vietnamese Government to effectively react.

The massive introduction of resources on behalf of South Vietnam by the United States Government has illustrated that the counterinsurgency and internal security effort can be influenced in favor of the South Vietnamese Government and has brought the supporters of the two original protagonists into direct confrontation.

The adverse influence upon a counterinsurgency effort which results when the insurgents deny the internal security forces access to large areas of the country involved is illustrated in South Vietnam. Winning the public confidence and hearts and minds of a group of people actually being governed by an insurgent government poses a problem.

In this instance the ethnic cleavages of the population have adversely affected counterinsurgency and internal security efforts. The ethnic similarity of the majority of the people inhabiting Vietnam has also created difficulties. It permits infiltration of former South Vietnamese residents and North Vietnamese into South Vietnam. It poses an identification problem for the internal security forces.

The manner in which a primitive population of a country can assume a substantial amount of importance in the counterinsurgency and internal security effort is illustrated by the indigenous tribesmen collectively called montagnards. The effective utilization of these people in maintaining internal security in the large section of the country which they inhabit has been adversely influenced by the cleavages that exist between the montagnards and the ethnic Vietnamese. Propaganda efforts from the North Vietnamese urging the montagnards to demand an autonomous state has made the counterinsurgency effort in this area more difficult.

CHAPTER EIGHT

DISCUSSION

APPROACH

The treatment of internal security and counterinsurgency in the specific countries concerned was intended to be selective and representative of the problem categories generally utilized as a framework for discussing the specific insurgencies. This approach has provided information about the problems, objectives, functions, and techniques of operation of the civilian police, paramilitary, and military forces which can be analyzed, evaluated, contrasted, and compared.

HISTORICAL AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS

The importance of historical and situational factors is apparent. Every insurgency occurs within a unique historical and situational context which must be part of the knowledge of one seeking answers to the problems of establishing, reestablishing, or maintaining internal security under conditions characterized by insurgency.

INTERNAL SECURITY

For the purpose of this study a broad definition of internal security has been used. In this context then, internal security is the maintenance of public confidence, safety, law, and order.

Internal security is not an all-or-nothing concept. It exists in varying degrees of effectiveness and may exist in some sections of a country during an insurgency and be absent in other sections.

The internal security forces include civilian police and paramilitary and military forces. This inclusive category appears in the light of the information available to be reasonable, as the involvement of these three forces in counterinsurgency efforts is complex and overlapping.

INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES PROBLEMS

From a review of the countries involved it appears that the designation of the central problem has a substantial influence upon the operations of the internal security forces. A failure to realize the magnitude of the threat such as occurred in Cuba, South Vietnam, and Algeria gives the insurgents a time advantage that is difficult to overcome.

Designation of the problem as one of maintaining law and order has certain advantages in that it makes the rules of the game known to the population, provides for effective use of government agencies, and does not unreasonably limit the individual rights of citizens. However, it does not take into account the political character of the conflict.

Expanding the Internal Security Forces

A substantial expansion of the internal security forces was necessary in Algeria, the Philippines, Malaya, and South Vietnam. At the same time that expansion took place there was an effort to readjust the posture and increase the ability of the internal security forces to function effectively. The changes that have taken place in the reorganization of the National Police of South Vietnam is an example of the tailoring of an organization so that the functions are designed to solve pressing problems. It has previously been noted that the insurgents in several instances, for example, the Philippines, Malaya, and South Vietnam, appeared to have gained a time advantage over the internal security forces. This time advantage was overcome in Malaya, Algeria, and South Vietnam by bringing in internal security forces from outside the country. In Malaya, internal security forces, mainly military and civilian police forces, were brought in from the British Commonwealth. In Algeria, the augmentation of military units from France and some French NATO units deployed in Germany were used. Police reinforcements came from metropolitan France and also from some of the French possessions, primarily Indochina. In South Vietnam the augmentation in military units was furnished primarily by the United States.

Maintaining Public Confidence

In Cuba, the maintenance of public confidence appears not to have been a primary objective of the Government. In Algeria, the recognition of the importance of public confidence was late in coming and the evaluation of the effectiveness of the Specialized Administrative Sections (SAS) in view of the situation is difficult. The maintenance of public confidence was accorded importance in the counterinsurgency efforts in Malaya and South Vietnam. It was, however, in the Philippines that the importance of the maintenance of public confidence was demonstrated. The opinion has been expressed that the counterinsurgency effort succeeded only because Ramón Magsaysay reestablished confidence in the Government.

Population Cleavages

Population cleavages of some kind figured importantly in every one of the counterinsurgency efforts discussed. Ethnic cleavages were important in

Malaya, South Vietnam, and Algeria. They were not in the Philippines, Cuba, and Venezuela. Religious cleavages characterized the insurgencies in Algeria and South Vietnam. They were not of major importance in the Philippines, Malaya, Cuba, and Venezuela. The population in Algeria appears to have been deeply divided in more ways than in any of the other countries. There were serious ethnic, religious, class, and political differences between the European and Moslem populations.

Recruitment

The recruitment difficulties appear to have been of two kinds. The first was getting recruits and the second was getting the right kind of recruits. South Vietnam exemplifies the difficulty in getting recruits and the Venezuelan civilian police forces the problem of getting the right kind of recruits. Ethnic and religious cleavages in the population seem to affect recruiting more than any of the other types of cleavages such as political or social class. The problem of recruiting ethnic Chinese into the internal security forces of Malaya was never solved.

Collection of Intelligence Information

This vital function in the counterinsurgency effort appears to have been more effectively handled by civilian police forces than by military forces, especially the gathering of information about both underground and guerrilla insurgents. The British recognized this fact in Malaya. The network of informers maintained by civilian police and their familiarity with the area seems to have made the difference. The French in Algeria were quite frustrated by their inability to obtain intelligence information from the Moslem public. One common thread running through all the counterinsurgency efforts is the brutal treatment of prisoners in an attempt to gain intelligence information. Of course, the degree and frequency vary. In Venezuela it is forbidden but occasionally practiced. In Malaya the officials in responsible positions recognized the futility of brutal interrogation, but nevertheless were not able to fully control the harsh methods of some police officers who had served in Palestine. In Algeria and Cuba harsh interrogation methods were standard practice.

Insurgent Terrorism

One of the interesting functions of terrorism is its role in the insurgents' control of the population. Selective terrorism may be the only effective long-range means that the insurgents have of controlling segments of the population. Terrorism was used by the insurgents in all the insurgencies reviewed.

Guerrilla Operations

This means was present in every insurgency. With terrorism it forms the pincers movement of insurgency. Reverses in guerrilla operations were frequently followed by an increase in terrorism. Effective internal security cannot be established in areas where guerrilla operations or uncontrolled terrorism prevails.

Border and Coastal Access

In the Philippines and Malaya the borders and coastal access were effectively controlled. In these two insurgencies the government forces were victorious. In Algeria and Cuba the aid received by the insurgents from outside the country was substantial; in both instances the insurgents were victorious. In Venezuela and South Vietnam insurgent aid was received from outside the country. Both insurgencies were still in progress as of February 1966.

Civil Disturbances

Civil disturbances have been a feature of all the insurgencies reviewed and have occurred in all of the phases of insurgency. Again, population cleavages appear to be a factor in most instances. In Malaya the rioting occurred between Malays and Chinese, in Algeria between Moslem and Europeans. Another distinct type of rioting is evident in Cuba and Venezuela and this is anti-Government rioting. In South Vietnam anti-Government rioting with religious overtones was common.

In all the insurgencies reviewed the subversive insurgents recognized the civil disturbance as represented by riots and demonstrations as a weapon of great potential. Efforts of insurgents to manipulate crowds and civil disturbances were a feature of each of the insurgencies. The manipulation of crowds and civil disturbances was least manifest in the Philippine insurgency.

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The problem of advising developing nations regarding the maintenance of internal security in situations characterized by insurgency has confronted the United States Government in the past. It appears that this problem will continue in the foreseeable future. One method of obtaining knowledge concerning the difficulties involved in these situations is to review insurgencies that have occurred in the past or are ongoing. The activities of the internal security forces (police, paramilitary, and military) of six countries are selectively described, discussed, and compared. The countries are: Malaya (1948-1960); The Philippines (1946-1954); Cuba (1953-1959); Venezuela (1960-1965); Algeria (1954-1962); and South Vietnam (1954-1965). The following problem areas are discussed: (1) the designation of the central problem; (2) expanding the internal security forces; (3) maintaining public confidence; (4) population cleavages; (5) internal security forces recruitment; (6) collection of intelligence information; (7) insurgent terrorism; (8) guerrilla operations; (9) border and coastal access; (10) internal security forces organization; (11) internal security forces objectives and functions; (12) internal security forces methods and techniques of operation; and (13) population and resources control.

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